WILLIAMS v. DIRECTOR VIRGIN ISLANDS BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS

Opinions

Opinion

For Publication

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

JALANI WILLIAMS ) S Ct Civ No 2021 0011 Appellant’Petitioner ) Re Super Ct Crim No 55 2020 (STX)

)

V )

)

PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ) WYNNIE TESTAMARK, DIRECTOR of ) the VIRGIN ISLANDS BUREAU OF ) CORRECTIONS )

Appellees/Respondents )

)

On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St Croix Superior Court Judge Hon Douglas A Brady

Argued December 14 2021 Filed January 10 2024

Cite as 2024 VI 2

BEFORE RHYS S HODGE ChiefJustice MARIA CABRET, Associate Justice and IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate Justice

APPEARANCES

Martial A Webster, Sr , Esq Law Office of Martial A Webster St Croix U S VI Attorneyfor Appellant,

Kenneth Case, Esq Assistant Attorney General St Thomas U S VI Attorneyfor Appellee

Opinion of the Court

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OPINION OF THE COURT

SWAN, Associate Justice

1]] Jalani Williams appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas

corpus The petition alleged newly discovered evidence and ineffective assistance of counsel as

grounds for habeas relief from Williams’ numerous felony convictions For the reasons elucidated

below, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

112 On August 2 2009, Jalani Williams (‘ Williams )shot Almanzo Williams (‘ A Williams ’)

at Gertrude’s Restaurant in St Croix, U S Virgin Islands After fleeing the scene, Williams was

eventually arrested and charged with numerous crimes including the first degree murder of A

Williams, who ultimately succumbed to his gun shot injuries

113 On May 17, 2012, the Superior Court sentenced Williams on multiple counts, including

first degree murder, following a week long jury trial On the first degree murder conviction, the

court imposed the statutory sentence of life imprisonment without parole Subsequently, Williams

appealed

‘I4 [11 a November 5, 2013 opinion, this Court affirmed all of Williams convictions, but

remanded the matter for resentencing on the first degree murder conviction pursuant to the U S

Supreme Court 5 holding in Miller v Alabama 567 U S 460 (2012) in which the High Court

concluded that mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile offenders violated the Eighth

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment Williams was sixteen years old

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when he perpetrated the crimes for which he was convicted Wzllzams v People, 59 VI 1024,

1042 (VI 2013)

115 On remand, the Superior Court sentenced Williams on December 23, 20M to life

imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the first degree murder charge

16 In a May 12, 2016 opinion, this Court affirmed the Superior Court 5 imposition of a life

sentence with the possibility of parole for Williams’ first degree murder conviction Williams v

People 64 V I 618 626 (V I 2016)

17 On September 12, 2017, Williams filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which

the Superior Court denied in a J anuary 23, 2019 opinion

118 On July 14, 2020, Williams filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, on different

grounds, which the Superior Court denied in a March 18, 2021 opinion In its opinion, the Superior

Court opined that Williams failed to provide sufficient facts to establish either the existence of

cognizable newly discovered evidence or ineffective assistance of counsel

119 On April 19 2021 Williams perfected the instant appeal

[I JURISDICTION

1] 10 ‘ The Supreme Court [has] jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final

decrees, and final orders of the Superior Court ’ 4 V I C 1‘} 32(a) An order that disposes of all

claims submitted to the Superior Court is considered final for the purposes of appeal ” Jung v

Ruiz 59 V I 1050 1057 (V I 2013) (citing Matthew v Herman 56 V I 674 677 (V I 2012))

Similarly, “an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a final order from which

an appeal may lie ” Suarez v Gov tofthe VI , 56 V I 754, 758 (V I 2012) Because the Superior

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Court’s March 18, 2021 order denying Williams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus disposed of

all claims submitted for adjudication, the order is final, and, we exercise jurisdiction over his

appeal I

III STANDARD OF REVIEW

1]] 1 We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and exercise plenary review over

its legal determinations Thomas v People 63 V I 595 602 03 (V I 2015) (citing Simmonds v

People, 53 V I 549, 555 (V I 2010)) Moreover, we exercise “plenary review over the dismissal

of a habeas corpus petition ’ Rivera Moreno v Gov I ofthe V I , 61 V I 279, 293 (V 1 2014)

