Williams v. Pfeiffer

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 3, 2022
• Docket: 3:20-cv-04776
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BARTON WILLIAMS, Case No. 20-cv-04776-WHA

8 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 9 v. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

10 CHRISTEN PFEIFFER, Respondent. 11

12 INTRODUCTION 13 This is a federal habeas corpus action filed by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 14 2245. Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should not be granted based on 15 petitioner’s claims of instructional error, ineffective assistance of counsel, and cumulative error. 16 Respondent has filed an answer and supporting documents denying petitioner’s claims. Petitioner 17 did not file a traverse. For the reasons stated below, the petition is DENIED. 18 STATEMENT 19 A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 20 Late in the evening of April 16, 2012, petitioner asked a passerby in a parking lot in San 21 Jose, California, to call 911 because his wife was on fire. The passerby alerted the parking lot 22 attendant, who called 911 and doused the flames with water. An ambulance took petitioner’s wife 23 to the hospital where she died the next afternoon of severe burns and inhalation. Petitioner told 24 two police officers that he had left his wife in the parking lot briefly while he went to buy a soda. 25 They had both been drinking alcohol, and he told the police that when he left, his wife had a lit 26 cigarette and when he came back, she was on fire. He said that his wife had fallen asleep and her 27 cigarette caused the fire. Surveillance video footage from the parking lot contradicted this 1 several small flashes of light started in petitioner’s lap and moved to his wife’s lap. Smoke then 2 appeared, and shortly thereafter, his wife was engulfed in flames. Nearly three minutes later, 3 petitioner used a blanket to smother the flames. An arson investigator concluded that the fire 4 started in petitioner’s wife’s lap and that it burned too quickly to have been started by a dropped 5 cigarette. A clinical neuropsychologist who examined petitioner concluded that he had slow brain 6 processing speeds, poor planning, attentional deficits, and over 20 years of alcoholism. She 7 opined that a person with these conditions might approach a fire in a haphazard way despite 8 having good intentions. 9 B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 10 In December 2014, a jury in Santa Clara County Superior Court found petitioner guilty of 11 first-degree murder. On remand, the trial court ultimately sentenced him to a term of 25 years to 12 life in state prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The California 13 Supreme Court denied a petition for review in an earlier stage of the direct appeal process. 14 ANALYSIS 15 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 16 Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a 17 federal court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody 18 pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of 19 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(a). The petition may not 20 be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s 21 adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 22 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 23 of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 24 of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 25 “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 26 arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a 27 question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of 1 “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 2 court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably 3 applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court 4 may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 5 relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 6 Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making 7 the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly 8 established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 9 When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to consider the petitioner’s 10 claims, the federal habeas court looks to the last reasoned opinion from the state courts. See 11 Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). When the state court has rejected a claim on the 12 merits without explanation, this court “must determine what arguments or theories supported 13 or . . . could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 14 fair-minded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 15 holding in a prior decision of [the U.S. Supreme] Court.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 16 (2011). 17 B. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 18 Petitioner claims that the jury instructions on felony murder violated his right to due 19 process, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the cumulative effect of these 20 errors violated his right to due process. He made these claims in his direct appeal to the California 21 Supreme Court. 22 1. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 23 Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated because the instructions on 24 felony murder misstated California law by failing to specify that there had to be purpose for the 25 felony that was independent of the murder. As explained by the California Court of Appeal, 26 California law penalizes murders committed during the course of a felony --- such as arson --- in 27 two ways: (1) felony murder is a type of first-degree murder under California Penal Code § 189; 1 Code § 190.2(a)(17)(H) is that the murder occurred in the course of a felony (ECF No. 13.20 at 2 219-20). The Court of Appeal further explained that one of the elements of felony murder as a 3 special circumstance under Section 190.2(a)(17)(H) is that the defendant committed the felony 4 with a purpose that was independent of the murder, i.e. the felony had an “independent felonious 5 purpose” (id. at 221-22). There is no such “independent felonious purpose” element for felony 6 murder under Section 189, however (ibid.). Petitioner was convicted of felony murder under 7 Section 189, not of the special circumstance of felony murder under Section 190.2(a)(17)(H). 8 Therefore, the “independent felonious intent” is not an element of petitioner’s offense under 9 California law (ibid.). 10 A state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the 11 challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 12 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). Even a determination of state law made by an intermediate appellate court 13 must be followed and may not be “’disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other 14 persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.’” Hicks v. Feiock, 485 15 U.S. 624, 630 n.3 (1988). Petitioner’s claim rests on his interpretation of state law that differs 16 from the conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that California law does not impose an 17 “independent felonious intent” element on the felony murder offense of which petitioner was 18 convicted. There is no data that the California Supreme Court would decide otherwise, or 19 indication that the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion was an “obvious subterfuge” of federal 20 law, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 n.11 (1975). Therefore, the California Court of 21 Appeal’s determination is binding on this federal court in conducting habeas review. Because an 22 “independent felonious intent” is not an element of petitioner’s offense, the felony murder 23 instructions did not misstate state law, nor violate due process, by failing to include such an 24 element. Accordingly, petitioner’s claim for federal habeas relief fails. 25 2. