Williams v. Dorethy

2019 IL App (3d) 180135

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 16, 2019
• Docket: 3-18-0135
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2019 IL App (3d) 180135

Opinion filed September 16, 2019 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

KEITH L. WILLIAMS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit, Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Knox County, Illinois. ) v. ) Appeal No. 3-18-0135 ) Circuit No. 18-MR-18 STEPHANIE DORETHY, Warden, ) Hill Correctional Center, et al., ) The Honorable ) Scott Shipplett, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ) ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Carter dissented, with opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 The plaintiff, Keith L. Williams, an inmate at the Hill Correctional Center (HCC),

requested leave to file a mandamus petition against numerous defendants, including Stephanie

Dorethy, the warden of HCC. The court allowed the filing and sua sponte dismissed the petition.

On appeal, Williams argues that the court erred when it dismissed his petition. We reverse and

remand. ¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On February 13, 2018, Williams filed a pro se request for leave to file a mandamus

petition against the defendants. The petition alleged various violations and/or abuses of prison

policies by HCC administration and staff.

¶4 In a letter to Williams dated February 15, 2018, the circuit court allowed the petition to

be filed and dismissed the petition. After citing case law on what is required to survive a

challenge to the legal sufficiency of a mandamus complaint, the court stated:

“Your Petition is an amalgamation of every complaint that

you have against the Department of Corrections, against the

Judgment of Conviction, actions in Federal Court, housing

placement, denial of a ‘holiday shop’ handling of disciplinary

reports, and really countless other grievances, none of which touch

on the simple 4 requirements of a Mandamus complaint as stated

above.

For these reasons, the Court will allow your filing without

cost, deny your Petition for Counsel, and Dismiss the Petition

Instanter.”

The dismissal was entered before any of the defendants had been served.

¶5 Williams filed a timely notice of appeal. The record indicates that the defendants were

never notified of the appeal; no appellee’s brief was filed.

¶6 II. ANALYSIS

¶7 On appeal, Williams argues that the circuit court erred when it dismissed his mandamus

petition.

2 ¶8 Initially, we note that the lack of an appellee’s brief is not necessarily an impediment to

the resolution of an appeal. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63

Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976). Because the record and issue presented in this case is simple, we will

decide the appeal on its merits. Id.

¶9 “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy appropriate to enforce as a matter of public right

the performance of official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part

is involved.” Madden v. Cronson, 114 Ill. 2d 504, 514 (1986). The provisions on mandamus

contained in the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/14-101 to 14-109 (West 2016))

provide a specific framework for circuit courts to follow once a mandamus petition has been

filed. Carroll v. Akpore, 2014 IL App (3d) 130731, ¶ 3.

¶ 10 In nearly identical circumstances, this court in Carroll addressed the question of whether

a circuit court can sua sponte dismiss a mandamus petition. Id. In that case, the petitioner sought

an order compelling proper food preparation as required by statute. Id. ¶ 1. The circuit court

dismissed the petition within days of its filing and before the defendants were even served. Id.

¶ 11 In analyzing the issue, the Carroll court noted that the mandamus provisions in the Code

required service on the defendants and did not provide for “summary dismissal” of the petition.

Id. ¶ 3. However, the Carroll court acknowledged that our supreme court has held that a

mandamus petition can be “summarily dismissed” if the relief it sought was cognizable in a

postconviction petition—even if the petition was not labeled as a postconviction petition. Id.

(citing People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 50-51 (2005)). Because the relief sought by the

plaintiff was not cognizable in a postconviction petition, the Carroll court concluded that the

circuit court erred when it sua sponte dismissed the plaintiff’s petition. Id. ¶ 4. Lastly, the

Carroll court emphasized that it was not addressing the defendant’s petition on its merits, but

3 rather was remanding the case for service of the petition on the defendants. Id. (stating that “[t]he

fact that the petition may have no merit does not allow the trial court to disregard the procedural

framework provided in the Code and the mandamus statute”).

¶ 12 We believe the same outcome from Carroll is mandated in this case. The circuit court

dismissed Williams’s mandamus petition without following the clear statutory procedure

contained in the Code. The petition alleged various violations and/or abuses of prison policies by

HCC administration and staff, which are not the type of arguments that can be raised in a

postconviction petition. See People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 471 (2006) (holding that “[t]o

be entitled to postconviction relief, a defendant must show that he has suffered a substantial

deprivation of his federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the

conviction or sentence being challenged”). Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred

when it sua sponte dismissed Williams’s petition. See Carroll, 2014 IL App (3d) 130731, ¶ 4.

We remand the case for service of the petition on the defendants. See id. ¶ 5.

¶ 13 Lastly, we acknowledge the dissent’s position and the existence of older cases from other

districts that stand for the proposition that a circuit court can sua sponte dismiss a mandamus

complaint based on the court’s inherent authority to control its docket. See Mason v. Snyder, 332

Ill. App. 3d 834, 842 (2002); Owens v. Snyder, 349 Ill. App. 3d 35, 45 (2004). However, we

choose to follow Carroll, which is a much more recent case from our own district, especially in

light of the clear statutory directive in section 14-102 (735 ILCS 5/14-102 (West 2016)) that the

clerk “shall” issue a summons to the defendant after a mandamus petition has been filed. See

Carroll, 2014 IL App (3d) 130731, ¶ 3. The legislature is aware of how to provide for sua sponte

dismissals of pleadings (see, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016) (providing

authorization for dismissals of postconviction petitions that are frivolous and patently without

4 merit)); if the legislature had intended for sua sponte dismissals of mandamus petitions, they

would have so provided.

¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15 The judgment of the circuit court of Knox County is reversed, and the cause is remanded.

¶ 16 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 17 JUSTICE CARTER, dissenting:

¶ 18 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision in the present case. Although I have

agreed with the majority on this issue in the past, upon further reflection and additional research,

I would now hold that the trial court has inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss or strike a

mandamus petition that is frivolous or patently without merit. See Mason v. Snyder, 332 Ill. App.

3d 834, 842 (2002); Owens v. Snyder, 349 Ill. App. 3d 35, 45 (2004). In my opinion, the trial

court has the ability to do so based upon its inherent authority to control its courtroom and its

docket. See Mason, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 842; Owens, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 45. I would, therefore,

affirm the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of the frivolous and patently meritless mandamus

petition in the instant case.

5 No. 3-18-0135

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County, No. 18-MR-18; the Hon. Scott Shipplett, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Keith L. Williams, of Galesburg, appellant pro se. for Appellant:

Attorneys No brief filed for appellees. for Appellee: