Williams v. New York City Housing Authority

Second Circuit

Williams v. New York City Housing Authority

361 F. App'x 220

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJanuary 19, 2010

Docket08-3689-cv

StatusUnpublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 361 F. App'x 220 (Williams v. New York City Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, 361 F. App'x 220 (2d Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Gina Williams, pro se, appeals from a June 30, 2008 judgment of the District Court, which granted the motion for summary judgment of defendant-appellee New York City Housing Authority and dismissed her claims of employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the District Court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because there was a question of material fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). Courts evaluate Title VII claims using the burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that he or she suffered an adverse employment action. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 115 (2d Cir.2007). Summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to make this showing. See McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.1997).

We have considered all of Williams’s contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. Substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its Memorandum and Order dated June 29, 2008, 2008 WL 2695139, we conclude that Williams failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action or that she worked in an objectively hostile work environment. Accordingly, the June 30, 2008 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

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SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Gina Williams, pro se, appeals from a June 30, 2008 judgment of the District Court, which granted the motion for summary judgment of defendant-appellee New York City Housing Authority and dismissed her claims of employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the District Court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment because there was a question of material fact as to whether she suffered an adverse employment action. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.

We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Paneccasio v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir.2008). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). Courts evaluate Title VII claims using the burden-shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must establish, inter alia, that he or she suffered an adverse employment action. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 115 (2d Cir.2007). Summary judgment is appropriate if a plaintiff fails to make this showing. See McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.1997).

We have considered all of Williams’s contentions on this appeal and have found them to be without merit. Substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court in its Memorandum and Order dated June 29, 2008, 2008 WL 2695139, we conclude that Williams failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action or that she worked in an objectively hostile work environment. Accordingly, the June 30, 2008 judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

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361 F. App'x 220, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-new-york-city-housing-authority-ca2-2010.

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