Williams v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Department

D. Nevada

Williams v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Department

DecidedSeptember 23, 2019

Docket2:18-cv-02432

StatusUnknown

This text of Williams v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Department (Williams v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Williams v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Department, (D. Nev. 2019).

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 JAMES WILLIAMS, Case No.: 2:18-cv-02432-APG-VCF

4 Plaintiff Order (1) Granting Motions to Dismiss, (2) Denying Motions to Amend and for 5 v. Equitable Relief

6 LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE [ECF Nos. 6, 12, 32, 33] DEPARTMENT, et al., 7 Defendants 8 Plaintiff James Williams brought this lawsuit in state court against the Las Vegas 9 Metropolitan Police Department, Sheriff Joseph Lombardo, Joshua Bromley, Jimmy Ruiz, Chris 10 Heim, Bonnie Polley, Theodore Schafer, Shane Stephens, David Rose, and Logan Jex 11 (collectively, the “LVMPD Defendants”), Joseph Negri, James Deane, Clark County District 12 Attorney Steven B. Wolfson, and Deputy District Attorney Frank Logrippo. He alleges civil 13 rights violations related to conditions of confinement that occurred while he was incarcerated at 14 the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) and two Nevada Department of Corrections 15 (NDOC) facilities. 16 The LVMPD defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss, arguing 17 Williams failed to prosecute his case by waiting four years before serving any defendants and by 18 delaying litigation with continuous motions to amend his complaint. ECF No. 6 at 9. They 19 contend they are prejudiced given how much time has passed since the alleged violations 20 occurred. Id. at 10. Finally, they argue Williams has failed to state a claim against any of the 21 LVMPD defendants. Id. at 12-15. 22 Negri joined that motion to dismiss and filed his own motion arguing, among other 23 things, that he should be dismissed from the case because none of the allegations in the operative 1 complaint is against him. See ECF Nos. 12 at 1-2, 5-6; 13. The LVMPD defendants joined 2 Negri’s motion, James Deane joined both motions, and DA Wolfson and Deputy DA Logrippo 3 joined the LVMPD defendants’ motion. ECF Nos. 14; 15; 18; 19. 4 Williams responded to the LVMPD defendants’ motion, arguing that the defendants’ 5 actions caused him to be unable to do any meaningful work on his case because they interfered

6 with his ability to access the courts. ECF No. 9 at 3-4. He did not respond to Negri’s motion, so 7 I grant Negri’s motion as unopposed. LR 7-2(d). 8 Williams also moves to amend his complaint and for equitable relief. ECF Nos. 32; 33. 9 The proposed amended complaint is nearly identical to a prior proposed amended complaint I 10 already denied. See ECF Nos. 21; 31. 11 I. ANALYSIS 12 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 13 that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 14 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may

15 dismiss an action with prejudice based on a party’s failure to prosecute, to obey a court order, or 16 to comply with local rules. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal 17 for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) 18 (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring amendment of complaint); Carey v. 19 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply with local rule 20 requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 21 1421, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with local 22 rules). 23 1 In determining whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of 2 Civil Procedure 41(b), I must consider: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 3 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 4 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the availability of less 5 drastic sanctions.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423.

6 Here, the first three factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Williams filed his complaint in 7 July 2014 but did not serve the defendants until December 2018. See ECF Nos. 1-1 at 2; 1-7 at 8 42; 1-8 at 1-33. While the state court allowed him to amend his complaint in February 2017, he 9 did not serve the defendants with the amended complaint for another 22 months. Id.; see also 10 ECF No. 1-3 at 34. And almost none of the named defendants appears in the allegations in the 11 amended complaint. See ECF No. 12-2. Further, a presumption of injury arises from 12 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th 13 Cir. 1976). Williams continues to delay this case by filing motions to amend his complaint, 14 including a recent version that is nearly identical to a prior proposed complaint that was already

