Williams v. Lee

493 S.W.2d 122, 254 Ark. 305, 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1512
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedApril 23, 1973
Docket5-6200
StatusPublished

This text of 493 S.W.2d 122 (Williams v. Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Lee, 493 S.W.2d 122, 254 Ark. 305, 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1512 (Ark. 1973).

Opinions

J. Fred Jones, Justice.

Carl W. Lee filed suit in chancery court against Harold Bryan and his wife and J. T. Williams and his son, Floyd, for $6000 in real estate brokerage commission. The case was transferred to circuit court where a jury was waived and a trial before the court resulted in judgments against Bryan for $3,000 and against J. T. Williams for $3,000. Only Williams has appealed.

Lee is a licensed real estate broker engaged in the real estate and insurance business in Benton County, Arkansas. The appellant Williams owned real estate in Seadrift, Texas, and advertised it for sale or trade in a Benton County newspaper. Mr. Lee saw the advertisement, got in touch with Mr. Williams by phone and Williams came to Benton County to look at property Lee had listed for sale. Lee took Williams to see some land belonging to a Mr. J. T. Smith in southern Missouri, and took him to see a farm in Benton County belonging to Harold Bryan and his wife. Williams was not interested in trading for the Smith property in Missouri but did become interested in trading for the Bryan farm. Bryan went with Williams to Texas and inspected Williams’ Seadrift property. Mr. and Mrs. Bryan then went with Williams to Williams’ attorney in Fort Smith and had a sales agreement drawn and deeds prepared for the exchange of their properties. No cash was involved in the transaction. The agreement signed by Mr. and Mrs. Bryan and Mr. and Mrs. Williams was notarized in Fort Smith on May 27, 1971. The deed from Mr. and Mrs. Bryan was made to Teddy Floyd Williams, the son of appellant J. T. Williams, and notarized by Mr. Max Cooper, a practicing attorney and notary public in Rogers, Arkansas, on July 10, 1971.

When Mr. Lee learned that the deed from the Bryans to Williams had been filed for record, he filed his complaint alleging that the Bryans had listed their property with him for sale or trade; that he had caused Williams to become interested in the purchase of the property, and that as a result of Lee’s services Mr. and Mrs. Bryan executed their warranty deed to Teddy Floyd Williams conveying the property to him on July 10, Í971. He alleged that J. T. Williams was the real purchaser and the conveyance to Teddy Floyd Williams was executed with the willful and deliberate intention of deceiving and defrauding him out of his real estate commission. He alleged that prior to July 10, 1971, Harold Bryan and J. T. Williams agreed to pay him the sum of $3,000 each as a real estate commission. He alleged that as a result of the deceit, fraud and conspiracy practiced by the defendants, he was entitled to a judgment against them in the sum of $6,000. Mr. and Mrs. Bryan, as well as J. T. Williams, filed their answers denying the allegations in Lee’s complaint. On his appeal to this court Williams has designated the points he relies on for reversal as follows:

"The Court’s finding that Appellee was not a volunteer is against the weight and preponderance of the evidence and constitutes reversible error.
The Court’s finding that the acceptance of the services of a real estate broker, knowing he was a broker, entitles such broker to a real estate commission, is against the law and evidence and constitutes reversible error.
The Court’s reliance upon custom and usage in determining the question of fact as to the existence of an agreement for a real estate commission is against the law and the evidence and constitutes reversible error.
The Court committed prejudicial error in refusing to let Richard Hurd testify.”

We find it unnecessary to devote much time to the separate discussion of the points because as we interpret the trial court’s findings, .the judgment was based on a finding that Williams agreed to pay one-half of the real estate commission in the amount of $3,000, and if there is any substantial evidence to sustain this finding, we must affirm. Courtney v. G. A. Linaker Co., 173 Ark. 777, 293 S. W. 723. See also Vanemburg v. Duffey, 177 Ark. 663, 7 S. W. 2d 336.

Mr. Lee testified that the Bryans listed their property with him for sale or trade at a list price of $110,000. This was admitted by Bryan and was not denied by Williams. Lee said the listing was an “open listing” as most of his listings are, and that an “open listing” simply means a “verbal listing.” Much of the testimony in this case, however, was directed toward evidence of a “verbal listing” by Mr. Williams of his Texas property for sale or trade by Mr. Lee, and Mr. Lee’s right to dual commissions on the exchange of the properties between Williams and Bryan. Mr. Lee did not allege, or even suggest, such listing in his complaint. In the trial court’s findings he did comment on portions of the large body of law pertaining to real estate commissions under such circumstances, but the judgment against Williams was based on his separate agreement to pay $3,000 as one-half of Lee’s commission, all of which could have been charged to or collected from Bryan. We do not agree with Mr. Lee’s statement that an “open listing” simply means a “verbal listing.” See Miller v. Jones, 54 Tenn. App. 31, 387 S. W. 2d 627. What we said in Bennett v. Wisdom, 248 Ark. 702, 453 S. W. 2d 396, is applicable to the situation in the case at bar. In Bennett we said:

“The fact that Wisdom is a licensed realtor vests him with no benefits in this case outside the affirmative provisions of his contract with Bennett. Perhaps such contract should be within the statute of frauds but it is not. Dallas v. Mosely, 150 Ark. 210, 233 S. W. 1084; Blanton v. Jonesboro B & L Association, 176 Ark. 315, 3 S. W. 2d 964. So long as a realtor’s right to a commission may rest in oral contract, such contract may be proved by oral testimony; and so long as a contract may be proven by oral testimony, trial courts and juries must resolve conflicts in such testimony.”

We deem it unnecessary to set out the testimony in detail. We have carefully reviewed the entire record and there is no question that Lee had a verbal contract or listing to sell or trade the Bryan property. Both Lee and Williams admit and recognize such agency. There is no question that Lee showed the Bryan property to Williams and that Williams was immediately interested in trading.

As a matter of fact both Bryan and Williams seem to admit that Lee has earned a real estate commission on the transaction and the amount of it is not questioned. Williams contends that Bryan should pay it and Bryan contends that Williams should pay half. Lee and Bryan testified that Williams agreed to pay one-half of the commission but Williams denied he ever agreed to pay any of the commission. Mr. Lee said he first took Williams to look at the Smith property he had listed in Missouri and then showed Williams the Bryan farm. He said that after he showed Williams the Bryan farm they returned to the Bryan driveway and that Mr. Bryan was in the pickup truck with him and Williams. He then testified as follows:

“Q. Now, did you have a deal closed at that time? Did you have a firm agreement that there was going to be a sale between these people or trade?
A. We had an agreement, Mr. Williams agreed to trade right there in the pickup truck and then that was when we got down to the commission part and each one agreed to pay me three thousand dollars a piece.”

Mr.

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Related

Blanton v. Jonesboro Building & Loan Ass'n
3 S.W.2d 964 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1928)
Courtney v. G. A. Linaker Co.
293 S.W. 723 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1927)
Vanemburg v. Duffey
7 S.W.2d 336 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1928)
Dallas v. Moseley
233 S.W. 1084 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1921)
Bennett v. Wisdom
453 S.W.2d 396 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1970)
Miller v. Jones
387 S.W.2d 627 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1964)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
493 S.W.2d 122, 254 Ark. 305, 1973 Ark. LEXIS 1512, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-lee-ark-1973.