Williams v. Eckl

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedNovember 7, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-01189
StatusUnknown

This text of Williams v. Eckl (Williams v. Eckl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Eckl, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JOVAN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-cv-1189-bhl

CO ECKL, SGT. SCHULTZ-PHALIN, CO KRAMMER, CPT. LARSON, KELSEY E. GRUEBNAU, DEVONA M. GRUBER, KAYLA P. MIEDEMA, SUPERINTENDENT BERRES, NELSON, BAUER, KYLE K. TRITT, SANCHEZ, JOSHUA ADDERTON and JOHN AND JANE DOES,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Jovan Williams, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at Columbia Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Williams’ motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee, motion to reconsider the initial partial filing fee, motion for free copies, and to screen the complaint. MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE Williams has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). Williams has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, as required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), and has been assessed a partial filing fee of $285.61. On October 12, 2022, Williams filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider the

amount of the initial partial filing fee. Dkt. No. 6. He explains that he has no money in his regular account and only $21.04 in his release account. He further explains that he received a one-time tax refund of $1,428.05, but he never had access to that money because prison officials applied the entire amount to his debts and obligations. Williams asserts that he has no financial support and cannot afford such a substantial initial partial filing fee. Without doubt, the sizable one-time deposit into Williams’ account significantly impacted the amount of the initial partial filing fee that he must pay to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1)(A) (requiring a prisoner to pay a partial fee of 20% of the average monthly deposits for the 6-month period preceding the filing of the complaint). Williams otherwise has had no deposits into his account and does not expect future deposits. As he notes, he currently has

no money in his regular account. Given the unique circumstances of a one-time tax refund, the Court will waive Williams’ obligation to pay an initial partial filing fee and will grant his motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(4). Williams will be required to pay the $350 filing fee over time as set forth at the end of this decision. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT Williams asserts that he was placed into clinical observation status on October 9, 2019. According to the exhibits Williams attached to his complaint, Defendant Kelsey Gruebnau decided the placement was necessary because Williams had submitted two crisis psychological services requests in one week, in which he stated that he was depressed and needed to be removed from his cell to prevent “future self-destruction.” Dkt. No. 1-1 at 5. Williams was given a smock, a security mat that was affixed to the concrete floor, and access to toilet paper. Id. He was not allowed any other property, including clothing or bedding. According to Williams, upon entering the cell, he

immediately noticed that it was very cold and filthy. He asserts that cold air was blowing through the vent in his cell as well as through the vent outside his cell. Further, according to Williams, the sleeping mat, floor, vent, and door were covered in dried semen, feces, and urine. Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Williams asserts that for five days he repeatedly asked all Defendants (except Berres) to clean the cell and/or to give him a blanket or turn up the heat, but his requests were ignored or denied. He explains that he was nearly naked and had nothing with which to keep himself warm. He states that he had to use the dirty mat and that he barely slept, got sick, and ached all over because of the cold. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS “The Eighth Amendment prohibits the States from subjecting prisoners to conditions of

confinement amounting to cruel and unusual punishment.” Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). To state a claim, a plaintiff must allege that “the conditions are sufficiently serious—i.e., that they deny the inmate the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities, creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety,” and that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Id. (citations omitted).

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez
914 F.3d 1040 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Richards v. HSBC Technology & Services USA, Inc.
303 F. App'x 356 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
Williams v. Eckl, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-eckl-wied-2022.