15 denied in this case.1 16 17 18 1 Making repeated requests for the same relief is an abusive litigation tactic that taxes the 19 resources of both the court and the parties. Rule 11 provides that sanctions may be imposed on an unrepresented party who signs a paper that is either filed with the court for an improper 20 purpose or is frivolous. See Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 439 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 21 1990) (en banc)). In Nugget, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions because a party’s second motion to compel largely duplicated the first. Id. Williams 22 has already been warned that continued motion practice requesting relief that has already been denied or making frivolous, unsupported requests may result in the imposition of sanctions. See 23 Williams v. F.N.U. Clark et al., 2:14-cv-00414-APG-PAL, ECF No. 57. Yet he continues to bring duplicative motions in this action. Because I am dismissing the case, I will not impose monetary sanctions. 1 Williams argues the delay was due to the defendants’ actions. ECF No. 9 at 3-4. He asks 2 me to look at an inoperative amended complaint for evidence that the defendants interfered with 3 his access to the courts. Id. at 4. But even that document does not present evidence to refute that 4 he failed to prosecute his case. For example, between February 2017, when he was granted leave 5 to amend his complaint, and December 2018, when he finally served the defendants, Williams

6 was able to file two emergency motions and a change of address in another case. See Williams v. 7 F.N.U. Clark et al., 2:14-cv-00414-APG-PAL, ECF Nos. 99; 103; 104. He was also able to file 8 a new complaint in yet another case and actively participate in that case. See Williams v. Las 9 Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t et al., 2:16-cv-03020-APG-NJK, ECF Nos. 4; 5; 6; 7; 9. Finally, he 10 was not in CCDC or NDOC custody throughout the entire period. Williams cannot blame the 11 defendants for interfering with his ability to timely serve the defendants and prosecute his case. 12 The fourth factor (public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits) is greatly 13 outweighed by the factors in favor of dismissal. As to the fifth factor (the availability of less 14 drastic sanctions), there are no better alternatives.

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 JAMES WILLIAMS, Case No.: 2:18-cv-02432-APG-VCF

4 Plaintiff Order (1) Granting Motions to Dismiss, (2) Denying Motions to Amend and for 5 v. Equitable Relief

6 LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE [ECF Nos. 6, 12, 32, 33] DEPARTMENT, et al., 7 Defendants 8 Plaintiff James Williams brought this lawsuit in state court against the Las Vegas 9 Metropolitan Police Department, Sheriff Joseph Lombardo, Joshua Bromley, Jimmy Ruiz, Chris 10 Heim, Bonnie Polley, Theodore Schafer, Shane Stephens, David Rose, and Logan Jex 11 (collectively, the “LVMPD Defendants”), Joseph Negri, James Deane, Clark County District 12 Attorney Steven B. Wolfson, and Deputy District Attorney Frank Logrippo. He alleges civil 13 rights violations related to conditions of confinement that occurred while he was incarcerated at 14 the Clark County Detention Center (CCDC) and two Nevada Department of Corrections 15 (NDOC) facilities. 16 The LVMPD defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss, arguing 17 Williams failed to prosecute his case by waiting four years before serving any defendants and by 18 delaying litigation with continuous motions to amend his complaint. ECF No. 6 at 9. They 19 contend they are prejudiced given how much time has passed since the alleged violations 20 occurred. Id. at 10. Finally, they argue Williams has failed to state a claim against any of the 21 LVMPD defendants. Id. at 12-15. 22 Negri joined that motion to dismiss and filed his own motion arguing, among other 23 things, that he should be dismissed from the case because none of the allegations in the operative 1 complaint is against him. See ECF Nos. 12 at 1-2, 5-6; 13. The LVMPD defendants joined 2 Negri’s motion, James Deane joined both motions, and DA Wolfson and Deputy DA Logrippo 3 joined the LVMPD defendants’ motion. ECF Nos. 14; 15; 18; 19. 4 Williams responded to the LVMPD defendants’ motion, arguing that the defendants’ 5 actions caused him to be unable to do any meaningful work on his case because they interfered

6 with his ability to access the courts. ECF No. 9 at 3-4. He did not respond to Negri’s motion, so 7 I grant Negri’s motion as unopposed. LR 7-2(d). 8 Williams also moves to amend his complaint and for equitable relief. ECF Nos. 32; 33. 9 The proposed amended complaint is nearly identical to a prior proposed amended complaint I 10 already denied. See ECF Nos. 21; 31. 11 I. ANALYSIS 12 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and “[i]n the exercise of 13 that power they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate . . . dismissal” of a case. 14 Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may

