Williams v. Johnson
This text of Williams v. Johnson (Williams v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ____________________
No. 00-40934 Summary Calendar ____________________
GARRY WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee. ____________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (5:99-CV-226) ____________________________________________________________ April 16, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Pursuant to a certificate of appealability granted by the
district court, Garry Williams (TDCJ # 512111) appeals the district
court’s determination that his habeas corpus petition should be
dismissed as time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Williams
asserted in his petition that his calendar time and good-time
credits unconstitutionally were forfeited after he was
reincarcerated on a parole violation. He contends that he is in
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. the custody of an administrative agency; and that, therefore, §
2244(d) does not apply. He also contends that a parole revocation
is not the equivalent of a conviction.
Williams’ contentions are without merit; his challenge to the
denial of sentencing credit for the time he spent on parole,
“although directly arising from an order of the pardon and parole
board, nevertheless also is one arising” from the judgment of a
state court. See Newby v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 567, 569 (5th Cir.
1996). Section 2244(d), by its terms, applies to “an application
for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court”. See § 2244(d)(1) (emphasis added). In
Alexander v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 906, 907 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998), this
court noted that a petition, which challenged the revocation of
parole, was “timely filed” under § 2244(d).
We do not consider the contentions raised for the first time
by Williams in his reply brief. See Stevens v. C.I.T. Group/Equip.
Fin., Inc., 955 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Knighten
v. C.I.R., 702 F.2d 59, 60 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
897 (1983).
AFFIRMED
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