Williams v. Fisher

New York Court of Common Pleas

Williams v. Fisher

28 N.Y.S. 739, 8 Misc. 314, 59 N.Y. St. Rep. 282

CourtNew York Court of Common Pleas

DecidedMay 17, 1894

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 28 N.Y.S. 739 (Williams v. Fisher) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Common Pleas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Williams v. Fisher, 28 N.Y.S. 739, 8 Misc. 314, 59 N.Y. St. Rep. 282 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1894).

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Opinion

BOOKSTAVER, J.

This action was brought to recover attorney’s fees for services rendered in an action in the supreme court which was settled between the parties without the consent of the plaintiff’s attorney in that action, being the respondent herein. Upon the trial the release so executed between the parties was given in evidence; and, thereafter, respondent introduced oral testimony tending to show what his charges vrere, and that the appellant herein, being defendant in the supreme court action, undertook to pay them. This was objected to by appellant on the ground that no oral testimony could be given to vary, enlarge, or define the written release. This contention is undoubtedly good, as between the parties to the contract itself, but not as to strangers to it, as the respondent in this case was. The rule prohibiting the reception of parol evidence to vary or modify a written agreement does not apply where the original contract was verbal and entire, and a part, only, reduced to writing. Nor does it apply to a collateral undertaking,. or to a stranger to the contract. Besides, where a promise is made by a party as a condition of compromise of a litigation for another’s benefit, that other can maintain an action upon it. See Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181; Rector v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 583, 24 N. E. 1014; Gifford v. Corrigan, 105 N. Y. 223, 11 N. E. 498; Id. 117 N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756. The judgment must therefore be affirmed, with costs.

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BOOKSTAVER, J.

This action was brought to recover attorney’s fees for services rendered in an action in the supreme court which was settled between the parties without the consent of the plaintiff’s attorney in that action, being the respondent herein. Upon the trial the release so executed between the parties was given in evidence; and, thereafter, respondent introduced oral testimony tending to show what his charges vrere, and that the appellant herein, being defendant in the supreme court action, undertook to pay them. This was objected to by appellant on the ground that no oral testimony could be given to vary, enlarge, or define the written release. This contention is undoubtedly good, as between the parties to the contract itself, but not as to strangers to it, as the respondent in this case was. The rule prohibiting the reception of parol evidence to vary or modify a written agreement does not apply where the original contract was verbal and entire, and a part, only, reduced to writing. Nor does it apply to a collateral undertaking,. or to a stranger to the contract. Besides, where a promise is made by a party as a condition of compromise of a litigation for another’s benefit, that other can maintain an action upon it. See Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181; Rector v. Teed, 120 N. Y. 583, 24 N. E. 1014; Gifford v. Corrigan, 105 N. Y. 223, 11 N. E. 498; Id. 117 N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756. The judgment must therefore be affirmed, with costs.

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Bluebook (online)

28 N.Y.S. 739, 8 Misc. 314, 59 N.Y. St. Rep. 282, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-fisher-nyctcompl-1894.

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