‘ In this case, the habeas corpus petition filed in the Superior Conn was erroneous because it named the People of the Virgin lslands as a custodial respondent Typically a writ of habeas corpus is properly directed to the g0» emment authorities, facilities and individuals that are responsible for detaining the petitioner in prison at the time the writ is filed The People were responsible for prosecuting Williams and enforcing territorial criminal laws against him once it was established that he violated them Consequently the People are not responsible for detaining Williams in prison Rather, the Virgin Islands Government, through the Bureau of Corrections is principally responsible for his detention However, Williams habeas corpus petition also named as a respondent Wynnie Testamark the Director of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections Under our precedents the petition achieved substantial compliance with 5 V I C § 1302 and V I H C R 2(a)(3)(B) ( The petition shall comply with the following requirements (1) [i]t shall specify the officer or person by whom he is confined or restrained naming all the parties, if they are known or describing them if they are not known ) See Rn era Moreno t Gm '1 ofthe V I 61 V I 279 300 (V l 2014) Importantly the petition ultimately resulted in a proper custodial respondent, the V 1 Bureau of Corrections, being before the Superior Court Additionally, the Bureau of Corrections participated in the proceedings in which the petition was thoughtfully considered and ultimately denied Although the notice of appeal in this case also incorrectly names the People of the Virgin Islands as an appellee presumably based on the caption of the petition and of the Superior Court 5 order denying it the notice of appeal correctly includes the Director of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections as a custodial respondent It thus achieves substantial compliance with 5 V I C § 1302 and V I H C R 2(a)(3)(B) Rn era Momno 61 V I at 300 We therefore exercise our discretion to hear this appeal, despite the errors in naming the People as a custodial respondent in both the petition and the notice of appeal See V I H C R 1(t) (mandating that [t]hese rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just determination of every habeas corpus proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay ) However, we take this opportunity to admonish that a petition for habeas corpus, and a notice of appeal seeking relief from the denial of such a petition, must name proper parties for either the Superior Court or this Court to have jurisdiction over the petition and any ensuing appeal These procedural obligations must be acknowledged and satisfied by the habeas petitioner See Nune t Got I ofthe VI No ST 12 CV 621 2013 WL 946447 at *4 5 (V I Super Ct Mar 6 2013) (unpublished) (habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving all facts entitling him to a discharge from custody including not only the substantive elements of a petitioner 5 claim but also the procedural requisites that entitle him to relief as well ) (citing Brown 1 Cuyler 669 F 2d 155, 158 (3d Cir 1982)) Failure to name a proper party in the petition or the notice of appeal particularly when doing so results in a custodial respondent not being given adequate notice to enable its participation in the proceedings, may ultimately prove fatal in a future case

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IV DISCUSSION

'IIZ In his appellate brief, Williams admits that the Superior Court must first assess whether a

habeas corpus petitioner presents a prima facie case for habeas corpus relief by evaluating the facts

the petitioner provides which supposedly warrant relief from the petitioner’s detention

Appellant’s Br 11 However, Williams contends that the Superior Court erred when it engaged in

this fact intensive analysis because it failed to accept his allegations as true and issue the writ

according to the statute if the writ was not procedurally barred Appellant 3 Br 12 Essentially,

Williams claims that the Superior Court sought only to disprove of his assertions, without

acknowledging their veracity Id Thus Williams alleges that the Supen'or Court subverted the

local habeas corpus statute in order to perpetuate his unjustified incarceration

1H3 We commence the analysis with a review of the territory’s habeas corpus rules, which

became effective December 1, 2017, and therefore applied to the Superior Court’s proceeding now

under appellate review In the Virgin Islands, the habeas corpus process is govemed by V I H C R

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2° 3 and 5 V I C §§ 1301 1325 Substantiver the rules entitle any person who claims to be

unlawfully detained to file a habeas corpus petition in order to have investigated the causes of the

person’s supposedly unlawful detention Rn era Moreno 61 V I 279 at 3 1 l 13 To seek habeas

relief, a petitioner must file a written document with the Superior Court that contains specific

details of the original case and specific facts that support the petitioner’s contentions that he is

wrongfully detained V I H C R 2(a)(2) and (a)(4)( The petition must separately state the facts

that support each of the claims )

