Williams v. Harth

161 S.W. 1102, 156 Ky. 702, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 172
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJanuary 8, 1914
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 161 S.W. 1102 (Williams v. Harth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Harth, 161 S.W. 1102, 156 Ky. 702, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 172 (Ky. Ct. App. 1914).

Opinion

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Hannah

Affirming.

J. F. Harth died in Union County, Kentucky, testate. J. W. Williams, a judgment creditor of said Harth, instituted an action in the MeCracken Circuit Court against Jennie E. Harth, widow of said J. F. Harth, under section 654, Kentucky Statutes, seeking to recover judgment against her in the sum of $1,427.58, the amount of his judgment against decedent. He alleged that said J. F. Harth during his lifetime and_ while insolvent, diverted a large sum of money from his creditors and employed same in the payment of premiums on policies of life insurance payable to said Jennie E. Harth, and that she had received from several insurance companies quite a sum of money as the proceeds of said insurance contracts, upon the death of said J. F. Harth, the insured. [703]*703The premiums so paid by decedent, and the policies upon which said sums were paid, were set out in detail in the petition. Soon after the filing of this petition, several' other creditors of said decedent instituted similar actions in said court. The defendant, Jennie E. Harth, answered for herself individually, and also as executrix of said J. F. Harth. She denied the fraud charged in the petition in the diversion of the money so paid for premiums; and pleaded that by virtue of section 671, Kentucky Statutes, the premiums paid by decedent on one of said insurance contracts, a certain benefit certificate held by him in the Knights of Honor, a fraternal insurance organization, were not recoverable by creditors of decedent; and finally, as a set-off against the causes of action of said plaintiffs, she pleaded a certain note executed to her by decedent and his two brothers, praying that she might have credit for the amount thereof as against whatever sum might be adjudged against her on account of the payment by decedent of the insurance premiums above mentioned.

As executrix, she alleged that should the court upon trial of said cases adjudge against her any amount because of the payment by decedent of said insurance premiums, the same belonged to and was a part of the estate of said decedent and that same should be so adjudged and subject to distribution ratably among all the creditors thereof. She further alleged that she had qualified in the Union County Court as executrix of the will of said J. F. Harth, he having died a resident of that county, and his said will having been probated therein; that as such executrix she had instituted an action in the Union Circuit Court for the settlement of the estate of said decedent, to which action the several plaintiffs in these actions, as well as all other creditors of said estate, had been made parties defendant; that the several plaintiffs in these actions had filed their claims against said estate, in that action, which she alleged was then still pending in said Union Circuit Court.

The several actions above mentioned were then consolidated, the pleadings completed, certain stipulations agreed to, and the cause submitted; and it was adjudged by the court that plaintiffs recovered of the defendant, Jennie E. Harth, the sum of $6,660.89, which amount the court found to be the sum total of the premiums paid by said decedent on said insurance contracts, after January 1, 1907, the date on which said J. F. Harth became insol[704]*704vent, as fixed and agreed upon by stipulation of the parties; which amount however does not include the amount of the premiums paid by said J. F. Harth on the benefit certificate held by him in the Knights of Honor. The court further adjudged said sum of $6,660.89 for which judgment was rendered against defendant, Jennie E. Harth, to be a part of the estate of said J. F. Harth, inuring to the benefit of all his creditors, and ordered the same to be paid into the hands of the master commissioner of the Union Circuit Court, wherein the above-mentioned action was then pending to settle the estate of said J. F. Harth; the court adjudging that neither the plaintiff nor the other creditors in the consolidated action obtained any priority over the other creditors of said estate by virtue of their institution of these actions. As to the premiums paid by said J. F. Harth upon, the insurance contract held by him in the Knights of Honor, the court adjudged that same were not recoverable by plaintiffs. And, in the matter of the set-off pleaded by (defendant, Jennie E. Harth, the court refused to allow same, holding that the proper procedure had been followed, when said note was filed and allowed as a guneral creditor’s claim in the action pending in the Union Circuit Court to settle said estate.

From the judgment denying to the plaintiff, J. W. Williams a superior lien on the fund recovered, and priority in the distribution thereof, and refusing to subject the amount of the premiums paid to the Knights of Honor after he became insolvent, said J. W. Williams appeals. The defendant, Jennie E. Harth, prosecutes a cross appeal from that part of the judgment denying the note above mentioned to be a set-off against the said fund in her hands adjudged to belong to the creditors of her deceased husband.

The questions presented by appellant are: (1) Did the court err in refusing to adjudge appellant to be a preferred creditor and entitled to priority over the other creditors in the distribution of the fund recovered because he instituted the first action to subject the fund; and (2) did the court err in denying a recovery of the amount of the premiums paid by said J. F. Harth as dues on the benefit certificate held by him in the Knights of Honor?

Appellant bases his claim to preference and priority in the distribution of the fund recovered, upon the ground that defendant, Jennie E. Harth, was grantee of a fraud[705]*705ulent conveyance. His petition described the premiums paid by decedent, and policies of insurance upon which same were paid, the purpose thereof being to create a lien on said fund. At the time of his death, tbe decedent owned several valuable tracts of coal land in Union County, encumbered by mortgage. Action having been instituted shortly after the death of said J. F. Harth for sale of said lands to discharge the mortgage^ debt, a sale thereof was had, at which defendant, Jennie E, Harth became the purchaser of said lands, the said purchase being made with the money received by her as the proceeds of the insurance contracts heretofore mentioned. Defendant, Jennie E. Harth, also erected a residence in Paducah with part of the same money. Appellant filed an amended petition containing the necessary allegations upon which to base a lis pendens lien, describing the said lands and residence property; and now claims that because of said proceedings he has a lien on the fund recovered superior to other creditors. The defendant, Jennie E. Harth, is not the defendant in the judgment which was made the basis of appellant’s action. Nor is she grantee of a fraudulent conveyance. There is no fraud brought home to her. The statute declares that the payment by any person of premiums on life insurance contracts made with intent to defraud creditors shall render recoverable an amount equal to the premiums so paid with interest thereon, which recovery shall inure to the benefit of said creditors. But the acceptance by the beneficiary of the amount of the policy, and the investment thereof in real estate, does not of itself constitute said beneficiary a fraudulent grantee.

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Bluebook (online)
161 S.W. 1102, 156 Ky. 702, 1914 Ky. LEXIS 172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-harth-kyctapp-1914.