18-3050 Williams v. Korines
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term 2019
Argued: March 4, 2020 Decided: July 20, 2020
Docket No. 18-3050
DANIEL WILLIAMS, Plaintiff–Appellant,
V.
N. K ORINES, CORRECTIONAL SERGEANT, SHAWANGUNK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; J.T. SMITH, SUPERINTENDENT, SHAWANGUNK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; S. K OBER, O FFENDER REHABILITATION COORDINATOR, SHAWANGUNK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; L. PINGOTTI, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT FOR SECURITY, SHAWANGUNK CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; A. RODRIGUEZ, ACTING DIRECTOR OF DISCIPLINARY PROGRAM ; D. UHLER, SUPERINTENDENT , UPSTATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, ACTING COMMISSIONER; M. LIBERTY, COMMISSIONER’S HEARING OFFICER, Defendants–Appellees. *
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York No. 16-cv-1157 – Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., Judge.
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to amend the caption as set forth above. 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
Before: LEVAL, HALL, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Williams, a state prisoner, brought an action against various corrections officials alleging that (1) New York DOCCS Rule 105.13 banning gang insignia or materials is unconstitutionally vague as applied to his photographs depicting family and friends wearing blue and making hand signs and (2) his placement in a special housing unit for six months following a prison disciplinary hearing determination that he had violated Rule 105.13 by possessing those photographs violated his due process rights. The district court (Scullin, J.) granted summary judgment to the defendants on both issues. We agree that summary judgment was proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
KATHERINE ANNE BOY SKIPSEY † (Michael Martin, Ian Weinstein, on the brief), Fordham Law School, Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc., New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
BRIAN D. GINSBERG, Assistant Solicitor General (Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Victor Paladino, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, on the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney General for the State of New York, Albany, NY, for Defendants- Appellees.
† Katherine Anne Boy Skipsey, a law student, argued the case for Plaintiff-Appellant Williams under the supervision of an attorney of Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc. of Fordham Law School pursuant to Local Rule 46.1(e).
2 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
HALL, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Daniel Williams, who is presently incarcerated by the
State of New York, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants N. Korines, J.T. Smith, S. Kober, L. Pingotti, A. Rodriguez, D. Uhler,
Anthony J. Annucci, and M. Liberty—all state corrections officials at Shawangunk
Correctional Facility, Upstate Correctional Facility, or the New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”)—for
infringement of his due process and free speech rights under the United States
Constitution. The claims stem from prison disciplinary charges brought against
Williams for the possession of photographs depicting perceived signs of gang
affiliation. The charges resulted in Williams’s serving a six-month term in solitary
confinement and the confiscation of his photographs of family and friends wearing
blue and allegedly making gang-related hand signals.
Defendants moved for summary judgment and the United States District
Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.), acting on the
recommendation of the magistrate judge (Dancks, M.J.), granted the motion.
Williams timely appealed. The questions presented on appeal are (1) whether New
York DOCCS Rule 105.13, banning possession of gang insignia or material, is
3 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Williams’s photographs, and (2) whether
various actions of the hearing officers conducting his disciplinary hearings denied
him procedural due process.
BACKGROUND
Williams’s personal property was searched on September 11, 2014. 1 While
searching Williams’s possessions, Defendant Korines identified sixteen
photographs that he believed violated DOCCS Rule 105.13, which prohibits
inmates from possessing “gang insignia or materials,” because some of the
photographs depicted individuals wearing blue and making hand signs.
Defendant Korines issued Williams a misbehavior report for violating Rule 105.13.
In the report, Korines explained that Defendant Kober had also reviewed the
photographs. Kober “advised [Korines] that Williams, D. goes by the nickname
‘Cike Bike’ and has previously been identified as a Crip” and further advised that
the photographs appear to be “pictures related to a gang known as the Crips, in
violation of rule 105.13.” Misbehavior Report at 1.
Defendant Hearing Officer Pingotti conducted a disciplinary hearing on
Williams’s misbehavior report over multiple days in September 2014. During the
1 The general sequence of events is not seriously disputed; this description, except as indicated, reflects that sequence viewed in the light most favorable to Williams.
4 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
hearing, Williams’s sixteen original photographs, misbehavior report, contraband
receipt, and various clippings from magazines were made part of the
administrative record. Defendant Kober testified that he had received training in
gang identification. He explained that a hand forming a “C” is a Crip gang sign.