’ Petition form and content (1) Availability Any person who believes he or she is unlawfiJlly imprisoned or detained in custody, or confined under unlawful conditions, may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek review of the legality of that imprisonment 0r detention (2) Format Applications for writ of habeas corpus shall be made in a written petition which is dated and must be signed under oath by the party seeking relief or if authorized by law by someone on that party 5 behalf (3) Content In Compliance with 5 V I C § 1302 the petition must (A) specify that the person on whose behalf the writ is sought is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty (B) identify the officer or person by whom, and the place where, the petitioner is confined or restrained, naming all the parties, if they are known or describing them if they are not known and (C) list all of the following (i) name and location of court that entered the judgment of conviction or order of detention being challenged (ii) criminal docket or case number of that proceeding (if known); (iii) date of the judgment of conviction or other order of detention (if known); (iv) whether in that proceeding the petitioner pled not guilty guilty nolo contendere (no contest), or an insanity plea If there were multiple charges and different pleas to the various charges specify the plea for each count or charge (iv) date of sentencing as well as the length and terms of the sentence imposed (v) name(s) of all crimes of which the petitioner was convicted in the judgment of conviction being challenged (vi) date of the judgment of conviction or order of detention and (vii) date and docket number (if known) of each appeal and of each appellate decision relating to these charges (4) Statement of grounds and supporting facts The petition shall set forth separately each ground on which the imprisonment or detention is alleged to be illegal and shall state the specific facts supporting each ground The petition need not argue or cite law, but it must separately state the facts that support each of the claims V 1 H C R 2(a)(l) (a)(4) 3 Preliminary consideration by the court (1) ConSIderation by the court When presented with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus within the period(s) specified in this Rule the Superior Court must first determine whether the petition states a prima facie case for relief that is whether it states facts that if true would entitle the petitioner to discharge or other relief and in its discretion, may also determine, after providing the petitioner with reasonable notice and a right to be heard whether the stated claims are for any reason procedurally or substantively barred as a matter of law (2) Grounds for relief A petitioner may be awarded a discharge or another form of redress, such as a new sentencing hearing, that remedies the violation alleged if any of the seven conditions set forth in 5 V I C § 1314 are met, or if relief is warranted to remedy a constitutional or statutory violation even if the right to that remedy is not expressly set forth in a statute (4) Denial of a petition at the preliminary consideration stage If the court determines that the petition does not state a prima facie case for relief, or that the claims are all barred as a matter of law the court shall enter an order denying the petition without further proceedings Where the court requests submission of records in an informal response as provided in subpatt (c) of this Rule, the submitted records may also be considered in determining whether the petition states a prima facie case for relief or whether all claims are barred as a matter of law V I H C R 2(b)( 1) (b)(2) and (b)(4)

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1H4 Once a habeas petition is received, the Superior Court must first establish that the petitioner

has demonstrated a prima facie case for habeas corpus relief Essentially, the court evaluates the

facts in the petition that alleged illegality the petitioner to relief and, if relief would be warranted

if the avennents were true, the court issues the writ, provided it is not procedurally barred If the

court determines that the petition fails to state a prima facie case, the court enters an order denying

petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus V I H C R 2(b)(4)

1|] 5 Apparently the crux of Williams’ appeal centers on whether the Superior Court was

compelled to issue the writ if his allegations were taken as true and the writ was not procedurally

barred This contention fails because the court is not obligated to automatically issue a writ of

habeas corpus simply because a petitioner files a habeas petition asserting facts the petitioner

claims are truthful Rather, the court must test the sufficiency of facts in the petition and compare

them with applicable law to ascertain whether the petition establishes a prima facie showing Here,

the Superior Court appraised the allegations in Williams’ petition and determined them to be either

deficient or unsubstantiated according to the trial record We agree See Dorsey v 0111, 148 F 2d

857, 869 (D C Cir 1945) (noting that a writ of habeas corpus petition fails if it does not

demonstrate, among other things, the allegedly illegality of restraint with pertinent facts, exhibits,

or the trial record so the court can make an intelligent judgment), United States ex rel Darrah v

Brierley 290 F Supp 960 963 (E D Penn 1968) (noting that petitioner beats the burden of

bringing forth sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case before the court is required to

accept his allegations as true), Greco v Workman, 481 F Supp 481, 484 (D Mass 1979)

