Williams v. Hill

66 Pa. D. & C.4th 43, 2004 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 250
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Erie County
DecidedMarch 15, 2004
Docketno. 12185-2001
StatusPublished

This text of 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 43 (Williams v. Hill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Erie County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Hill, 66 Pa. D. & C.4th 43, 2004 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).

Opinion

FEUDALE, S.J.,

Specially Presiding,

— Before this court in this defamation and libel case is a motion in limine filed by plaintiffs, Cunningham Chrysler, Plymouth Inc. and various owners, salesmen and other employees of a franchise retail dealer of Chrysler/Plymouth Jeep vehicles.

Defendant, Samuel S. Hill, who is unrepresented by counsel, indicated in his pretrial narrative statement that he would be calling as a witness at a jury trial scheduled for April 12, 2004, Attorney Brian M. McGowan and Ms. Marsha Cedeno in defense of the allegations against him. Mr. McGowan is an attorney with the law firm known as The McDonald Group L.L.P., and Ms. Cedeno is a paralegal with the same law firm.

FACTS

The relevant facts for the purpose of deciding the motion in limine reflect that Mr. Hill purchased a used 1995 Grand Cherokee with mileage of 41,687 miles on April 6, 1999. Contemporaneous to the purchase of the Grand Cherokee, Mr. Hill purchased a warranty (Chrysler service contract), that according to his answer, covered the vehicle for a period of two years or 24 months, subsequent to the 90-day warranty, which came with the vehicle. Mr. Hill, in his pretrial narrative, alleges inter alia, that he was persuaded by used car salesman, Russell Moore, to purchase the extended warranty. He also alleges he was told by Mr. Moore1 that the warranty would [46]*46cover everything that went wrong with the vehicle except items that normally wear out tires, brakes, mufflers, etc. According to plaintiffs, Mr. Hill brought the vehicle in for service on three different occasions between April 6,1999, and October 1999 and he was told each time the repairs he was requesting were not covered under the warranty. In his answer to the amended complaint, Mr. Hill alleged only one repair was actually done, which was a leak in the transmission.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, on June 16,2001, and June 28, 2001, Mr. Hill and two other people described by Cunningham in their complaints against Mr. Hill as co-conspirators,2 arrived at the site of Cunningham Chrysler Plymouth, and proceeded to express their displeasure with plaintiffs by way of verbal utterances and picket signs.3

Apparently, at a subsequent discovery proceeding, Mr. Hill was at the McDonald Group law firm for the purpose of examination and photocopy of the picket signs. According to Mr. Hill, Attorney Brian McGowan saw the picket signs spread out on the conference table (one of which reflected Cunningham “Salesman lie,” and Mr. McGowan allegedly responded in front of paralegal Marsha Cedeno, “Yes everyone knows that.”). Defendant has listed Brian McGowan and Ms. Cedeno, as liability witnesses in his pretrial statement.

[47]*47The wherefore clause of plaintiffs’ motion in limine provides:

“Wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully request the issuance of an order in limine precluding any and all of the defendants from referring to and/or utilizing the alleged statements of Attorney Brian M. McGowan in any manner whatsoever, and further precluding the presentation of the testimony of Attorney McGowan and/or Ms. Cedeno by any and all of the defendants.”

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, the alleged statements are not relevant to the issues to be determined at trial, that Mr. McGowan has never been a customer or purchased a vehicle from Cunningham, that Mr. McGowan never held nor does he now hold any opinion nor does he know the reputation of “plaintiffs” (emphasis added) and, therefore, there is no factual basis for admission of the testimony.

Additionally, during argument on the motion, an issue arose whether Mr. McGowan had any knowledge or involvement as counsel in the case. Mr. Hill alleged, and subsequently provided, a copy of a motion to extend case management order, which along with a certificate of service, was signed by Attorney McGowan in May of 2002. While Mr. Conti (who is the only attorney this court has had any involvement with in both cases filed by Cunningham et al., against defendant Hill, Crozier and Jackanic) asserts such evidenced a limited involvement by Mr. McGowan. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we would note plaintiffs’ counsel’s praecipe for appearance filed with the prothonotary on August 17,2001 provides “Please enter our appearance on behalf of all the plaintiffs in the above matter. Respectfully submitted, The [48]*48McDonald Group L.L.P.” and was signed by Joseph P. Conti, Esquire. Clearly, such evidenced both the intent and ability of Mr. McGowan to act as counsel, when deemed appropriate, and/or as also evidenced when Mr. Conti was unavailable.

RELEVANT LAW

In their motion in limine, the first averment of plaintiffs is that the “alleged statements are not in any manner relevant to the issues to be determined at trial.”4 In order to determine such we must review plaintiffs’ and defendant’s burdens in this cause of action.

In an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove:

“(1) the defamatory character of the communication;

“(2) its publication by the defendant;

“(3) its application to the plaintiff;

“(4) the understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning;

“(5) the understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff;

“(6) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication; and

“(7) abuse of a conditionally privileges occasions.” 42 Pa.C.S. §8343(a); see also, Smith v. Wagner, 403 Pa. Super. 316, 588 A.2d 1308 (1991); Thomas Merton Center v. Rockwell International Corp., 497 Pa. 460, 442 A.2d 213 (1981); Kryeski v. Schott Glass Technologies, 426 Pa. Super. 105, 626 A.2d 595 (1993).

The defendant has the burden of proving, when relevant to the defense:

[49]*49“(1) the truth of the defamatory communication;

“(2) the privileged character of the occasion on which it was published; and

“(3) the character of the subject matter of defamatory comment as of public concern.” 42 Pa.C.S. §8343(b)

Finally, in consideration of the elements and defense of a cause of action for defamation, and plaintiffs’ motion requesting we address the admissibility and relevance of the witnesses Mr. Hill seeks to call, we turn to the relevant rules of evidence.

Pa. Rule of Evidence 104 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

“Rule 104. Preliminary questions

“(a) Questions of admissibility generally

“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privilege.

“(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact

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Related

Kryeski v. Schott Glass Technologies, Inc.
626 A.2d 595 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1993)
Thomas Merton Center v. Rockwell International Corp.
442 A.2d 213 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1981)
Smith v. Wagner
588 A.2d 1308 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1991)
Baker v. Lafayette College
532 A.2d 399 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1987)
Baker v. Lafayette College
504 A.2d 247 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1986)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
66 Pa. D. & C.4th 43, 2004 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 250, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-hill-pactcomplerie-2004.