Kober identified individuals, some wearing the color blue, making the “C” sign in
eight of Williams’s photographs (photos 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 14, and 16).
Williams disputed that the individuals in the pictures were making gang
signs. Rather than forming a “C,” he argued that their hands were “just down,”
Hearing Tr., Sept. 18, 2014, at 30 (photo 1); “just up,” id. at 39 (photo 14); making a
“B,” id. (photo 2); giving the middle finger, id. at 32, 35 (photos 6 and 11); holding
a cup, id. at 34 (photo 9); or forming closed fists, id. at 40 (photo 16). Kober rejected
most of these suggestions but agreed that it was possible that in one of the
photographs the individual’s hand was unintentionally forming a “C” (photo 4).
Kober explained that he and Korines confiscated the other eight photographs
because they contained names or images that Kober believed were related to the
Crips, but he was not certain. Hearing Officer Pingotti found no issues with those
photographs, but confiscated one anyway, explaining: “You claim it is a birthday
cake[], birthday candles in this, which there is clearly not.” Id. at 37. Pingotti later
5 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
clarified that he confiscated this picture “to display that this inmate was less th[a]n
truthful at times during this hearing.” Superintendent Hearing Disposition at 2.
In support of his argument that the hands in his photographs were not
intentionally forming “C” signs and instead making natural gestures, Williams
presented images from magazines of celebrities making hand gestures that
arguably, and presumably unintentionally, resembled “C” signs. In addition,
Williams testified that he had had the confiscated photographs in his possession
for at least a decade, and they were reviewed by guards at numerous prisons, and
were never before determined to be gang related. See e.g., Hearing Tr., Sept. 18,
2014, at 46 (“They scrutinize everything I have and not a time did they ever state
that those pictures [were gang material].”). Williams sought witness testimony
from Sergeant Cochran and Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator McCarthy,
guards at other prisons who had searched his pictures and had not concluded that
they were gang material, but Pingotti declined to allow Williams to call witnesses
at the hearing.
Pingotti found Williams guilty of violating Rule 105.13 for possessing the
eight photographs that Kober identified as having “C” hand signs. On September
25, 2014, Pingotti imposed the following punishment: (1) six months in the Special
6 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
Housing Unit (SHU); (2) loss of packages, commissary, and telephone privileges
during that time; and (3) confiscation of the photographs deemed to be
contraband. Williams appealed the hearing disposition to the DOCCS
Commissioner.
Williams began serving six months in the SHU on September 25, 2014. On
December 5, 2014, on behalf of the Commissioner, Donald Venettozzi, Acting
Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Program for DOCCS at the
time, affirmed Pingotti’s disciplinary decision. Williams completed his six months
in the SHU on March 25, 2015.
Proceeding pro se, Williams filed an Article 78 proceeding in the New York
State Supreme Court, Appellate Division. The Appellate Division vacated and
remanded Pingotti’s disciplinary decision because Williams was not allowed to
call witnesses at the hearing. Williams v. Annucci, 137 A.D.3d 1355 (App. Div. 3d
Dep’t 2016).
Williams, at this point incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility, was
afforded a second hearing beginning on April 4, 2016. At the second hearing,
conducted by Defendant Hearing Officer Liberty, Williams again argued that the
“C” signs in his photographs were common gestures and presented magazine
7 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
clippings of celebrities unintentionally making similar gestures. This time the
administrative record included copies of the nine photographs deemed to be
contraband during the first hearing (renumbered photos 1–9) rather than the
original photographs. Williams requested to see his actual confiscated
photographs and complained that the copies were poor, but Liberty could not
locate the originals.
During the second hearing, Williams was allowed to identify and request
the testimony of witnesses from other prison facilities to be called at the hearing,
but he could not speak to them before the hearing and could only question them
through Liberty. Officer Heely, who had training in identifying gang related
material, testified: “The C hand symbol is usually for the [C]rips.” Hearing Tr.,
Apr. 8, 2016, at 38. He reviewed the nine copies of Williams’s photographs and
identified “C” hand signs in two photographs (photos 4 and 5). In three other
photographs, Heely identified miscellaneous hand gestures that he did not know
the meaning of but believed were gang related, including “the pinky controlled
and the 3 fingers out,” id. at 35 (photo 1), and “finger spelling,” id. at 36 (photo 2);
see also id. at 38 (photo 3). Officer Heely did not identify gang material in two of
the photographs of people (photos 7 and 8), but noted in one picture that “[he]
8 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
c[ould] see where that would be interpreted for a ‘C.’” Id. at 42–43. Heely also did
not identify gang material in the picture of the cake (photo 6). Whether Heely
identified a gang sign in the final photograph is unclear on the record before us:
the hearing transcript states “inaudible.” Id. at 43.
