Williams v. New York City Transit Authority

145 F. App'x 712
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedOctober 20, 2005
DocketNo. 05-1484-CV
StatusPublished

This text of 145 F. App'x 712 (Williams v. New York City Transit Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. New York City Transit Authority, 145 F. App'x 712 (2d Cir. 2005).

Opinion

Corrected SUMMARY ORDER

Pro se plaintiff James Williams appeals from an award of summary judgment in favor of defendant New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”) on Williams’s claim of discriminatory discharge based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.1 We review de novo an award of summary judgment, and we will affirm only if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Williams, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact and NYCTA’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir.2005); June v. Town of Westfield, 370 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.2004). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.

On an independent review of the record, we conclude, substantially for the reasons stated by the district court, that the plaintiff has failed to adduce admissible evidence sufficient to establish a genuine dispute of fact as to whether defendant’s stated non-discriminatory reason for Williams’s termination was a pretext for race discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (“ ‘[T]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’ ” (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)); see also Collins v. New York City Trans. Auth., 305 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.2002).

We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion either in denying Williams’s request to have counsel appointed, see Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172-74 (2d Cir.1989),2 or in issuing various discovery orders, see B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 523-24 (2d Cir.1996). Having already conducted substantial discovery in an ultimately unsuccessful effort to secure evidence in support of his Title VII claim, Williams is not now entitled to further discovery in the hope that something supportive of his claim will turn up. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2000).

The district court’s award of summary judgment in favor of defendant, entered on February 1, 2004, is hereby AFFIRMED.

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Related

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine
450 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Bennie Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc.
877 F.2d 170 (Second Circuit, 1989)
Goodrich v. Betkoski
99 F.3d 505 (First Circuit, 1996)
Shelley Weinstock v. Columbia University
224 F.3d 33 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Allianz Insurance Company v. Regina Lerner
416 F.3d 109 (Second Circuit, 2005)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (Supreme Court, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
145 F. App'x 712, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-new-york-city-transit-authority-ca2-2005.