(explaining the court’s denial of petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus petition because he failed to

make a prima facie showing, despite the petitioner submitting supporting affidavits and even if the

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court accepted all petitioner’s allegations as true); United States ex rel Cuber i Koson, 273

FSupp 998 1000 (S DNY 1967) (explaining that bare legal allegations unsupported by

statement of sworn facts will not suffice to support a prima facie showing for a writ of habeas

corpus)

W6 Here, Williams asserts two grounds for habeas corpus relief ineffective assistance of

counsel and newly discovered evidence We address each argument in turn

1H7 Regarding the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams argues in his brief that

his trial counsel 3 performance was deficient because he failed to object at trial to the admission

of the prior inconsistent statements of two witnesses Appellant s Bn'ef 13 Interestingly, for the

first time in the present proceeding, Williams identifies the witnesses as Arkiesa and Lynell

Hughes 1d However in the petition for habeas corpus relief, Williams failed to name the

witnesses, but intimated that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of their prior

inconsistent statements4 constituted a conflict of interest that infringed upon his constitutional

rights, because Williams instructed his trial counsel to dispute the admission of the statements

IA 16 18 Finally, although he fails to provide a foundation for the proposition, Williams

concludes that his trial counsel’s omission precluded his entitlement to a new trial J A 16

1118 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner ‘ must demonstrate

that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s

performance prejudiced him resulting in an unreliable and fundamentally unfair outcome in the

4 A statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay (l) A Declarant Witness 3 Prior Statement The declarant testifies and is subject to cross examination about a prior statement, and the statement (A) is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony and was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding or in a deposition[] V! R Evm 801(d)(])(A)

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proceeding Blyden v Gov t of the VI 64 VI 367 381 (VI 2016) (citations and internal

quotations omitted), see also Strzckland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 687 (1984) (‘ A convicted

defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction

or death sentence has two components First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance

was deficient This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

fiJnctioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment Second, the

defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense This requires showing

that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result

is reliable Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death

sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable ”)

Importantly, the court provides counsel with a “strong presumption that [his] conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance [Thus ] the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might have been sound trial

strategy United States v Thomas 772 F Supp 2d 164 168 (D D C 2011) Moreover a court

determines an attorney’s performance is deficient if ‘ ‘counsel made errors so serious that [he] was

not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment ’ Umted States v Metaxas,

449 F Supp 3d 24 28 (E D N Y 2020) (citations omitted) See Kimmelman v Morrison 477 U S

365, 381 (1986) (“[To establish deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate] that

counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the

challenged action was not sound strategy The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to

be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the

circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential ) Similarly, a court concludes

prejudice to the defendant exists based on counsel’s ineffectiveness, if there is a reasonable

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probability that the trial’s outcome might have been different but for counsel’s legal errors 1d

(citations omitted) However, “[flailure to make the required showing [on] either [the] deficient

performance or sufficient prejudice [prongs] defeats the ineffectiveness claim ” Thomas, 722

F Supp 2d at 168 (citations omitted) See Woodrup v Gm tof the V I No ST 16 MC 47 2018

WL 3099143 at *4 (V I Super June 20 2018) (unpublished) ( [A] court 3 scrutiny of counsel 3

performance must be highly deferential Consequently, proving ineffective assistance of

counsel ‘presents a high bar ‘ ’) (citations omitted); Buck v United States, No 3 18 CV 01245 B

(BT) and No 3 14 cr 00354 B 1 2020 WL 7753712 at *3 (N D Tex Nov 20 2020)

(unpublished) (‘ [T]he mere possibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to prevail on the

prejudice prong Rather, the defendant must demonstrate the prejudice rendered sentencing

‘fundamentally unfair or unreliable ’ ’) (citations omitted); Eze v Senkowskt, 321 F 3d 110, 136

(2nd Cir 2003) (noting that acts or omissions based on a sound strategy will not support ineffective

assistance of counsel claims) Yarborough v Gentry, 540 U S l, 8 (2003) (‘ The Sixth Amendment

guarantees reasonable competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of hindsight );

United States v Rosemond, 958 F 3d 1 l l, 123 (2d Cir 2020) (explaining that counsel’s decision

to concede an element of the charged crime was a reasonable strategy); United States v Scrzpps,

