UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA __ ) OSCAR WILLIAMS ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 17-1653 (EGS) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ) ) Defendant. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Oscar Williams brings this action alleging
defendant Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) discriminated
against him because of his sexual orientation, retaliated
against him, and created a hostile work environment in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq., and the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act (“DCHRA”), D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1402.21. Specifically,
Mr. Williams alleges that MPD took a series of actions resulting
in his eventual termination after learning about Mr. Williams’
same-sex marriage. Pending before the Court is MPD’s motion to
dismiss the amended complaint. Upon consideration of the amended
complaint, MPD’s motion, the response and reply thereto, and the
applicable law, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
MPD’s motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Court finds that Mr.
Williams’ claims based on discrimination and retaliation may proceed, but that he has failed to adequately allege a claim
based on hostile work environment.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Williams is a married gay man. Am. Compl., ECF No. 11 ¶
6. In 2016, Mr. Williams applied for a Management Supervisory
Service position of Supervisor at MPD. Id. ¶ 7. On or about May
5, 2016, Mr. Williams was notified that he was hired for the
position, and that the “background investigation unit” would
contact him to begin the hiring process. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
Approximately two and a half months later, Mr. Williams received
a call from MPD’s Human Resource Specialist Marie Dawkins who
notified Mr. Williams that he had successfully passed the
background investigation. Id. ¶ 16. Ms. Dawkins extended an
offer of employment to Mr. Williams, which he accepted. Id. ¶
18.
In the course of that call, Mr. Williams asked Ms. Dawkins
whether the salary associated with the position could be
negotiated, noting that his “partner” had advised him that
negotiation may be possible. Id. ¶¶ 19, 20. Ms. Dawkins asked
what he meant by “partner,” and Mr. Williams informed her that
he was gay. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. According to Mr. Williams, the
conversation “soured quickly” at that point, and Ms. Dawkins
told him that salary negotiations would “definitely not happen
in this situation.” Id. ¶ 23. Mr. Williams subsequently
2 contacted MPD’s Human Resource Department and complained to
Operations Manager Lennie Moore about the exchange with Ms.
Dawkins and her “offensive response.” Id. ¶ 24.
On or about August 5, 2016, Mr. Moore contacted Mr.
Williams to advise him that there was a “mishandling of
paperwork,” that the supervisory position he was offered was
going to be reposted, and that he would need to re-apply and re-
interview. Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Mr. Moore also informed Mr. Williams
that, in the meantime, MPD would offer him a “non-competitive
career service appointment” position. Id. ¶ 29. Mr. Williams
“reluctantly” accepted the appointment until he could re-apply
for the supervisory position. Id. ¶ 30. Mr. Williams alleges
that, around the same time, another employee, Lamont Mahone, was
hired for a position identical to the supervisory position for
which Mr. Williams was initially hired. Id. ¶ 26. Mr. Williams
believes that Mr. Mahone is a heterosexual man. Id.
On August 8, 2016, Mr. Williams met with Ms. Dawkins and
Human Resource Director Kathleen Crenshaw for orientation for
the non-competitive appointment position he accepted. Id. ¶ 31.
Mr. Williams alleges that, when he inquired about benefits for
his partner during an orientation session, he immediately
noticed “disdain and disgust in Ms. Dawkins’ body language,
tone, and voice in responding.” Id. ¶¶ 33-34. Moreover, Ms.
Dawkins “avoided interaction with Mr. Williams for the rest of
3 [that] day.” Id. ¶ 36. A few days later, Mr. Williams reported
the incident to Mr. Moore. Id. ¶ 37. In the course of this
conversation, Mr. Moore stated that Ms. Dawkins “was the person
who initially mishandled [Mr. Williams’] paperwork” and that she
was “not very fond” of gay men. Id. ¶¶ 38-40.
On September 7, 2016, after Mr. Williams had begun working
in the non-competitive position, he received a call from Ms.