15 dismiss an action with prejudice based on a party’s failure to prosecute, to obey a court order, or 16 to comply with local rules. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal 17 for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) 18 (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring amendment of complaint); Carey v. 19 King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply with local rule 20 requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 21 1421, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with local 22 rules). 23 1 In determining whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of 2 Civil Procedure 41(b), I must consider: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 3 litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; 4 (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits and (5) the availability of less 5 drastic sanctions.” Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423.

6 Here, the first three factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Williams filed his complaint in 7 July 2014 but did not serve the defendants until December 2018. See ECF Nos. 1-1 at 2; 1-7 at 8 42; 1-8 at 1-33. While the state court allowed him to amend his complaint in February 2017, he 9 did not serve the defendants with the amended complaint for another 22 months. Id.; see also 10 ECF No. 1-3 at 34. And almost none of the named defendants appears in the allegations in the 11 amended complaint. See ECF No. 12-2. Further, a presumption of injury arises from 12 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. See Anderson v. Air West, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th 13 Cir. 1976). Williams continues to delay this case by filing motions to amend his complaint, 14 including a recent version that is nearly identical to a prior proposed complaint that was already

15 denied in this case.1 16 17 18 1 Making repeated requests for the same relief is an abusive litigation tactic that taxes the 19 resources of both the court and the parties. Rule 11 provides that sanctions may be imposed on an unrepresented party who signs a paper that is either filed with the court for an improper 20 purpose or is frivolous. See Nugget Hydroelectric, L.P. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 981 F.2d 429, 439 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.3d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 21 1990) (en banc)). In Nugget, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions because a party’s second motion to compel largely duplicated the first. Id. Williams 22 has already been warned that continued motion practice requesting relief that has already been denied or making frivolous, unsupported requests may result in the imposition of sanctions. See 23 Williams v. F.N.U. Clark et al., 2:14-cv-00414-APG-PAL, ECF No. 57. Yet he continues to bring duplicative motions in this action. Because I am dismissing the case, I will not impose monetary sanctions. 1 Williams argues the delay was due to the defendants’ actions. ECF No. 9 at 3-4. He asks 2 me to look at an inoperative amended complaint for evidence that the defendants interfered with 3 his access to the courts. Id. at 4. But even that document does not present evidence to refute that 4 he failed to prosecute his case. For example, between February 2017, when he was granted leave 5 to amend his complaint, and December 2018, when he finally served the defendants, Williams

6 was able to file two emergency motions and a change of address in another case. See Williams v. 7 F.N.U. Clark et al., 2:14-cv-00414-APG-PAL, ECF Nos. 99; 103; 104. He was also able to file 8 a new complaint in yet another case and actively participate in that case. See Williams v. Las 9 Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t et al., 2:16-cv-03020-APG-NJK, ECF Nos. 4; 5; 6; 7; 9. Finally, he 10 was not in CCDC or NDOC custody throughout the entire period. Williams cannot blame the 11 defendants for interfering with his ability to timely serve the defendants and prosecute his case. 12 The fourth factor (public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits) is greatly 13 outweighed by the factors in favor of dismissal. As to the fifth factor (the availability of less 14 drastic sanctions), there are no better alternatives. Williams admits that he is not new to

15 litigation. See ECF No. 9 at 3. He was able to prosecute other actions, but apparently chose not 16 to pursue this one. Further, he has been warned to stop filing duplicative motions, yet he 17 continues to do so. Given all this, the appropriate sanction is dismissal. 18 II. CONCLUSION 19 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff James Williams’s motions for leave to file 20 an amended complaint and for equitable relief (ECF Nos. 32, 33) are DENIED. 21 / / / / 22 / / / / 23 / / / / 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 6, 12) GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The clerk of court is instructed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, and to close this case. 4 DATED this 23rd day of September, 2019. 5 fe 6 ANDREW P. GORDON 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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