961 F 3d 626, 633 34 (3rd Cir 2020) (explaining that counsel 5 decision not to appeal cannot be

deemed deficient without knowing if it was strategic)

1119 Here, Williams challenges his trial attorney 5 failure to object to the admission of the prior

inconsistent statements of two witnesses who were never identified in his initial habeas corpus

petition Williams contends that this omission by his trial counsel amounted to a conflict of interest

that resulted in a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and his

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Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and prevented him from obtaining the new trial to

which he was entitled .1 A 16 5

1120 However Williams’ allegations fail to comprehend that evidence adduced at trial is

assessed under a totality of the circumstances pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s ruling

in Strickland 466 U S at 694 Gov t of the VI v Jacobs 22 V I 267 278 (D V I 1986)

Essentially, if counsel’s conduct, even if deficient, did not prejudice him, a petitioner’s

ineffectiveness claim must fail Malcom v Houston, No 4 04CV3243, WL 3780541, at *2 (D

Neb Dec 21 2006) (unpublished) See Turnerv United States 699 F 3d 578 584 (1st Cir 2012)

(explaining that the court need not address the obj ective reasonableness prong where the petitioner

fails to demonstrate prejudice), Garner v Lee, 908 F 3d 845, 849 (2d Cir 2018) (same), Vickers

v Superintendent Graterford SCI 858 F 3d 841 857 58 (3d Cir 2017) (explaining that a

petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim was dismissed when he could not demonstrate prejudice

despite demonstrating that counsel’s performance was unreasonable); Hope v Cartledge, 857 F 3d

518, 523 26 (4th Cir 2017) (noting that petitioner s ineffective assistance claim was dismissed

when trial counsel’s deficiency did not result in prejudice), Smith v Baker, 983 F 3d 383, 398 99

(9th Cir 2020) (explaining that ineffective assistance claim dismissed when counsel’s

5 Williams asserts that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest presumably because trial counsel failed to object to the admission of prior witness statements that were allegedly inconsistent despite Williams instructions to object to the admission of those statements The Strickland Court recognized that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from counsel s conflict of interest presents a special case subject to the standard articulated by Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 U S 335 (1980) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel on conflict of interest grounds a petitioner must establish that (1) his attorney labored under an actual conflict of interest that (2) adversely affected his lawyer s performance After a petitioner satisfies this tWO part test prejudice is presumed An actual conflict of interest arises ‘when a defense attorney places himself in a situation inherently conducive to divided loyalties If a defense attorney owes duties to a party whose interests are adverse to those of the defendant, then an actual conflict exists Whelchel 1 Bazzle 489 F Supp 2d 523 534 35 (D S C 2006) [n this case Williams fails to identify a party to whom his trial counsel had loyalties that were adverse to Williams’ interests Accordingly, we find that no conflict of interest has been demonstrated here and evaluate Williams’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim pursuant to the general two part Strickland test that entails counsel’s deficient performance and prejudice to petitioner because of counsel s deficient performance

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performance was deficient but not prejudicial); Monroe v Warden Ohio State Penitentiary, No

2 07 CV 258 2016 WL 3165946 at *6 (S D Ohio June 7 2016) (unpublished) Janoushek v

Watkms Civil No 02 CV 000988 REB MJW 2007 WL 2316952 at *4 (D C010 Aug 9 2007)

(unpublished) (“[A]ny prejudice accruing from prosecutorial misconduct [during closing

arguments] was [extinguished] effectively by the jury instruction admonishing the jury that closing

argument of counsel was not evidence and by other trial evidence permitting a reasonable inference

that the petitioner struck the victim with the gun before shooting her Trial counsel’s failure to

object cannot be said to have prejudiced petitioner to the extent required under St; tckland ”)

721 Here, along with the challenged admissions, the People presented ample evidence that

warranted the jury finding Williams guilty of numerous crimes including first degree murder

beyond a reasonable doubt Specifically the jury also considered physical evidence including the

guns Williams possessed when he was arrested following a high speed chase from the crime scene,

and the bullet casings recovered from the crime scene that matched at least one of the guns

Williams possessed at the time of his arrest .1 A 26 Furthemiore, numerous witnesses testified at

Williams trial and the jury was free to consider their testimony 6 J A 66 See Wallace v People,

