[Cite as Williams v. Hamilton Cty. Prosecutor, 2025-Ohio-3298.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL WILLIAMS, : APPEAL NO. C-240504 TRIAL NO. A-2402974 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. :
HAMILTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR, : JUDGMENT ENTRY and :
OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, :
Defendants-Appellants. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 9/12/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as Williams v. Hamilton Cty. Prosecutor, 2025-Ohio-3298.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL WILLIAMS, : APPEAL NO. C-240504 TRIAL NO. A-2402974 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
HAMILTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR, : OPINION
and :
Defendants-Appellees. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 12, 2025
Christopher-Michael Williams, pro se,
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Defendant-Appellee Hamilton County Prosecutor,
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Mark D. Tucker, James P. Reising, and Julie M. Pfeiffer, Assistant Attorneys General, for Defendant-Appellee Ohio Attorney General. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Christopher-Michael Williams appeals the trial
court’s judgment dismissing his declaratory judgment action. Because a declaratory
judgment action may not be used to collaterally attack a conviction, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Following a jury trial in 2016, Williams was convicted of two counts of
rape of a child under the age of 13 in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). The two
victims were Williams’s young daughters. The trial court imposed a life sentence for
each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Williams
unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences on direct appeal and in two
postconviction petitions filed in 2017 and 2019. State v. Williams, 2017-Ohio-8898
(1st Dist.); State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-1148 (1st Dist.).
{¶3} In July 2024, Williams filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment
seeking a declaration that R.C. 2907.01(A) is unconstitutional because its definition of
“sexual conduct” is vague and ambiguous. He takes issue with the phrase “however
slight” in the definition:
‘Sexual Conduct’ means vaginal intercourse between a male and female
. . . and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any
part of the body . . . into the vaginal . . . opening of another. Penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal . . . intercourse.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2907.01(A). Williams argues that the phrase “however slight”
is unconstitutionally vague and, because that phrase does not indicate a specific
“measurement,” then this results in some people being charged with rape and others
with gross sexual imposition, solely at the whim of the prosecutor. Thus, he argues
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that his convictions for rape, which were based on this vague definition of “sexual
conduct,” should be vacated, and he should be released from prison immediately.
{¶4} He also argues, and seeks a declaration, that his due process rights were
violated at his criminal trial because his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective,
the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor
allegedly lied to the grand jury about whether Williams had confessed to the criminal
conduct. Finally, he contends that his convictions violate equal protection guarantees
in the Ohio and United States Constitutions because he was charged with rape instead
of gross sexual imposition.
{¶5} In his complaint, Williams sued both the Hamilton County Prosecutor
(“the county prosecutor”) as well as the Ohio Attorney General (“the AG”). Before the
AG could file a response to Williams’s complaint, the county prosecutor moved to
dismiss the action, arguing that Williams did not meet the justiciability requirement
of a declaratory judgment action, which limits such actions to an actual or “live”
controversy. In support, the county prosecutor cited this court’s decision in State v.
Braggs, 2013-Ohio-3364 (1st Dist.), where we held that “because of the justiciability
requirement, a declaratory judgment action does not provide a means for determining
whether previously-adjudicated rights were properly decided.” Id. at ¶ 7. The trial
court, agreeing with the county prosecutor that a justiciable controversy did not exist,
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.
{¶6} Williams now appeals, raising four assignments of error, which can
reasonably be read together to challenge the dismissal of his action.
II. Analysis
{¶7} To obtain a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a real
controversy exists between the parties, (2) the controversy is justiciable in character,
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and (3) speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties. Moore v.
Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 49. A trial court properly dismisses a declaratory
judgment action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) where there is no justiciable controversy
between the parties. Redman v. Sheward, 2018-Ohio-2609, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.).
{¶8} We review de novo dismissals by the trial court under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
Tri-State Computer Exchange, Inc. v. Burt, 2003-Ohio-3197, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.).
However, “[j]usticiability is a threshold requirement for a declaratory judgment.”
Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-4809, ¶ 44, citing Arnott v. Arnott, 2012-Ohio-
3208, ¶ 10. We review a trial court’s decision regarding justiciability of a declaratory
judgment action for an abuse of discretion. Arnott at ¶ 13.
