Williams v. Lorman

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: May 29, 2025
• Docket: 24-1866-cv
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-1866-cv Williams v. Lorman

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of May, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DENNIS JACOBS, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ SEAN L. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 24-1866-cv

JOSEPH LORMAN, MAGISTRATE, VICTORIA THOPE, CASE MANAGER, WENDY DICKIE, COURT OPERATION MANAGER, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT,

Defendants-Appellees. ------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Sean L. Williams, pro se, New York, NY

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

of Vermont (William K. Sessions III, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the District Court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Sean L. Williams, representing himself, appeals from a judgment

of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Sessions, J.)

dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(m) for failure to properly serve any defendant. We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings,

to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

“We review dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for abuse of discretion.”

Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2012). We affirm because Williams has

abandoned any argument on appeal by failing to address the District Court’s

basis for dismissal in his brief. Although we “liberally construe pleadings and

briefs submitted by pro se litigants,” Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54 F.4th 108, 111 (2d

Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted), “even a litigant representing himself is

2 obliged to set out identifiable arguments in his principal brief,” Terry v. Inc. Vill.

Of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631, 632–33 (2d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).

Williams’s two-page appellate brief fails to advance any identifiable argument

explaining how the District Court erred in dismissing his claims under Rule

4(m). “[W]e need not manufacture claims of error for an appellant proceeding

pro se,” LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995), and we decline

to do so here.

We have considered Williams’s remaining arguments and conclude that

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s judgment

of conviction is AFFIRMED. 1

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

1 The District Court is directed to review Williams’s submissions for sensitive information. Social Security numbers, birth dates, and the names of minors may not be contained in public filings unless the court so orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a); Dieujuste v. Sin, 125 F.4th 397, 400 n.2 (2d Cir. 2025). 3