71 V 1 703, 714 (V l 2019) ( [T]he testimony of one witness is sufficient to prove any fact [and

°Although we acknowledge that Williams did not provide trial transcripts to indicate the quantity of witnesses who testified at the proceeding below we have previously recognized that it was a multiple day trial in which several Witnesses testified See Williams, 59 V I at 1028 31 Moreover, to support his habeas corpus petition, Williams submitted 10h Williams affidavit which stated the People presented witness testimony at trial Accordingly we take judicial notice that the People presented numerous trial witnesses whose testimony the jury had latitude to evaluate V1 R EVID 201(c)(l)(a Virgin Islands court may takejudicialnotice on its own ) V1 R EVID 201(d) (court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding”), Codrmgton v Gm '1 ofthe VI , 2016 WL 694876] at *3 n 9 (V 1 Super Ct Nov 18 2016) (unpublished)( A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the same court (quoting Gottsch 1 Bank ofStapleton 458 N W 2d 443 455 (Neb 1990)) Moore 1 Walters 61 V I 502 505 n 2 (V I 2014) (court does not err in taking judicial notice of transcripts of prior court proceedings because those transcripts were sources ‘whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned’ within the intendment of Rule 201(1)) (citing Phonometrics Inc 1 Hospitality Intl Inc 120 Fed Appx 341 345 (Fed Cir 2005))

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a] conviction may be sustained on the testimony of single witness or victim even when other

witnesses testify to the contrary ’) (citations omitted); United States v Seary Colon, 997 F 3d 1,

l3 (lst Cir 2021) (recognizing that the jury was free to consider witness testimony) United States

v Ramzrez Martmez, 6 F4th 859, 868 (8th Cir 2021) ( A jury is free to believe or reject a

witness s testimony in part or in whole ”) (citations omitted), United States v Gaona Lopez, 408

F 3d 500 505 (8th Cir 2005) ( The jury is free to believe the testimony of any witness in its

entirety, or to reject that testimony as untrustworthy ’ ) (citations omitted)

1|22 Finally, Williams fails to identify how trial counsel 3 failure to object to the admission of

the now challenged statements precluded his ability to obtain a new trial to which he was allegedly

entitled See Craft v Hetzel No 5 11 CV 00175 HGD 2012 WL 3259672 at *7 (N D Ala July

18, 2012) (unpublished) (finding that petitioner offered insufficient evidence to establish a prima

facie case for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because his trial counsel did not object to

the admission of DNA evidence) United States v Escobar, No 90C4047 and No 87CR356 1,

1991 WL 94531 at *3 (N D 111 May 29 l991)(unpublished)' Fazel v Umted States No l 17

Ct 14 2018 WL 8996387 at *5 (E D Va July 18 2018) (unpublished) ( Petitioner alleges that

his attorney offered ineffective assistance by failing to object to inclusion of victims in the final

[Pre Sentencing Investigation Report] However, Petitioner fails to do more than make the mere

assertion that his attomey’s failure to object constituted ineffective assistance Plaintiff does not

allege reasons to support the notion that there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that such objections

would have been successful nor does he even allege which victims in particular he believes were

incorrectly added With these mere assertions alone, Petitioner fails to prove “that [his]

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense ’) Undeniably,

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Williams does not offer sufficient proof concerning the prejudice he allegedly sustained from his

trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the alleged prior inconsistent statements of two

witnesses Rather, the trial record substantiates ample evidence from which a reasonablejury could

have determined that Williams committed the crimes for which he was convicted Therefore, we

conclude that the failure of Williams’ trial counsel to object to the admission ofthe allegedly prior

inconsistent statements oftwo witnesses did not prejudice Williams in a manner warranting habeas

corpus relief Accordingly, Williams ineffective of counsel claim fails

1|23 Moreover, although we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of

the allegedly prior inconsistent statements of these specific witnesses did not prejudice Williams

and that ruling defeats Williams’ ineffectiveness claim, we also find trial counsel’s failure to object

to the admission of the statements did not constitute deficient performance

1124 Assuming arguendo that trial counsel had objected to the admission of the statements, the

court could have overruled counsel 3 objection ’ Following the court’s permission to admit the

statements, the jury was free to consider them during deliberations See Abu AI: v United States,

No l 05 or 00053 GBL and No 1 12 cv 00474 GBL 2013 WL 5797855 at *3 (E D Va Oct

28, 2013) (unpublished) (“Trial counsel does not provide ineffective assistance for failure to object

when the objection would have been overruled and the evidence was otherwise admissible );