During his questioning of Heely, Williams again argued that the hands were
not intentionally making gang signs. He claimed the individuals were gesturing
for a phone (photo 1), just open (photo 3), or giving the middle finger (photo 4).
And again, he provided pictures from magazines where individuals’ hands were
in positions that resemble a “C” sign. Heely believed that one of the magazine
clippings appeared to be a gang sign, but agreed the others were unintentional
gestures or waves and were not gang signs.
Defendant Kober testified, explaining the significance of the “C” hand sign
and suggesting that blue clothing is another sign of the Crips. Hearing Tr., Apr.
19, 2016, at 101, 107. He added that the hand sign “Cs over Bs” means Crips over
Bloods. Id. at 101. He identified individuals, some wearing blue, gesturing “C” or
“Cs over Bs” in seven photographs. As to two photographs, Kober was not
confident enough to identify gang hand signs. When Williams asked about the
clippings from magazines, Kober agreed that he believed some of the individuals
9 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
were making a “C” sign and explained that the magazine The Source was banned
from his department because it was “consistently having hand signs flashed in it.”
Id., at 23. Williams argued that Kober was biased against him and the misbehavior
report was a result of personal prejudice. Kober testified that he was not biased.
Williams called prison teacher Todd Isabella, who had training in
identifying gang related material. Liberty provided Isabella with color and black
and white copies of Williams photographs which had circles around the hand
gestures. Williams objected, saying that the circles on his photographs as well as
Officer Liberty’s questioning prejudiced his witness. Isabella responded that “it’s
pretty self-evident [] regardless of any being circled that [] they are in fact gang
signs.” Hearing Tr., May 9, 2016, at 99.
Like Kober and Heely, Isabella explained that the color blue and the hand
sign “C” are associated with the Crips. Isabella identified a “C” sign in one of
Williams’s photographs (photo 7). Isabella also stated that the hand signs “3 over
2, Crips over Bloods,” “six pointed star,” and “Crips rule” are associated with the
Crips. While noting that the photos were difficult to interpret because of the poor
quality, he identified Crips hand signs in three photographs. Hearing Tr., May 9,
2016, at 99 (photo 1: “3 over 2, Crips over Bloods”); 93 (photo 2: “six pointed star”;
10 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
photo 4: “Crips rule”). In the middle of Isabella’s testimony, Officer Liberty
removed Williams from the hearing because he was repeatedly interrupting her.
Outside Williams’s presence, Liberty asked Isabella if he could identify gang
material in Williams’s magazine clippings and Isabella stated that he did not
believe they were gang related because “the difference is the intent . . . . [T]he
pictures that were confiscated from Mr. Williams indicate that these are in fact
members of a gang. [T]he intent’s obviously there. Where as these ads, I don’t see
it.” Id. at 100.
In sum, the witnesses who reviewed Williams’s photographs agreed that at
least some of them depicted individuals making “C” hand signs: photo 4 (Heely
and Kober), photo 5 (Heely and Kober), photo 7 (Isabella, and possibly Heely and
Kober), photo 8 (possibly Heely and Kober). None of the witnesses identified gang
material in the photograph of the cake (photo 6). Only Kober identified C’s in
photos 1, 2, and 3. In some of these photographs, Isabella and Heely identified
different signs that they believed were associated with the Crips. The witnesses’
discrepancy could be explained by the quality of the copies of the photographs.
Kober is the only witness who had viewed the original photographs at the first
hearing. Heely and Isabella acknowledged their copies were of poor quality.
11 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
Hearing Tr., Apr. 19, 2016, at 112 (“Officer Heely: [M]aybe [Kober’s] copy is
cleaner than mine is.”); Hearing Tr., May 9, 2016, at 93 (“Isabella: Some of them,
. . . they’re very difficult to make out with the [] quality of the photos.”).