Dawkins regarding the supervisory position for which he had
initially applied. Id. ¶ 47. Ms. Dawkins explained that “all
interviews were cancelled” and that Mr. Williams would “receive
a call if they were rescheduled.” Id. ¶ 47. Mr. Williams
subsequently spoke to Mr. Moore, who reiterated that Ms. Dawkins
was “not friendly” toward gay men and stated that Ms. Dawkins
had “once again incorrectly handled the situation.” Id. ¶¶ 48-
50.
On September 30, 2016, Mr. Williams’ immediate supervisor
instructed him to report to Human Resources. Id. ¶ 52. Upon
doing so, Mr. Williams was informed by Sergeant George Bernard
that his employment with MPD was terminated. Id. ¶¶ 52-53.
According to Sergeant Bernard, the purported reason for the
termination was because Mr. Williams was “not a DC resident when
he began employment and that ‘maybe’ the background check was
unsuccessful.” Id. ¶ 54. Notably, Mr. Williams alleges that the
reasons for termination provided by Sergeant Bernard were
4 different than the ones listed in the written confirmation of
his termination that he later received. Id. ¶¶ 57-59.
Based on these facts, Mr. William claims that MPD
discriminated against him — and eventually terminated him —
because of his sexual orientation. Mr. Williams’s amended
complaint alleges that MPD violated Title VII and the DCHRA by
(1) discriminating against him on the basis of his sexual
orientation, (2) retaliating against him after he complained to
Human Resources, and (3) creating a hostile work environment.
See Am. Compl., ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 63-98. MPD moved to dismiss
plaintiff’s amended complaint, arguing that Mr. Williams failed
to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for sex
discrimination, retaliation or a hostile work environment. See
Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss. Am. Compl. (“Def.’s
Mem.”), ECF No. 13 at 7. MPD’s motion is now ripe and ready for
the Court’s adjudication.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
5 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation
marks omitted). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to
dismiss [pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)], a judge must accept as true
all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the
court must give the plaintiff the “benefit of all inferences
that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI
Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Despite this liberal pleading standard, to survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially
plausible when the facts pled in the complaint allow the court
to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to
a “probability requirement,” but it does require more than a
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Mr. Williams alleges thee different claims under Title VII
and the DCHRA based on (1) discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, (2) retaliation; and (3) hostile work environment.
Because the legal standards for establishing these claims under
6 both Title VII and the DCHRA are substantively the same, see
e.g., Carpenter v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 165 F.3d 69, 72
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that, “[i]n interpreting its Human
Rights Act the District of Columbia . . . generally seems ready
to accept the federal constructions of Title VII, given the
substantial similarity between it and the D.C. Human Rights
Act”), the Court will analyze Mr. Williams’ claims under these
statutes together.
To bring an actionable discrimination claim, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the unfavorable
action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. See Stella
v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Easaw v. Newport,
253 F. Supp. 3d 22, 28 (D.D.C. 2017). A plaintiff need not plead
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
at the motion to dismiss stage, but rather, need only allege
facts that “give the defendant fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002).
Consistent with this principle, “courts in this Circuit have
consistently recognized the ‘ease with which a plaintiff
claiming employment discrimination can survive . . . a motion to
dismiss.’” Fennell v. AARP, 770 F. Supp. 2d 118, 127 (D.D.C.
2011) (citation omitted).
7 MPD does not dispute that Mr. Williams is a member of a
protected class1 or that he suffered an adverse employment
action. Instead, the only dispute is whether Mr. Williams has
sufficiently alleged facts suggesting that any adverse action he
suffered was because of his sexual orientation. Specifically,
MPD argues that Mr. Williams has not alleged that the
individuals who made the decision to force plaintiff to reapply
for his supervisory position — and who decided, eventually, to
terminate plaintiff’s employment — were aware of his sexual
orientation. Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 13 at 11-12. MPD posits that
it is “implausible” that Ms. Dawkins, the human resources
specialist who purportedly is “not very fond” of gay men and
allegedly behaved in a discriminatory manner, “had the authority
to require Plaintiff to reapply” for the supervisory position.
Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 13 at 12. MPD’s arguments in this regard
1 The Court notes that, while the DCHRA specifically prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation, D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1402.21, courts are split as to whether sexual- orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title VII, compare Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation”), with Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 351-52 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (“a person who alleges that she experienced employment discrimination on the basis of her sexual orientation has put forth a case of sex discrimination for Title VII purposes”). The D.C. Circuit has not yet confronted this question. Because defendant “assumes that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination encompasses claims based on sexual orientation,” see Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 13 at 11 n.1, the Court need not decide the issue at this time. 8 are unpersuasive. Questions about the scope of Ms. Dawkins’
authority and the depth of the terminating officials’ knowledge
regarding Mr. Williams’ sexual orientation raise “factual
question[s]” that are “not properly resolved at the motion-to-
dismiss stage when all reasonable inferences must be drawn to
the plaintiff’s benefit.” Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 723 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
In any event, Mr. Williams provides considerable detail
with respect to his allegations in his amended complaint,
pointing to specific dates on which purportedly discriminatory
interactions occurred and naming specific individuals involved.
For example, Mr. Williams alleges that he was told that he
passed a background check and was offered a supervisory position
with the MPD. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 8-18. He claims that
it was only after he told Ms. Dawkins that he was a gay man that
the conversation about his employment “soured,” and he claims
that it was Ms. Dawkins who “mishandled” the paperwork that led
to his supervisory position being reposted. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 27-28,
38. He further alleges that another individual, who was a
heterosexual man, was hired for “an identical position” around
the same time. Id. ¶ 26. These factual allegations, if true,
make plaintiff’s claim “‘plausible on its face,’ and therefore
the allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”
9 Ryan-White v. Blank, 922 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 (D.D.C. 2013).
Therefore, MPD’s motion to dismiss Mr. Williams’ discrimination
claims is denied.
Likewise, Mr. Williams has sufficiently pled his
retaliation claims. To state a claim for retaliation under Title
VII and the DCHRA, a plaintiff must allege (1) that he engaged
in statutorily protected activity; (2) that he suffered a
materially adverse action by his employer; and (3) that a causal
link connects the two. Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677
(D.C. Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
need not plead all elements of his prima facie case.
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. Instead, at “this early stage of
the proceedings, [the] plaintiff can meet h[is] prima
facie burden of causation simply by alleging that the adverse
actions were caused by h[is] protected activity.’” Hoskins v.
Howard Univ., 839 F. Supp. 2d 268, 279–80 (D.D.C. 2012)
(citation omitted).
MPD does not contest that Mr. Williams was engaging in a
statutorily protected activity or that he suffered a materially
adverse action. See Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 13 at 14-15. Instead,
MPD contends that Mr. Williams “fails to plausibly allege any
causal link between his protected activity and [MPD’s] allegedly
retaliatory conduct.” Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 13 at 14. According
to MPD, this is because Mr. Williams has not alleged that Ms.
10 Dawkins or the terminating officials knew that Mr. Williams had
engaged in a protected activity — i.e., making a complaint to
Human Resources. Id. In addition, MPD argues that Mr. Williams
has not alleged that any of the terminating officials knew about
Mr. Williams’ sexual orientation, and there is no “plausible
allegation that Dawkins made the decision to require [Mr.
Williams] to re-apply for the supervisory position or cancel his
scheduled interviews.” Id.