Nomckz t Cunningham No 09 Civ 8476(KMK)(GAY) 201 l WL 12522139 at *8 (S D N Y

Mar 30, 201 l) (unpublished) ( Counsel 3 decision to object to evidence falls squarely within the

ambit of trial strategy Accordingly, a strategically sound decision to withhold an objection will

’ Notably, counsels for Williams’ co defendants objected to the admission of the prior inconsistent statements and the court overruled their objections J A 65

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not ‘rise to the level of deficient performance under Strzckland ’) (citations omitted),

Furthermore, "[f]ailure to raise a meritless objection cannot support a claim for ineffective

assistance ” Szttner v Bowersox, 969 F 3d 846, 853 (8th Cir 2020) Undeniably, Williams only

offers a paucity of facts in a failed effort to substantiate trial counsel’s deficient performance

Although he questions the competency of his trial counsel’s strategy, which apparently involved

counsel’s failure to object to the admission of allegedly prior inconsistent statements, Williams

fails to suggest why the failure to object was an unsound trial strategy Therefore, we conclude

that Williams’ trial counsel did not demonstrate deficient performance for failing to object to the

admission of the alleged prior inconsistent statements

1125 On appeal, Williams also asserts newly discovered evidence as another ground for habeas

corpus relief Like Williams ineffectiveness claim, the Superior Court first had to assess whether

the allegations in the petition, if true, presented a prima facie case for newly discovered evidence

that would entitle Williams to relief Fahze v Gov tofthe VI 73 V I 443 451 (V I 2020)

t26 To prevail on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a petitioner must identify evidence

that is “so conclusive and so persuasive that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt Fahze, 73 V I at 451 This standard is extremely high 1d See United

States 1 Laureano Salgado, 933 F 3d 20, 28 (lst Cir 2019) (“To get a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence, a defendant ordinarily must show that the evidence (1) was either unknown

or unavailable to him during the trial, (2) could not have been uncovered sooner with diligence,

(3) is material, not just cumulative or impeaching; and (4) is sufficiently compelling that it would

probably produce an acquittal at a retrial a hefty burden, to be sure ”)

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1127 In his habeas corpus petition, Williams attached an August 15, 2017 affidavit from Lynell

Hughes which primarily stated that she did not witness Williams shoot A Williams and that she

attempted to inform the People and the court of that fact 8 In its opinion denying Williams habeas

corpus petition, the Superior Court stated that Hughes’ trial testimony and statement in the affidavit

did not differ substantially J A 10 Moreover, on appeal, Williams fails to provide a complete

trial transcript that would enable us to properly assess the allegedly inconsistent nature of the

statements Yet, as previously recognized in footnote 6 of this opinion, we may take Judicial notice

of prior judicial proceedings Thus, we notice the facts and other evidence in Williams’ direct

appeal of his original convictions to this Court published in 59 V I 1024 In that case, we reviewed

Hughes’ trial testimony where she stated that she did not see anyone shoot A Williams Williams,

59 V 1 at 1029 Significantly that is precisely the same claim she asserts in the August 15, 2017

affidavit Therefore, although the trial transcript provided to this Court in the present proceeding

was deficient, we concur with the Superior Court that Hughes affidavit is not new evidence and

affirm the trial court’s denial of Williams’ claim of newly discovered evidence on that ground

CONCLUSION

$28 For the above reasons, we affirm the Superior Court’s denial of Williams petition for writ

of habeas corpus

3 We question whether Hughes affidavit actually represents new evidence especially when she testified at trial See Rozelle t Sec yDep 10fComedians 672 F 3d 1000 1016 1019 (11th Cir 2012) (explaining that evidence known to petitioner at the time of trial was not new ) United States v West 103 F Supp 2d 1301 1304 05 (N D Ala 2000) (noting that petitioner’s arguments for newly discovered evidence was unavaihng for several reasons, including the fact that if it was premised on the trial record, it logically cannot involve anything new)

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Dated this [a 4 day of 2024 :

IVE ARLINGTO WAN Associate Justice

ATTEST VERONICA J HANDY ESQ Clerk of t Court

By ‘ Deputy Clerk [I

Date I [O (30% fiL