On May 9, 2016, at the end of the hearing, Defendant Liberty found Williams
guilty of violating Rule 105.13 and levied the punishment that Williams had
already completed after the first hearing. Williams again appealed, and Defendant
Rodriguez, Acting Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Program,
affirmed the decision. On August 22, 2016, Williams requested that Rodriguez
reconsider his determination. Williams also sent a letter to the DOCCS Deputy
Commissioner stating that he had been found guilty of violating an
unconstitutionally vague rule.
On September 22, 2016, Williams filed a § 1983 claim against Defendants for
violations of due process and argued that Rule 105.13 is unconstitutionally vague
as applied to his photographs. He asserted that he had possessed the photographs
at other facilities, they had been reviewed numerous times, and they had never
before been considered contraband. Williams sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, including the return of his confiscated photographs, and monetary
damages. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Williams had
12 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
received adequate process at the disciplinary hearings and that Rule 105.13 is not
unconstitutionally vague.
On August 1, 2018—nearly two years after Williams asked for
reconsideration from DOCCS—Donald Venettozzi, Director of Special Housing
and Inmate Disciplinary Program, administratively reversed the second finding of
Williams’s guilt because “circumstances surrounding the incident raise questions
to [sic] inmate’s culpability.” Venettozzi Memorandum, Aug. 1, 2018, at 1.
Williams had long since served the six months in the SHU, but the infraction was
expunged from his record, and Williams states that his original photographs were
returned to him.
On August 31, 2018, reviewing Williams’s § 1983 claim, the magistrate judge
recommended granting summary judgment to the Defendants. The magistrate
judge found that Williams received adequate process at his second hearing
because he had notice of the charges, was able to call witnesses and present
evidence, had a neutral hearing officer, and received a written copy of the decision.
In addition, the magistrate judge found that Rule 105.13 was not vague because it
gave persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct was prohibited.
The district court granted summary judgment against Williams, adopting the
13 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
recommendations of the magistrate judge, upholding the constitutionality of the
Rule, and finding no due process violation.
Williams timely appealed the district court’s decision.
DISCUSSION
“We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de
novo, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all permissible factual inferences in
favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Burg v. Gosselin,
591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir.
2009) and citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “Summary judgment is appropriate only
when ‘the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Moses, 913 F.3d 297, 305 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
I. Vagueness Challenge
We first consider whether Rule 105.13 is unconstitutionally vague as applied
to Williams’s photographs of individuals wearing blue2 and making “C” signs
2 We note that none of the photographs that the hearing officer found to be gang-related were identified as such solely because someone in the photo was wearing an item of blue clothing. We therefore need not address the circumstances, if any, in which such a photo could be held to violate the rule. Here, the focus of the proceeding was on the hand gestures, and the references to blue clothing were at most corroborative of the witnesses’ conclusion that the hand gestures were gang insignia or materials.
14 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
with their hands. We agree with the district court that it is not. “We examine as-
applied vagueness claims in two steps: . . . first [we] determine whether the statute
gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited,” and second we “consider whether the law provides explicit
standards for those who apply it.” Rubin v. Garvin, 544 F.3d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Chatin v. Coombe, 186 F.3d 82, 87 (2d
Cir. 1999) (applying the test to determine if a DOCCS Rule of Inmate Behavior is
unconstitutionally vague as applied). “Limitations inherent in the English
language often prevent the drafting of statutes ‘both general enough to take into
account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair
warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited.’” Perez v. Hoblock, 368 F.3d
166, 175 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159–60 (1974)). We
have acknowledged, therefore, that “a statute or regulation is not required to
specify every prohibited act.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
Williams argues that Rule 105.13 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to
him because the definitions of “gang” and “gang material” are too broad to (1)
provide adequate notice that photographs of people making hand signs violate the
15 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
Rule and (2) cabin adequately the discretion of prison officials enforcing the Rule.
Rule 105.13 and the accompanying note provide:
An inmate shall not engage in or encourage others to engage in gang activities or meetings, or display, wear, possess, distribute or use gang insignia or materials including, but not limited to, printed or handwritten gang or gang related material.
Note: For purposes of this rule, a gang is a group of individuals, having a common identifying name, sign, symbol or colors, who have individually or collectively engaged in a pattern of lawlessness (e.g., violence, property destruction, threats of harm, intimidation, extortion, or drug smuggling) in one or more correctional facilities or that are generally recognized as having engaged in a pattern of lawlessness in the community as a whole. For purposes of this rule, printed or handwritten gang or gang related material is written material that, if observed in the inmate’s possession, could result in an inference being drawn about the inmate’s gang affiliation, but excludes published material that that the inmate has obtained through the facility library or that has been approved for the inmate to possess through the media review process.