{¶9} A justiciable controversy is one where “[t]he danger or dilemma of the
plaintiff must be present, not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future
events . . .” and there is “a genuine dispute between parties having adverse legal
interest of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.” High St. Props. L.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 2015-Ohio-1451, ¶ 29 (8th
Dist.), citing Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Heasley, 2007-Ohio-1248, ¶ 9, and Brewer
v. Middletown, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3983, *10 (12th Dist. Aug. 3, 1992).
{¶10} Upon careful review of the record, we hold that Williams has not
presented a justiciable controversy in his declaratory judgment action. Instead, what
Williams is attempting to do is collaterally attack his rape convictions, something that
he cannot do in a declaratory judgment action. State v. Lingo, 2014-Ohio-1052. In
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[Cite as Williams v. Hamilton Cty. Prosecutor, 2025-Ohio-3298.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL WILLIAMS, : APPEAL NO. C-240504 TRIAL NO. A-2402974 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
vs. :
HAMILTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR, : JUDGMENT ENTRY and :
OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, :
Defendants-Appellants. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 9/12/2025 per order of the court.
By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as Williams v. Hamilton Cty. Prosecutor, 2025-Ohio-3298.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL WILLIAMS, : APPEAL NO. C-240504 TRIAL NO. A-2402974 Plaintiff-Appellant, :
HAMILTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR, : OPINION
and :
Defendants-Appellees. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 12, 2025
Christopher-Michael Williams, pro se,
Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ronald W. Springman, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Defendant-Appellee Hamilton County Prosecutor,
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Mark D. Tucker, James P. Reising, and Julie M. Pfeiffer, Assistant Attorneys General, for Defendant-Appellee Ohio Attorney General. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Christopher-Michael Williams appeals the trial
court’s judgment dismissing his declaratory judgment action. Because a declaratory
judgment action may not be used to collaterally attack a conviction, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} Following a jury trial in 2016, Williams was convicted of two counts of
rape of a child under the age of 13 in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). The two
victims were Williams’s young daughters. The trial court imposed a life sentence for
each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Williams
unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences on direct appeal and in two
postconviction petitions filed in 2017 and 2019. State v. Williams, 2017-Ohio-8898
(1st Dist.); State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-1148 (1st Dist.).
{¶3} In July 2024, Williams filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment
seeking a declaration that R.C. 2907.01(A) is unconstitutional because its definition of
“sexual conduct” is vague and ambiguous. He takes issue with the phrase “however
slight” in the definition:
‘Sexual Conduct’ means vaginal intercourse between a male and female
. . . and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any
part of the body . . . into the vaginal . . . opening of another. Penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal . . . intercourse.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2907.01(A). Williams argues that the phrase “however slight”
is unconstitutionally vague and, because that phrase does not indicate a specific
“measurement,” then this results in some people being charged with rape and others
with gross sexual imposition, solely at the whim of the prosecutor. Thus, he argues
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that his convictions for rape, which were based on this vague definition of “sexual
conduct,” should be vacated, and he should be released from prison immediately.
{¶4} He also argues, and seeks a declaration, that his due process rights were
violated at his criminal trial because his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective,
the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor
allegedly lied to the grand jury about whether Williams had confessed to the criminal
conduct. Finally, he contends that his convictions violate equal protection guarantees
in the Ohio and United States Constitutions because he was charged with rape instead
of gross sexual imposition.
{¶5} In his complaint, Williams sued both the Hamilton County Prosecutor
(“the county prosecutor”) as well as the Ohio Attorney General (“the AG”). Before the
AG could file a response to Williams’s complaint, the county prosecutor moved to
dismiss the action, arguing that Williams did not meet the justiciability requirement
of a declaratory judgment action, which limits such actions to an actual or “live”
controversy. In support, the county prosecutor cited this court’s decision in State v.
Braggs, 2013-Ohio-3364 (1st Dist.), where we held that “because of the justiciability
requirement, a declaratory judgment action does not provide a means for determining
whether previously-adjudicated rights were properly decided.” Id. at ¶ 7. The trial
court, agreeing with the county prosecutor that a justiciable controversy did not exist,
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.