MPD’s arguments are unavailing at the motion-to-dismiss
stage. The D.C. Circuit has held that a plaintiff is not
required to allege that a specific supervisor had knowledge of
protected activity to plead a claim for retaliation. See e.g.,
Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In
Hamilton, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to
show that the supervisor who took the adverse employment action
had knowledge of the plaintiff’s complaint to the agency. Id. at
1358. In reversing the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s retaliation
claim, the D.C. Circuit explained that, at the prima facie
stage, “the fact that [the plaintiff] submitted the complaint to
the agency is sufficient.” Id.; see also Bartlette v. Hyatt
Regency, 208 F. Supp. 2d 311, 323 (D.D.C. 2016) (defendant’s
argument that plaintiff’s complaint was “deficient because it
does not allege that the supervisors involved in the
11 discrimination complaints were the same supervisors who engaged
in the retaliatory conduct” failed “because the law does not
require such a showing”).
So here too. In his amended complaint, Mr. Williams states
that he complained multiple times to Mr. Moore, an Operations
Manager in MPD’s Human Resources Department, between July 2016
and September 2016. See Am. Compl., ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 24, 37-42, 48-
51. Mr. Williams specifically alleges that, on or about
September 7, 2016, he “told Mr. Moore that he believed that he
was being treated differently because he was gay.” Id. ¶ 51.
Less than four weeks later, on September 30, 2016, Mr. Williams
was terminated. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. The Court concludes that these
allegations are sufficient at this stage to plead a plausible
claim for retaliation. Cf. Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth.,
791 F.3d 65, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“under some circumstances,
temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected
activity and an adverse personnel action may alone be sufficient
to raise an inference of causation”). Accordingly, MPD’s motion
to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claims is denied.
On the other hand, the Court concludes that Mr. Williams
allegations — which are the same ones upon which his
discrimination and retaliation claims are based — are
insufficient to support his hostile work environment claim. To
state a claim under Title VII or the DCHRA based on a hostile
12 work environment, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing
that his “workplace is permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [plaintiff’s]
employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). He must therefore establish
that “(1) he . . . is a member of a protected class; (2) he . .
. was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment
occurred because of the plaintiff's protected status; (4) the
harassment was severe to a degree which affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew
or should have known about the harassment, but nonetheless
failed to take steps to prevent it.” Peters v. Dist. of
Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 189 (D.D.C. 2012). In evaluating
these factors, the “court looks to the totality of the
circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it
interferes with an employee's work performance.” Baloch v.
Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008). This standard
is a demanding one, as Title VII is not intended to function as
a “general civility code” that regulates the “ordinary
tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of
13 abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.”
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
Here, Mr. Williams claims that MPD created a hostile work
environment by “denying him the opportunity to negotiate for his
pay; mishandling his paperwork; requiring him to re-apply for
the position he was hired for; terminating any interviews he had
for that position; and subsequently terminating his employment.”
Am. Compl., ECF No. 11 ¶ 71. These allegations consist of
discrete instances of alleged discrimination or retaliation —
indeed, Mr. Williams relies on these very same allegations to
form the basis of his other claims. “[A]s a general matter,
courts in this Circuit frown on plaintiffs who attempt to
bootstrap their alleged discrete acts of retaliation into a
broader hostile work environment claim” and are “reluctant to
transform mere reference to alleged disparate acts of
discrimination against plaintiff into a hostile work environment
claim.” Dudley v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Authority, 924 F.
Supp. 2d 141, 164 (D.D.C. 2013) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, even in instances in which
courts have permitted a plaintiff to rely on “discrete acts that
the plaintiff claims . . . . are actionable on their own,” those
facts must be “sufficient to show that those decisions were part
of a severe and pervasive pattern of harassment.” Outlaw v.
Johnson, 49 F. Supp. 3d 88, 92 (D.D.C. 2014) (emphasis added).
14 Here, Mr. Williams simply does not allege the type of
“intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is sufficiently
“severe and pervasive” to state a hostile work environment
claim. Therefore, MPD’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s hostile
work environment claim is granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Memorandum Opinion, the
defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. A separate Order accompanies
this Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan United States District Judge June 30, 2018