Rule 105.13, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, § 270.2 (2008); see also Dist. Ct. Dk.
No. 16 at 27.
To be sure, the language of the Rule is broad, but we are tasked with
examining the application of the Rule to Williams’s photographs. Perez, 368 F.3d
at 175 (“The evaluation of whether [the regulation] is vague as applied to Perez
must be made with respect to Perez’s actual conduct and not with respect to
hypothetical situations at the periphery of the regulation’s scope . . . .” (internal
16 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
quotation marks and brackets omitted)). With respect to the definition of “gang,”
therefore, we need not consider whether hypothetical groups who commit minor
crimes could fall under the definition. The definition clearly covers the Crips, who
are identified by distinctive tattoos, blue clothing and blue bandanas, and are well
known for their acts of violence. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 328 (2009)
(blue bandanas); Samuel v. LaValley, 551 F. App’x 614, 618 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary
order) (blue clothing, violence); McTier v. People of New York, No. 07-CV-870 (DLI),
2009 WL 792087, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2009) (blue clothing and bandanas,
violence); Dodge v. Cty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (tattoos,
violence). Moreover, Williams was surely aware that the Rule covered material
associated with the Crips: he spent six months in the SHU in 2012 for possessing a
birthday card that said “bluetiful” (ostensibly a reference to the Crips’ identifying
color).
We next consider the definition of “gang insignia or materials” as applied
to Williams’s photographs. The Rule explains that gang insignia or materials
“includ[e], but [are] not limited to, printed or handwritten gang or gang related
material.” Rule 105.13.
17 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
Considering both the Rule and the accompanying note, Defendant Liberty
provided the following interpretation: “For the purposes of Rule 105.13 printed
gang related material is the type of material that ‘if observed in the inmate’s
possession, could result in an inference being drawn about the inmate’s gang
affiliation.’” Superintendent Hearing Disposition at 4. Magistrate Judge Dancks
cited with approval the following similar interpretation of the Rule:
It is quite clear, according to the rule, that a gang sign is something that another inmate would recognize as creating an inference of a particular gang affiliation. More specificity in the prison context would be impossible because . . . individuals could change the signs to avoid detection, interfering with the security and order of the facility.
App. at 211 (quoting Booker v. Maly, No. 9:12-CV-246 NAM/ATB, 2014 WL 1289579,
at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014)). Williams argued to the district court that the
application of the note’s definition of “gang related material” to photographs was
erroneous because the note and the Rule clearly limit the ban on gang related
material to material that is written. The district court disagreed, citing the Rule’s
catch all provision “which includes but is not limited to.”
It would be obvious to a person of average intelligence that the inclusion of the phrase “is not limited to printed or handwritten gang or gang related material” indicates that the Rule proscribes conduct involving items other than “written material.” In addition, a person of average intelligence would understand that the term “materials”
18 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
also includes photographs, among other things, as long as those items are “gang or gang related.” Photographs of hand gestures that gang members use to identify their membership in a gang could reasonably be considered to be “gang or gang-related” materials and, thus, possession of such photographs would be a violation of Rule 105.13.
App. at 226–27.
In the same vein, Defendants offer the following “broad, but . . .
straightforward” interpretation: Rule 105.13 prohibits “‘Gang or gang related
material’ [which] is ‘material that, if observed in the inmate’s possession, could
result in an inference being drawn about the inmate’s gang affiliation.” Appellees’
Br. 25.
According to these interpretations, Rule 105.13 prohibits not just “gang
insignia or materials,” but all gang related material. This requires that the note’s
inclusion of the word “written” be ignored, which violates a canon of construction
as “courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language
superfluous . . . .” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
Although the note clarifies that “printed or handwritten gang or gang related
material” is “written material that . . . could result in an inference . . . about the
inmate’s gang affiliation,” nothing in the Rule or note prohibits possessing all
“gang related material.” Nor does the Rule or note suggest that nonwritten items
19 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
that could result in an inference of gang affiliation automatically qualify as “gang
insignia or materials.”
