Williams v. Gould

CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
DecidedFebruary 20, 2003
Docket2003-UP-153
StatusUnpublished

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Bluebook
Williams v. Gould, (S.C. Ct. App. 2003).

Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

James W. Williams,        Respondent,

v.

Otis David Gould,        Appellant.


Appeal From Colleton County
Luke N. Brown, Jr., Circuit Court Judge


Unpublished Opinion No. 03-UP-153
Heard December 10, 2002 – Filed February 20, 2003


REVERSED AND REMANDED


Deborah R.J. Shupe, of Columbia; Robert J. Harte, of Aiken; for appellant.

Ronnie L. Crosby, of Hampton; for respondent.

PER CURIAM:           In this boundary line dispute, Otis Gould appeals the trial court’s order finding he trespassed on property owned by James Williams, arguing the record evidence supports his acquiescence of title defense.  We reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In June 1961, Raymond M. Gatch conveyed a parcel of land fronting the Edisto River in Colleton County to G.M. Gould.  Sometime in 1962 or 1963, Gould built a small cabin on the property.  In the early 1970’s, Bill Hadley, an adjoining landowner, dug a canal separating the property on which Gould’s house sat from his own.  The canal stretched from the river to  within 200 feet of state road S-15-30, the western border of the Hadley property.  A few years later Gould gifted the back (non-waterfront) part of his lot to Dolphus and Betty Bridges.  In July 1990, Gould conveyed the waterfront portion to his son, Otis Gould.  The transfer deed clearly describes the waterfront area as being 57.5 feet wide. 

In November 1993, James Williams bought the former Hadley property from First National Bank.  Prior to purchasing the land, Williams hired Gene Whetsell, a registered land surveyor familiar with the area, to subdivide the parcel into separate tracts.  Whetsell prepared a plat designating the land as follows:  Tract “A” (1.72 acres), Tract “B” (11.15 acres), and Tract “C” (2.32 acres).  The plat depicts Tract “C” bounded on the west by Tract “B,” on the south by a canal, on the east by the Edisto River, and on the north by the canal and property of Otis Gould and Dolphus Bridges. [1]  

The following year Williams notified Gould that he believed several of Gould’s structures were lying over his property line.  Although Gould subsequently retained an attorney, the parties never resolved the matter. 

In 1997 Williams again hired Whetsell to further divide Tract “C” into three relatively uniform lots facing the Edisto River.  These lots were also designated “A,” “B,” and “C.”  Whetsell’s plat indicates Lot “A” is the northern-most section of Tract “C,” and thus lies directly across from the property owned by Gould and Bridges.

In January 1999, Williams filed a complaint for trespass, alleging Gould had “erected structures and placed sewerage lines across the common property boundary.”  Gould answered and, in addition to a general denial, asserted the complete defense of acquiescence of title.  Gould contended both his and Williams’ ancestors in title “acquiesced to the northern edge of the aforesaid canal as the boundary line between the two properties.” 

Following a bench trial on October 2, 2000, the trial court issued an order adopting the boundary line established by Gene Whetsell, Williams’s expert, as the true dividing line between the properties.  As a result, the court ordered the parties to split the costs of a new survey and plat reflecting this boundary.  The trial court also found Gould had committed a trespass and awarded $2,500 in attorney’s fees to Williams.  This appeal followed. 

LAW/ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

If a boundary dispute encompasses an issue of title, the trial thereon is an action at law.  Knox v. Bogan, 322 S.C. 64, 472 S.E.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1996).  “In actions at law tried without a jury, the findings of fact of the judge will not be disturbed on appeal unless found to be without evidence which reasonably supports them.”  Id. at 66, 472 S.E.2d at 45; see Townes Assocs.  Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976).  Thus, the trial court’s factual findings “have the same force and effect as a jury verdict unless the court committed some error of law leading it to an erroneous conclusion or unless the evidence is reasonably susceptible only of a conclusion opposite of [that] reached by the court.”  Knox, 322 S.C. at 71, 472 S.E.2d at 47-48. 

Discussion

It is well settled that a boundary line may be established “by mutual recognition of and acquiescence in a particular line.”  Croft v. Sanders, 283 S.C. 507, 509, 323 S.E.2d 791, 792 (Ct. App. 1984); see Kirkland v. Gross, 286 S.C. 193, 197, 332 S.E.2d 546, 548-49 (Ct. App. 1985) (“A disputed boundary line can be established by acquiescence of the parties.”).  Thus, “‘if adjoining landowners occupy their respective premises up to a certain line which they mutually recognize and acquiesce in for a long period of time . . . they are precluded from claiming that the boundary line thus recognized and acquiesced in is not the true one.’”  Knox, 322 S.C. at 71-72, 472 S.E.2d at 48 (quoting Klapman v. Hook, 206 S.C. 51, 57, 32 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1945)); see Gardner v. Mozingo, 293 S.C. 23, 26, 358 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1987).  In other words, if acquiescence in a boundary is shown for a sufficient period of time, a “‘conclusive presumption [arises] that the line thus acquiesced in is the true boundary line. ’”  Knox, 322 S.C. at 71-72, 472 S.E.2d at 48 (quoting Klapman, 206 S.C. at 57, 32 S.E.2d at 884).  

The party claiming a boundary by acquiescence bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence. [2]   See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries §§ 104, 116 (1938); cf. Croft, 283 S.C. at 509, 323 S.E.2d at 792.  Acquiescence itself “is a question of fact determined by the intent of the parties.”  Kirkland, 286 S.C. at 198, 332 S.E.2d at 549.  As such, it may be proved by any evidence which would satisfy a person that the purported boundary “had been accepted by both of the adjoining landowners as a dividing line between them.”  11 C.J.S.

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Related

Gardner v. Mozingo
358 S.E.2d 390 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1987)
Townes Associates, Ltd. v. City of Greenville
221 S.E.2d 773 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1976)
Giles v. Parker
403 S.E.2d 130 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1991)
Croft v. Sanders
323 S.E.2d 791 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1984)
Kirkland v. Gross
332 S.E.2d 546 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1985)
Knox v. Bogan
472 S.E.2d 43 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 1996)
Klapman v. Hook
32 S.E.2d 882 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1945)

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Williams v. Gould, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-gould-scctapp-2003.