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 26 Petitioner claims that his trial lawyer was ineffective by not objecting to the felony-murder 27 instructions on the grounds set forth in his first claim, and by failing to object to the prosecutor’s 1 Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), the claim of ineffective 2 assistance of counsel must be evaluated using two-prongs. Under the first prong, “the defendant 3 must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 4 688. When assessing performance of defense counsel under this first prong, the reviewing court 5 must be “highly deferential” and must not second-guess defense counsel’s trial strategy. 6 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, the relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have 7 done but rather whether the choices made by defense counsel were reasonable. See Babbit v. 8 Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). Under the second prong of the Strickland test, 9 petitioner bears the highly demanding” and “heavy burden” of establishing actual prejudice. 10 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 394 (2000). A reasonable probability is defined under 11 Strickland as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. If the 12 absence of prejudice is clear, a court should dispose of the ineffectiveness claim without inquiring 13 into the performance prong. Id. at 692. Petitioner has the burden of “showing” both that 14 counsel’s performance was deficient, Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F2d 741, 743 (9th Cir. 1990), and 15 prejudicial, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 16 For the reasons discussed above, the California Court of Appeal’s determination that the 17 felony-murder instruction was correct under state law is binding on federal habeas review. As the 18 instruction is deemed to have correctly stated the law, defense counsel’s failure to object to it was 19 neither deficient nor prejudicial. 20 Defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument was not 21 prejudicial. The California Court of Appeal found that prosecutor misstated state law when he 22 argued that the jury had to determine whether the evidence showed that petitioner had the capacity 23 to form the intent to kill (ECF No. 17 at 1718-19). The Court of Appeal explained that because 24 California had abolished the diminished capacity defense, the issue was not whether petitioner was 25 able to form the intent to kill; it simply had to determine whether he did form such intent (ECF 26 No. 13.20 at 225). The Court of Appeal found no prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to the 27 prosecutor’s misstatement, however, based on the following reasoning: counsel's failure to object to that misstatement of law. The remarks 1 at issue were brief. Elsewhere in his closing argument, the prosecutor spent considerable time explaining how, in his view, the 2 evidence established the requisite intent for first degree murder. And the jury was given a series of instructions that correctly explained 3 the law, including CALCRIM No. 200 (“You must follow the law as I explain it to you . . . . If you believe that the attorneys' comments 4 on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions”); CALCRIM No. 521 (“The defendant is guilty of first 5 degree murder if the People have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation”); CALCRIM No. 1501 (“To 6 prove that defendant is guilty of Arson, the People must prove that . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [the defendant] acted willfully and maliciously”); and 7 CALCRIM No. 3428 [“You may consider . . . evidence [that the defendant may have suffered from a mental defect] only for the 8 limited purpose of deciding whether, at the time of the charged crime, the defendant acted with the intent or mental state required 9 for that crime. [¶] The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the required intent or 10 mental state . . .”). “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume the jury understood and followed the court's instructions.” 11 (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 635 (Williams).) Under these circumstances, the prosecutor's misstatement was not 12 prejudicial and thus cannot form the foundation for an ineffective assistance claim. 13 (Id. at 225-26). 14 The Court of Appeal’s prejudice analysis is a reasonable application of federal law. 15 “Arguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the 16 court.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 (1990). There is no dispute that the instructions in 17 this case correctly stated the law regarding mental capacity and intent. Under Boyde, such 18 instructions carried more weight than the prosecutor’s incorrect statement, and the jury 19 presumptively followed the other instruction that it must resolve any conflict between the 20 instructions and closing arguments in favor of the instructions. In addition to the instructions, the 21 remark by the prosecutor was brief and came in the context of his argument that petitioner did not 22 in fact form the intent to kill, which was the correct issue before the jury. Lastly, this was not a 23 close case on the issue of petitioner’s intent. The video showed him initiate the fire in his wife’s 24 lap and then watch her burn for three minutes before beginning to try to put it out. The defense 25 expert indicated that petitioner’s mental conditions could make any attempt by him to put out the 26 fire “haphazard,” but for three minutes he did not show a “haphazard” effort; he showed no effort. 27 His eventual attempt to put it out and hail a passerby indicated a change of heart, at best, or an ] attempt to cover his tracks. The video also established that he lied to the police when he blamed 2 || his wife for lighting herself on fire, which reasonably indicated a consciousness of his own guilt. 3 In the context of such evidence that petitioner intended to kill, as well as the instructions’ correct 4 || statement of the law, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have reached a different 5 || verdict if defense counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s brief misstatement of the law. 6 || Accordingly, the state courts’ conclusion that petitioner had not shown prejudice from counsel’s 7 || failure to object to the prosecutor’s closing argument was a reasonable application of federal law, 8 and petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 9 3. CUMULATIVE ERROR 10 Petitioner claims that the cumulative prejudicial effect of the errors in his first two claims 11 rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. The cumulative effect of trial 12 || errors may result in a deprivation of due process. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 E 13 (1973). “There can be no cumulative error when a defendant fails to identify more than one 14 || error.” United States v. Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2012). The instruction cited in his 3 15 first claim did not cause any prejudice because it did not have any error, and, as explained above, 16 || defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument was not sufficiently prejudicial to i 17 || cause constitutional error. Accordingly, this claim for habeas relief fails. 18 CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 20 A certificate of appealability will not issue because reasonable jurists would not “find the 21 district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 22 || 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). If petitioner wishes to appeal this decision, he must file a notice of 23 appeal in this court, and also request a certificate of appealability from the United States Court of 24 || Appeals. The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 || Dated: January 3, 2022. Pee 27 { A ~ WILLIAM ALSUP 28 United States District Judge