Williams v. Facebook, Inc.

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Williams v. Facebook, Inc.. Read the opinion of the Court — 384 F. Supp. 3d 1043
District Court, N.D. California·Decided November 7, 2019·No. 3:18-cv-01881·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 LAWRENCE OLIN, et al., Case No. 18-cv-01881-RS (TSH)

8 Plaintiffs, DISCOVERY ORDER 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 110 10 FACEBOOK, INC., 11 Defendant.

12 13 The parties have filed a joint discovery statement concerning whether Plaintiffs Lawrence 14 Olin, et al., may disclose Defendant Facebook, Inc.’s source code to their proposed experts, Dr. 15 Istvan Jonyer and Dr. Jae young Bang. ECF No. 110. The Court continued the hearing on this 16 dispute pending a ruling on Facebook’s motion to dismiss. On October 31, 2019, the parties filed 17 a status report concerning this dispute, ECF No. 144, and the Court heard oral argument today. 18 By way of background, Plaintiffs are suing Facebook for its alleged exploitation of a 19 vulnerability in the permission setting for the Facebook Messenger1 smartphone application that 20 existed in prior versions of the Android operating system. Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 88. 21 When users install the app, they are prompted to grant Facebook access to their contacts and then 22 are given the choice to allow or deny. But when they made that choice, the app scraped users’ call 23 and text logs, which Facebook then monetized for advertising purposes. Id. Or at least that’s the 24 allegation. Plaintiffs say this conduct ended in October 2017, when the Android OS fully 25 deprecated this vulnerability in all versions of the Android SDK. Id. ¶ 22. They now purport to 26 sue on behalf of a nationwide class for violations of the California Computer Data Access and 27 1 Fraud Act, violations of the California right to privacy, and for intrusion upon seclusion, unjust 2 enrichment and fraud. Id. ¶¶ 36-65. 3 On April 3, 2019, Plaintiffs provided Facebook with a list of their proposed experts to 4 whom they intend to show Facebook’s source code. Facebook objected to two of them, Jonyer 5 and Bang. As to Jonyer, Facebook objected that he “worked for Facebook competitor Google 6 from August 2010 to February 2012.” ECF No. 110-1, Ex. A. In addition, Facebook objected that 7 Jonyer has an “active consulting business working with a variety of technology companies, 8 including NearMe, NimbleVR, and startups coming out of Stanford and in the ‘ex-Google 9 network.’” Id. As to Bang, Facebook objected that he “worked for Kakao Corporation for three- 10 and-a-half years until just two months ago when he left to work for Quandry Peak Research. As 11 Dr. Bang’s resume discloses, he designed and implemented the user identity platform used by over 12 100 million people who use Kakao services, including KakaoTalk, which is a messaging app 13 available on Android devices.” Id. 14 The Protective Order in this action, ECF No. 91, states that “the Party opposing disclosure 15 to the Expert shall bear the burden of proving that the risk of harm that the disclosure would entail 16 (under the safeguards proposed) outweighs the Receiving Party’s need to disclose the Protected 17 Material to its Expert.” Id. ¶ 7.5 (unnumbered subparagraph). But it also defines an expert as “a 18 person with specialized knowledge or experience in a matter pertinent to the litigation who (1) has 19 been retained by a Party or its counsel to serve as an expert witness or as a consultant in this 20 action, (2) is not a past or current employee of a Party or of a Party’s competitor, and (3) at the 21 time of retention, is not anticipated to become an employee of a Party or of a Party’s competitor.” 22 Id. ¶ 2.6 (emphasis added). Facebook argues that Jonyer and Bang do not come within the 23 definition of an “expert” and therefore are per se disqualified under the Protective Order, and thus 24 Facebook has no burden to prove risk of harm under paragraph 7.5. In other words, as Facebook 25 reads the Protective Order, the definition of an “expert” screens out certain groups of people who 26 are categorically unqualified from being an expert, and then leaves a subset of people who are 27 presumptively qualified, and the burden under paragraph 7.5 only applies to people in that subset. 1 Facebook’s interpretation of the Protective Order and additionally argue that no showing of risk of 2 harm has been made here. 3 As an initial matter, it is factually true that both Jonyer and Bang are past employees of a 4 competitor of Facebook’s. Jonyer worked for Google in 2010-12. ECF No. 110-1, Ex. B. Google 5 competes with Facebook for advertising revenue, as Plaintiffs themselves allege. Sec. Am. 6 Compl. ¶ 17 (“the online advertising industry has formed into a duopoly between Facebook and 7 Google”). Also, Gmail and Google’s messaging applications are services that compete with 8 Facebook Messenger. Jonyer’s work at Google focused on Google TV, the predecessor to 9 Chromecast, ECF No. 110-1, Ex. B, and no one contends that product was or is in competition 10 with Facebook.2 Bang worked for Kako from 2015-2019. ECF No. 110-1, Ex. C. Kakao makes a 11 messaging app that competes with Facebook Messenger. Plaintiffs assert that Bang’s work was 12 limited to the app’s user authentication platform and that he did not participate in the development 13 of KakaoTalk (the messaging app). 14 The Protective Order in this action is based on the District’s model order. As Facebook 15 observes, at least one court in this district has rejected an attempt to modify the model order in a 16 way that would have allowed the plaintiffs to hire former employees of a defendant’s competitors 17 as experts, noting the “unnecessary risk of competitive harm if the court permitted Plaintiffs to 18 hire the former employees of [Defendant’s] competitors as experts.” Corley v. Google, Inc., 2016 19 WL 3421402, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 22, 2016). In TVIIM, LLC v. McAfee, Inc., 2014 WL 2768641 20 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2014), the Court explained that “[t]his district clearly requires that an ‘expert’ 21 under the Protective Order may not be ‘a past or current employee of a Party or of a Party’s 22 competitor,’” id. at *2. In that case, the plaintiff’s proposed expert was then-currently employed 23 by ImmuneSoft, which defendant McAfee claimed was a competitor. Id. When the plaintiff failed 24 to address that issue head on, the Court took that as a concession and found that the proposed 25 expert “is not an ‘expert’ as defined by the Protective Order.” That section of the Court’s order 26 2 As to Jonyer’s ongoing consulting business, Facebook does not identify any particular client that 27 was or is a competitor. Further, paragraph 2.6 of the Protective Order states that the expert cannot 1 did not go on to assess the risk of harm in determining whether to allow that person to serve as an 2 expert. In isolation, that section of the order therefore seems to support Facebook’s view that 3 paragraph 2.6 of the protective order categorically excludes certain people from the definition of 4 an expert, so no further analysis of risk of harm is needed. On the other hand, the proposed expert 5 in TVIIM was also a named inventor of the patent at issue, and in the next section of the order the 6 Court held that this was an additional reason not to allow him to have access the defendant’s 7 confidential information, and the Court included an analysis of risk of harm in that section of the 8 order. Accordingly, this case does not cleanly support Facebook’s argument that being outside of 9 the definition of “expert” is the end of the matter, since the Court did end up doing an analysis of 10 risk of harm, albeit in the next section of the order. 11 Plaintiffs cite to Codexis, Inc v. EnzymeWorks, Inc., 2017 WL 5992130 (N.D. Cal. Dec.

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Williams v. Facebook, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2019).

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