We are thus skeptical of the interpretations advanced by Defendant Liberty,
the magistrate judge, and the district court. But to prevail on an as-
applied challenge, Williams must have lacked notice that the particular materials
that he was punished for possessing were proscribed. We need not decide the full
scope of the Rule. Again, we must consider the Rule’s clarity in the context of how
it was enforced against Williams. Although Kober, Heely, and Isabella sometimes
had divergent interpretations of the same hand sign, all agreed that the “C” hand
sign is a symbol of the Crips, and all agreed that at least one of Williams’s
photographs included individuals wearing blue and making that sign.
An individual of ordinary intelligence in Williams’s position would have
reason to believe that gang insignia or materials includes the gang’s “common
identifying name, sign, symbol or colors.” Photographs of individuals wearing
blue and intentionally making “C” signs, therefore, fit within any reasonable
understanding of the Rule.3 We hold that Williams had adequate notice that his
3 Although one might conceivably read the explanatory note to the Rule as clarifying that “printed . . . gang . . . material” is prohibited only when it is “written,” this does not disturb our conclusion that an individual of ordinary intelligence had reasonable opportunity to know that Williams’s photographs were prohibited. Even if the note so
20 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
photographs were prohibited by Rule 105.13 and that the provision prohibiting
gang material was not vague under the first prong of our as-applied vagueness
analysis.
Having held that Rule 105.13 provides adequate notice to Williams that his
photographs are prohibited, we turn to the second prong: whether the
Rule adequately cabins the discretion of those who apply it. See Farid v. Ellen, 593
F.3d 233, 243 (2d Cir. 2010). As a preliminary matter, it is hard to imagine a rule
with a catch-all provision that adequately cabins discretion. See id. (finding a rule
did not adequately cabin discretion when “the catch-all contraband rule allowed
prison officials to determine in their unbounded discretion what was and was not
‘specifically authorized’ in the facility.”).
In an as-applied vagueness challenge where the statute does not provide
sufficiently clear standards to eliminate the risk of arbitrary enforcement, the
challenge may nonetheless fail when “even in the absence of such standards, the
limits the ban on “printed . . . gang . . . material,” it does not apply to “gang insignia.” Any reasonable interpretation of “gang insignia” would include Williams’s photographs depicting the identifying hand signs of the Crips. And, in any event, the formation of the letter “C” in a printed photograph renders that photograph “written” material. See Write, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/write (last visited June 20, 2020) (defining “write” as “to form (characters, symbols, etc.) on a surface with an instrument”).
21 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
conduct at issue falls within the core of the statute’s prohibition, so that
the enforcement before the court was not the result of the unfettered latitude that
law enforcement officers and factfinders might have in other, hypothetical
applications of the statute.” Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 494 (2d Cir. 2006).
We hold that Rule 105.13 provides adequate standards for prison guards to
determine whether pictures of people wearing blue and intentionally making “C”
hand signs are prohibited. For the same reasons that Williams had notice that the
Rule covered his photographs, so too did Korines and Kober. No reasonable
prison guard could have doubted that Williams’s possession of photographs of
people wearing blue and making “C” hand signs violated Rule 105.13 and,
therefore, there was no danger that the Rule’s enforcement would be arbitrary
with regard to Williams’s photographs.
II. Due Process Claim
For the purpose of summary judgment, Defendants concede that Williams’s
punishment implicates a liberty interest. See Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d
Cir. 2004) (“Palmer had no right to due process at his hearing unless a liberty
interest was infringed as a result.” (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted)). In a prison disciplinary hearing, due process rights provide that “at a
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minimum, a prisoner is entitled to be confronted with the accusation, informed of
the evidence against him and afforded a reasonable opportunity to explain his
actions.” Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation
marks and ellipsis omitted). More specifically, an inmate must receive “advance
written notice of the charges against him; a hearing affording him a reasonable
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence; a fair and
impartial hearing officer; and a written statement of the disposition, including the
evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary actions taken.” Sira v.
Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004).
Williams alleges procedural due process violations in his first disciplinary
hearing, including refusal to call witnesses. We agree with the district court that
all claims relating to the first hearing are moot given that the Article 78 proceeding
vacated the first guilty finding and remanded for a new hearing and that when
Williams was found guilty the second time, the hearing officer gave him credit for
the prior punishment. That is, Williams’s confinement was attributable to the
second hearing and his first hearing did not deprive him of due process. Horne v.
