Williams v. Lantz

242 N.W. 269, 123 Neb. 67, 1932 Neb. LEXIS 165
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedApril 8, 1932
DocketNo. 28049
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 242 N.W. 269 (Williams v. Lantz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Lantz, 242 N.W. 269, 123 Neb. 67, 1932 Neb. LEXIS 165 (Neb. 1932).

Opinion

Good, J.

Plaintiff sued to foreclose a tax lien on the north half of a private alleyway, 16 feet wide and 100 feet long. The alleyway in question runs west from the west line of Sixteenth street, in the city of Lincoln, and is midway between S and R streets. Defendant Gamma Phi Beta Building Association (hereinafter referred to as the sorority) has the record title to a tract of land, 100 feet long from east to west, abutting on Sixteenth street and extending from the center of the alley South- for a distance of 75 feet. Defendant Mattie C. Williams has the record title to a tract of land, 150 feet long, extending west from Sixteenth street. The east 75 feet lie adjacent to the north line of the alley; the next 25 feet west extend south to the center of the alley, and the west 50 feet of her tract extend south to the south line produced of the alley. Defendant Hetta R. McDowell owns the record title to a tract of land, 50 feet wide, extending from R street 142 feet north, and abutting upon the land owned by Mattie C. Williams. The east end of the McDowell tract abuts the west boundary of the sorority tract.

In 1886 the then owners of the tracts of land lying either side of the center line of this private alley entered into an agreement whereby an easement was created for a private walk and driveway, “to be kept clear of all obstructions, * * * this mutual grant to extend to the heirs and other legal representatives of the parties hereto until same shall be legally set apart by city council as a public alley.” It was further provided that the grant might at [69]*69any time be annulled by the parties owning the same or their legal representatives. The grant was never annulled by the parties, and the driveway was never set apart by the city council as a public alley.

Many parties were made defendants who Were alleged to claim some interest in or to some parts of the tract in question. The sorority and Hetta R. McDowell each filed answers and cross-petitions, the sorority claiming the fee title by prescription to the north half of the alley and asserting the right to redeem from the tax lien. The cross-petitioners made Mattie C. Williams a party defendant.

Hetta R. McDowell alleged that she had acquired and owned an easement over the alley in question by adverse use, and also that by user she had acquired and owned an easement across the land of Mattie C. Williams, extending from the north end of her land to the alley. Mattie C. Williams answered, denying that the sorority had ever acquired title by adverse possession to the north half of the private alley, and alleged that the sorority, in constructing its building, had encroached on the south side of the alley to the extent of four feet, and prayed for a mandatory injunction requiring the sorority to remove the part of its building which encroaches upon the alley. She further denied that McDowell had ever acquired a right of way by user over her land immediately west of the alley.

The trial court found that McDowell had acquired by user for the statutory period a right to use the 100-foot alley, but found that she had not acquired and did not have by user a right of way over the land of Mattie C. Williams to reach the alley, and further found that McDowell had obtained a right of way across a corner of the sorority land whereby she could reach the 100-foot alley. The court further found that the sorority had not acquired title by adverse possession to the north half of the alley, and that it had wrongfully encroached upon the south half of the alley with its building, to the extent of three feet, and ordered the removal of such obstruction [70]*70from the alley, unless the sorority would quitclaim to Mattie C. Williams a strip, three feet wide, off the north side of the alley; awarded to McDowell the right to use the center ten feet of the 100-foot alley, and denied to McDowell and the sorority the right to redeem from the tax lien. Incidentally, the decree awarded to Mattie C. Williams a right to redeem from the tax sale the west 25 feet of the north half of the alley, being that part of the alley to which she held record title. The court awarded plaintiff a first lien on the north half of the alley, subject, however, to the easement rights of McDowell, the sorority and Mattie C. Williams, and, subject to such easement, directed a sale of the premises to satisfy the lien. The sorority and McDowell have appealed.

The facts disclosed by the record show that the alleyway in dispute, since its creation in 1886, has been continuously used by the various parties to this litigation, or their grantors, and that at no time has the sorority had the exclusive possession of any part of the alleyway, save that part wherein its building encroaches on the south side of the alley to the extent of three feet, and this for a period of less than five years.

"Title by adverse possession is not established, unless the proof shows actual, exclusive and continuous possession under claim of ownership for the full statutory period of ten years.” Butler v. Smith, 84 Neb. 78. The evidence is insufficient to support the claim of the sorority to title to any part of the alley by adverse possession.

The sorority and McDowell both insist that each is entitled to redeem from the tax lien. Since the only right that either of these parties had to the north half of the alley was an easement for the purpose of a walk and driveway, and since the decree foreclosing the tax lien orders the property sold subject to these easements, neither the sorority nor McDowell is affected as to any right they may have in or to the north half of the alley. All the right thereto which either of them has is preserved and retained. No one has a right to redeem from [71]*71a tax lien on realty whose interest therein will not be affected by its foreclosure.

It appears beyond dispute that, in erecting its building, the sorority wrongfully encroached upon the south side of the alleyway to the extent of three feet by constructing ■an areaway and stairway in the alley, and that this was done over the objection and protest of Mattie C. Williams.

Where two or more parties enter into an agreement creating an easement for a driveway and walk upon the division line of their respective properties, and for a certain width of such driveway, neither party has a right to encroach thereon and deprive the other of the full width of the driveway created by the contract. In 19 C. J. 984, it is said: “If by the terms of the grant or reservation the way must be of a certain width, no structures can be erected which encroach upon the width stated.” See, also, Ballinger v. Kinney, 87 Neb. 342. The decree ordering the removal of the stairway and areaway of the sorority which extends into and encroaches upon the 16-foot alley is in accordance with sound principles of equity.

Complaint is made because the trial court would permit the encroachment by the sorority to remain on condition that it would relinquish to Mattie C. Williams its right to the easement in the north three feet of the alley. The court does not compel such action, but leaves it optional to the sorority to either remove the areaway and stairway that encroach or to relinquish its right to a corresponding width on the north side of the alley. This was a favor to the sorority and not prejudicial to it. It therefore has no just grounds to complain of this action.

McDowell complains because of the action of the trial court in not awarding to her an easement across the land of Mattie C.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Mueller v. Bohannon
589 N.W.2d 852 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1999)
Hillary Corp. v. United States Cold Storage, Inc.
550 N.W.2d 889 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1996)
Davco Realty Co. v. Picnic Foods, Inc.
252 N.W.2d 142 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1977)
Toelle v. Preuss
109 N.W.2d 293 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1961)
Mader v. Mettenbrink
65 N.W.2d 334 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1954)
Conkey v. Knudsen
284 N.W. 737 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1939)
Ellsworth Corp. v. Stratbucker
278 N.W. 381 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1938)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
242 N.W. 269, 123 Neb. 67, 1932 Neb. LEXIS 165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-lantz-neb-1932.