Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Carrollton

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Carrollton

394 S.E.2d 389, 195 Ga. App. 590, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 629

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMay 11, 1990

DocketA90A0252

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 394 S.E.2d 389 (Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Carrollton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Carrollton, 394 S.E.2d 389, 195 Ga. App. 590, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).

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Opinion

Carley, Chief Judge.

Pursuant to the provisions of OCGA § 22-2-100 et seq., appelleecondemnor instituted proceedings to condemn appellant-condemnees’ property. Appellants were dissatisfied with the amount that was ulti *591 mately awarded by the special master and they appealed to the superior court. The issue of just and adequate compensation was tried before a jury and appellants appeal from the judgment that was entered by the superior court on the jury’s verdict.

Decided May 11, 1990. Jack F. Witcher, John E. Gilchrist, Johnson, Beckham & Price, William P. Johnson, for appellants. Wiggins & Camp, William J. Wiggins, for appellee.

1. The jury’s verdict was within the range of the evidence that was adduced as to the fair market value of the property. Accordingly, appellants’ enumeration of the general grounds is without merit. Southern v. Cobb County, 78 Ga. App. 58 (2) (50 SE2d 226) (1948).

2. Appellants enumerate as error several instances wherein their witnesses were not allowed to testify as to a separate value for the “chewacla” soil located on the property.

The fact that “chewacla” soil was present was a relevant factor to be considered in determining the overall value of the property. See generally State Hwy. Bd. of Ga. v. Shierling, 51 Ga. App. 935 (1, 2) (181 SE 885) (1935). However, the separate value of the “chewacla” soil would certainly not be a relevant inquiry. “[L]and containing [valuable] deposits . . . may be of greater market value than land without [such] deposits, but. . . the land and the deposits constitute one subject matter and there cannot be a recovery for the land as such, and also for the . . . deposits.” Southern R. Co. v. Miller, 94 Ga. App. 701, 704 (1) (96 SE2d 297) (1956). “The existence of [chewacla soil] on the land taken was certainly a factor to be considered in determining its value, but the loss of [such soil] was not a separate element of damages which [appellants] were entitled to recover in addition to recovering the fair market value of the land as enhanced by [chewacla soil]. [Cit.]” Department of Transp. v. Willis, 165 Ga. App. 271, 272 (2) (299 SE2d 82) (1983). Thus, the only relevant inquiry was the overall value of the property, with the fact that the property contained “chewacla” soil being taken into account. The trial court did not err in excluding irrelevant testimony as to the separate value of the “chewacla” soil located on the property.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.

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Carley, Chief Judge.

Pursuant to the provisions of OCGA § 22-2-100 et seq., appelleecondemnor instituted proceedings to condemn appellant-condemnees’ property. Appellants were dissatisfied with the amount that was ulti *591 mately awarded by the special master and they appealed to the superior court. The issue of just and adequate compensation was tried before a jury and appellants appeal from the judgment that was entered by the superior court on the jury’s verdict.

Decided May 11, 1990. Jack F. Witcher, John E. Gilchrist, Johnson, Beckham & Price, William P. Johnson, for appellants. Wiggins & Camp, William J. Wiggins, for appellee.

1. The jury’s verdict was within the range of the evidence that was adduced as to the fair market value of the property. Accordingly, appellants’ enumeration of the general grounds is without merit. Southern v. Cobb County, 78 Ga. App. 58 (2) (50 SE2d 226) (1948).

2. Appellants enumerate as error several instances wherein their witnesses were not allowed to testify as to a separate value for the “chewacla” soil located on the property.

The fact that “chewacla” soil was present was a relevant factor to be considered in determining the overall value of the property. See generally State Hwy. Bd. of Ga. v. Shierling, 51 Ga. App. 935 (1, 2) (181 SE 885) (1935). However, the separate value of the “chewacla” soil would certainly not be a relevant inquiry. “[L]and containing [valuable] deposits . . . may be of greater market value than land without [such] deposits, but. . . the land and the deposits constitute one subject matter and there cannot be a recovery for the land as such, and also for the . . . deposits.” Southern R. Co. v. Miller, 94 Ga. App. 701, 704 (1) (96 SE2d 297) (1956). “The existence of [chewacla soil] on the land taken was certainly a factor to be considered in determining its value, but the loss of [such soil] was not a separate element of damages which [appellants] were entitled to recover in addition to recovering the fair market value of the land as enhanced by [chewacla soil]. [Cit.]” Department of Transp. v. Willis, 165 Ga. App. 271, 272 (2) (299 SE2d 82) (1983). Thus, the only relevant inquiry was the overall value of the property, with the fact that the property contained “chewacla” soil being taken into account. The trial court did not err in excluding irrelevant testimony as to the separate value of the “chewacla” soil located on the property.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.

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394 S.E.2d 389, 195 Ga. App. 590, 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 629, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-mayor-city-council-of-carrollton-gactapp-1990.

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