Coughlin, 155 F.3d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1998) (“We need not discuss [the plaintiff’s]
contention that his rights were violated at the first hearing, because it became a
23 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
nullity. All findings and penalties imposed at the first hearing were vacated, and
all the penalties [the plaintiff] suffered were imposed at the second hearing.”).
Williams’s pro se brief (filed before he was appointed pro bono counsel)
alleges additional due process violations during his second hearing, including
insufficiency of the evidence, denial of notice, failure to present untainted
documentary evidence and verbal testimony, hearing officer bias, and removal
from the hearing. Assuming arguendo that these claims survive, they are either
unsupported by evidence or were harmless, and therefore summary judgment
was appropriate.
Williams argues that none of his pictures are gang material—and therefore
there is insufficient evidence to support Liberty’s guilty determination—because
Director Venettozzi reversed the second disciplinary ruling and the prison
returned Williams’s original photographs. Reversal of the disciplinary ruling does
not, however, automatically establish Williams’s federal claim because New
York’s “sufficiently relevant and probative information to constitute substantial
evidence” standard is more stringent than the “some evidence standard necessary
to afford due process.” Sira, 380 F.3d at 76 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The documentary evidence and testimony of three witnesses with training in gang
24 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
identification provide “some reliable evidence” that some of Williams’s
photographs depicted individuals wearing blue and gesturing “C,” and that those
are symbols of the Crips. See Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v.
Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985) (“[T]he relevant question is whether there is any
evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.”); see also Sira, 380 F.3d at 69 (“[T]he ‘some evidence’ standard
requires some ‘reliable evidence.’”).
With respect to notice of the accusation, it is undisputed that Williams
received the misbehavior report with the names of the guards who conducted the
search, the date and time of the search, and an explanation that the guards
determined that sixteen of Williams’s photographs depicted hand signs that were
associated with the Crips. These facts provide sufficient detail to allow Williams
to prepare a defense. Cf. Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2001)
(finding that a misbehavior report with “vague or conclusory” allegations from
confidential informants did not provide notice).
Regarding Williams’s claim that the documentary evidence shown to
Isabella was tainted, Williams agreed that the color prints presented at the second
hearing were accurate copies of his photographs. The circles on photographs,
25 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
while suggestive, were harmless because Isabella reviewed unmarked copies of
the photographs before the hearing and explained that it was “self-evident” that
people in the photographs were making gang signs. See, e.g., Powell v. Coughlin,
953 F.2d 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1991) (applying harmless error analysis to prison
disciplinary proceeding).
In addition, Williams presents no evidence that Officer Liberty prejudged
the evidence, see e.g., Patterson v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 564, 569-70 (2d Cir. 1990), or
otherwise demonstrated bias. “[A] plaintiff-inmate armed with nothing more than
conclusory allegations of bias and prejudgment should not be able to defeat a well-
supported motion for summary judgment.” Francis, 891 F.2d at 47. Our review of
the record reveals no evidence of bias to support Williams’s claim. At the second
hearing, Liberty allowed Williams to call witnesses, raise objections, and testify. In
addition, Liberty recalled witnesses for further questioning in response to
Williams’s claims of bias. Moreover, Liberty explained that her guilty
determination was supported by the testimony of Kober, Heely, and Isabella who
had training in identifying gang related materials and all agreed that some of the
hand signs in Williams’s photographs were a symbol of the Crips.
26 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
Finally, with respect to Williams’s removal from the hearing, there was no
due process violation. In a criminal trial, a defendant who continues disruptive
behavior after repeated warnings can lose his right to be present in the courtroom.
See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) (noting that the behavior must be “so
disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that [the defendant’s] trial
cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom”). Here, Williams continued to
talk over Officer Liberty and wag his finger at her after she gave him multiple
warnings and told him that he would be removed if he continued to interrupt her.
Whatever the extent of a prisoner’s due process rights in a prison disciplinary
hearing, they are surely no greater than those accorded a defendant in a criminal
trial. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Whatever right Williams had
to be present at his disciplinary proceeding was lost when he continued the
disruptive and disrespectful behavior after Liberty’s multiple warnings.
In sum, we agree with the district court that Williams received a hearing
that provided the minimal requirements of procedural due process. We have
considered Williams’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
27 18-3050 Williams v. Korines
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is
AFFIRMED.