{¶6} Williams now appeals, raising four assignments of error, which can
reasonably be read together to challenge the dismissal of his action.
II. Analysis
{¶7} To obtain a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a real
controversy exists between the parties, (2) the controversy is justiciable in character,
4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and (3) speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties. Moore v.
Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 49. A trial court properly dismisses a declaratory
judgment action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) where there is no justiciable controversy
between the parties. Redman v. Sheward, 2018-Ohio-2609, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.).
{¶8} We review de novo dismissals by the trial court under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
Tri-State Computer Exchange, Inc. v. Burt, 2003-Ohio-3197, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.).
However, “[j]usticiability is a threshold requirement for a declaratory judgment.”
Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2019-Ohio-4809, ¶ 44, citing Arnott v. Arnott, 2012-Ohio-
3208, ¶ 10. We review a trial court’s decision regarding justiciability of a declaratory
judgment action for an abuse of discretion. Arnott at ¶ 13.
{¶9} A justiciable controversy is one where “[t]he danger or dilemma of the
plaintiff must be present, not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future
events . . .” and there is “a genuine dispute between parties having adverse legal
interest of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.” High St. Props. L.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 2015-Ohio-1451, ¶ 29 (8th
Dist.), citing Mid-Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Heasley, 2007-Ohio-1248, ¶ 9, and Brewer
v. Middletown, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3983, *10 (12th Dist. Aug. 3, 1992).
{¶10} Upon careful review of the record, we hold that Williams has not
presented a justiciable controversy in his declaratory judgment action. Instead, what
Williams is attempting to do is collaterally attack his rape convictions, something that
he cannot do in a declaratory judgment action. State v. Lingo, 2014-Ohio-1052. In
Lingo, the Ohio Supreme Court explained,
Although the purpose of the [declaratory judgment] act is to declare
rights in the face of uncertainty, it is well settled that declaratory
judgment is not a proper vehicle for determining whether rights that
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
were previously adjudicated were properly adjudicated. For direct and
collateral attacks alike, declaratory judgment is simply not a part of the
criminal appellate or postconviction review process. Ohio’s Criminal
Rules and statutes provide for the direct review of criminal judgments
through appeal, and collateral attacks through postconviction petitions,
habeas corpus, and motions to vacate. A declaratory-judgment action
cannot be used as a substitute for any of these remedies.
(Cleaned up.) Id. at ¶ 44; see Braggs, 2013-Ohio-3364, at ¶ 6 (1st Dist.) (holding a
declaratory judgment action cannot be used as “a means for mounting a collateral
challenge to a criminal conviction.”).
{¶11} Here, Williams’s complaint for declaratory judgment requested that his
convictions be vacated because of the unconstitutionality of the statute defining sexual
conduct and he requested that he immediately be released from prison. The
arguments in his complaint before the trial court all focused on alleged errors that
occurred at his criminal trial and why those errors necessitate the reversal of his
convictions. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that, in essence, Williams was
attempting to collaterally attack his convictions via a declaratory judgment action.
{¶12} Williams argues that his action presents a justiciable controversy
because he is still in prison based upon what he contends is an unconstitutional
criminal statute. But he is in prison because the controversy between him and the
State was previously litigated at trial. He cannot now use a declaratory judgment
action to determine whether that controversy, i.e., whether he was guilty of rape, was
properly adjudicated. Instead, “[t]he criminal appellate and postconviction review
processes remain the sole avenues for redress.” Lingo at ¶ 45; see R.C. 2953.21(K)
(except for direct appeals, the relief set forth in R.C. 2953.21 is the exclusive remedy
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
by which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or
sentence in a criminal case).
{¶13} Because Williams’s complaint is a collateral attack on his convictions,
we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that he had
failed to present a justiciable controversy in his declaratory judgment action. And
because there was no justiciable controversy presented in his complaint, the trial court
did not err by dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim. The four
assignments of error are overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶14} Having overruled all four assignments of error, we affirm the trial
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS and MOORE, JJ., concur.