1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 JAMES DAVID WILLIAMS, 7 Case No. 19-cv-05685-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL v. AND SERVICE 9 RALPH DIAZ, et al., 10 Defendants. 11
12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”), 14 has filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that prison 15 officials at CTF have limited his ability to purchase “religious oils” for his “daily 16 meditation/prayers” in violation of his constitutional rights and those guaranteed under the 17 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, and the 18 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Dkt. 1 at 3, 5-6.1 He will be granted leave to 19 proceed in forma pauperis in a separate written Order. 20 In his complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants from the California Department 21 of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”): Secretary Ralph Diaz and Chaplain Charles Richey, 22 as well as Defendants from CTF: Warden C. Koenig, Protestant Chaplain B. D. Min, Associate 23 Warden D. Chamberlain, Jewish Chaplain Y. Friedman, and Chief Deputy Warden K. Hoffman. 24 Id. at 2. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary. Id. at 3. 25 Venue is proper because certain events giving rise to the claims are alleged to have 26 occurred at CTF, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 27 II. DISCUSSION 1 A. Standard of Review 2 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 3 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 5 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se 7 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 8 Cir. 1988). 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 10 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 11 the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 12 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 13 B. Legal Claims 14 As mentioned above, Plaintiff specifically alleges that CTF prison officials impermissibly 15 burdened the practice of his religion by limiting his ability to order/purchase religious oil 16 fragrances. See Dkt. 1 at 3, 5-8. Plaintiff does not specify his particular religion, but he states that 17 Defendants has “been ordering [the religious oils] for 8 years at CTF . . . .” Id. at 14. He claims 18 he uses these religious oils for his “daily meditation/prayers.” Id. at 6. He alleges that on January 19 3, 2019, Defendant Richey “sent a[n] email via [Defendant] Min . . . addressed to [Community 20 Resource Managers (“CRMs”)], Chaplains, and [Receiving and Release (“R&R”)] Officers.” Id. 21 at 3. Plaintiff explains that “[t]his email . . . discussed how ‘changes[’] are being made to the 22 departmentally approved religious vendors, and in [a]dvance of . . . [the] Religious Personal 23 Property Matrix and [the Department Operations Manual] changes, which will be forthcoming in 24 the near future.”2 Id. Then, the next day, on January 4, 2019, a second email “instructs all of the 25 Chaplains . . . “Do not approve any forms” that were not in compliance with the new list which 26 27 1 [D]efendants knew from the prior day was unauthorized to enforce.” Id. at 3, 5. Plaintiff alleges 2 that Defendants “were aware that [the] CDCR could not yet just deny what Plaintiff was 3 requesting, [i.e.,] religious oils.” Id. at 5. However, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Koenig, R&R 4 staff, Chaplains and CRMs “changed the local procedures to get approval of Special Purchase 5 Forms . . . facilitating the underground restrictions on [P]laintiff[’]s departmentally authorized 6 religious items.” Id. 7 Plaintiff has attached to his complaint copies of his requests to purchase certain religious 8 oils and the limitations to his access to such oils, which also include the grievances Plaintiff 9 submitted requesting to “have [his] special purchase for religious items processed for approval” 10 and to “be free to select any scent of prayer oil.” Id. at 11-35. Plaintiff’s exhibits indicates that 11 one of his grievances, log no. CTF-19-00178, was “partially granted” but he had to submit a 12 “Inmate/Parolee Request” form on April 28, 2019 because he had not “received the Approved 13 Special Religious Purchase form that was granted,” and he “[could not] order until this occur[ed].” 14 Id. at 35. The exhibit does not show a response to his request. Id. Thus, Plaintiff claims that 15 “[t]hese unauthorized changes are burdensome, with no notice given, with malicious intent to 16 deprive Plaintiff . . . [and] [t]hese changes] have had a discriminatory effect on [him] and [his] 17 daily meditation/prayers.” Id. at 6. He argues that the aforementioned actions of Defendants 18 violated his rights under RLUIPA, the RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 19 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 7. 20 Plaintiff claims that Defendants Diaz, Chamberlain, Friedman, and Hoffman are liable for 21 improperly handling his inmate appeal (log no. CTF-19-00178,) on this issue. However, there is 22 no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system. Mann v. Adams, 855 23 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). 24 Although there certainly is a right to petition government for redress of grievances (a First 25 Amendment Right), there is no right to a response or any particular action. Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 26 728 (8th Cir. 1991) (“prisoner’s right to petition the government for redress . . . is not 27 compromised by the prison’s refusal to entertain his grievance.”). Plaintiff’s claims against 1 Giving it the liberal construction to which it is entitled, the complaint states cognizable 2 claims for violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and his 3 Fourteenth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) 4 (prison officials may not burden the practice of prisoner’s religion, by preventing him from 5 engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to 6 legitimate penological interests).
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 JAMES DAVID WILLIAMS, 7 Case No. 19-cv-05685-YGR (PR) Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF PARTIAL DISMISSAL v. AND SERVICE 9 RALPH DIAZ, et al., 10 Defendants. 11
12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”), 14 has filed the instant pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that prison 15 officials at CTF have limited his ability to purchase “religious oils” for his “daily 16 meditation/prayers” in violation of his constitutional rights and those guaranteed under the 17 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, and the 18 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Dkt. 1 at 3, 5-6.1 He will be granted leave to 19 proceed in forma pauperis in a separate written Order. 20 In his complaint, Plaintiff names the following Defendants from the California Department 21 of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”): Secretary Ralph Diaz and Chaplain Charles Richey, 22 as well as Defendants from CTF: Warden C. Koenig, Protestant Chaplain B. D. Min, Associate 23 Warden D. Chamberlain, Jewish Chaplain Y. Friedman, and Chief Deputy Warden K. Hoffman. 24 Id. at 2. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary. Id. at 3. 25 Venue is proper because certain events giving rise to the claims are alleged to have 26 occurred at CTF, which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 27 II. DISCUSSION 1 A. Standard of Review 2 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 3 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 5 that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se 7 pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 8 Cir. 1988). 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 10 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 11 the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 12 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 13 B. Legal Claims 14 As mentioned above, Plaintiff specifically alleges that CTF prison officials impermissibly 15 burdened the practice of his religion by limiting his ability to order/purchase religious oil 16 fragrances. See Dkt. 1 at 3, 5-8. Plaintiff does not specify his particular religion, but he states that 17 Defendants has “been ordering [the religious oils] for 8 years at CTF . . . .” Id. at 14. He claims 18 he uses these religious oils for his “daily meditation/prayers.” Id. at 6. He alleges that on January 19 3, 2019, Defendant Richey “sent a[n] email via [Defendant] Min . . . addressed to [Community 20 Resource Managers (“CRMs”)], Chaplains, and [Receiving and Release (“R&R”)] Officers.” Id. 21 at 3. Plaintiff explains that “[t]his email . . . discussed how ‘changes[’] are being made to the 22 departmentally approved religious vendors, and in [a]dvance of . . . [the] Religious Personal 23 Property Matrix and [the Department Operations Manual] changes, which will be forthcoming in 24 the near future.”2 Id. Then, the next day, on January 4, 2019, a second email “instructs all of the 25 Chaplains . . . “Do not approve any forms” that were not in compliance with the new list which 26 27 1 [D]efendants knew from the prior day was unauthorized to enforce.” Id. at 3, 5. Plaintiff alleges 2 that Defendants “were aware that [the] CDCR could not yet just deny what Plaintiff was 3 requesting, [i.e.,] religious oils.” Id. at 5. However, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Koenig, R&R 4 staff, Chaplains and CRMs “changed the local procedures to get approval of Special Purchase 5 Forms . . . facilitating the underground restrictions on [P]laintiff[’]s departmentally authorized 6 religious items.” Id. 7 Plaintiff has attached to his complaint copies of his requests to purchase certain religious 8 oils and the limitations to his access to such oils, which also include the grievances Plaintiff 9 submitted requesting to “have [his] special purchase for religious items processed for approval” 10 and to “be free to select any scent of prayer oil.” Id. at 11-35. Plaintiff’s exhibits indicates that 11 one of his grievances, log no. CTF-19-00178, was “partially granted” but he had to submit a 12 “Inmate/Parolee Request” form on April 28, 2019 because he had not “received the Approved 13 Special Religious Purchase form that was granted,” and he “[could not] order until this occur[ed].” 14 Id. at 35. The exhibit does not show a response to his request. Id. Thus, Plaintiff claims that 15 “[t]hese unauthorized changes are burdensome, with no notice given, with malicious intent to 16 deprive Plaintiff . . . [and] [t]hese changes] have had a discriminatory effect on [him] and [his] 17 daily meditation/prayers.” Id. at 6. He argues that the aforementioned actions of Defendants 18 violated his rights under RLUIPA, the RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment 19 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 7. 20 Plaintiff claims that Defendants Diaz, Chamberlain, Friedman, and Hoffman are liable for 21 improperly handling his inmate appeal (log no. CTF-19-00178,) on this issue. However, there is 22 no constitutional right to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system. Mann v. Adams, 855 23 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). 24 Although there certainly is a right to petition government for redress of grievances (a First 25 Amendment Right), there is no right to a response or any particular action. Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 26 728 (8th Cir. 1991) (“prisoner’s right to petition the government for redress . . . is not 27 compromised by the prison’s refusal to entertain his grievance.”). Plaintiff’s claims against 1 Giving it the liberal construction to which it is entitled, the complaint states cognizable 2 claims for violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and his 3 Fourteenth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997) 4 (prison officials may not burden the practice of prisoner’s religion, by preventing him from 5 engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification reasonably related to 6 legitimate penological interests). Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint also implicate RLUIPA, 7 which provides: “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 8 person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 [which includes state 9 prisons, state psychiatric hospitals, and local jails], even if the burden results from a rule of 10 general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 11 person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 12 means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The 13 complaint adequately links Defendants Richey, Koenig, and Min. 14 Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants violated his rights under the RFRA when they limited his 15 access to religious oils is not cognizable because the Supreme Court has declared the RFRA 16 unconstitutional with respect to city and state governments. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 17 507, 536 (1997). 18 III. CONCLUSION 19 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 20 1. Plaintiff has stated cognizable claims under RLUIPA, the First Amendment’s Free 21 Exercise Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants Richey, Koenig, and Min for 22 limiting his access to religious oils for his daily meditation/prayers. 23 2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Diaz, Chamberlain, Friedman, and Hoffman 24 relating to the alleged improper handling of his inmate appeal on this issue along with Plaintiff’s 25 claim that Defendants violated his rights under the RFRA when they limited his access to religious 26 oils are DISMISSED without prejudice. 27 3. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 1 and all attachments thereto (dkt. 1), and a copy of this Order to the following Defendants: CDCR 2 Chaplain Charles Richey; CTF Warden C. Koenig; and CTF Protestant Chaplain B. D. Min. 3 The Clerk also shall mail a copy of the complaint and a copy of this Order to the State Attorney 4 General’s Office in San Francisco. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order to 5 Plaintiff. 6 4. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7 requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 8 Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on 9 behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, Defendants will be required to 10 bear the cost of such service unless good cause be shown for the failure to sign and return the 11 waiver form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the 12 date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be 13 required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for 14 waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 15 summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the 16 waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 17 service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before 18 Defendants personally have been served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on 19 which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed, 20 whichever is later. 21 5. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of 22 Civil Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action: 23 a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date their answer is due, Defendants 24 shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion must be 25 supported by adequate factual documentation, must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 26 Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from 27 1 the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand3 notice 2 so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to 3 oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out 4 in Rand must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss 5 for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be accompanied by a similar notice. 6 However, the Court notes that under the new law of the circuit, in the rare event that a failure to 7 exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, Defendants may move for dismissal under Rule 8 12(b)(6), as opposed to the previous practice of moving under an unenumerated Rule 12(b) 9 motion. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 10 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust available administrative 11 remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), should be raised by a 12 defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Otherwise, if a failure to exhaust is not clear 13 on the face of the complaint, Defendants must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a 14 motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most 15 favorable to Plaintiff shows a failure to exhaust, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 16 under Rule 56. Id. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the 17 district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. at 18 1168. 19 If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 20 Defendants shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All 21 papers filed with the Court shall be served promptly on Plaintiff. 22 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 23 and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which 24 Defendants’ motion is filed. 25 c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 26 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you 27 1 must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 2 be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact—that is, if there is no real dispute about 3 any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 4 entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 5 makes a motion for summary judgment that is supported properly by declarations (or other sworn 6 testimony), you cannot rely simply on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 7 specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 8 as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 9 documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 10 your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 11 If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154 12 F.3d at 962-63. 13 Plaintiff also is advised that—in the rare event that Defendants argue that the failure to 14 exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint—a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 15 administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 16 prejudice. To avoid dismissal, you have the right to present any evidence to show that you did 17 exhaust your available administrative remedies before coming to federal court. Such evidence 18 may include: (1) declarations, which are statements signed under penalty of perjury by you or 19 others who have personal knowledge of relevant matters; (2) authenticated documents— 20 documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are 21 authentic, or other sworn papers such as answers to interrogatories or depositions; and 22 (3) statements in your complaint insofar as they were made under penalty of perjury and show that 23 you have personal knowledge of the matters state therein. As mentioned above, in considering a 24 motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust under Rule 12(b)(6) or failure to exhaust in a summary 25 judgment motion under Rule 56, the district judge may hold a preliminary proceeding and decide 26 disputed issues of fact with regard to this portion of the case. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168. 27 The notices above do not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve similar notices again 1 motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935. 2 d. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the 3 date Plaintiffs opposition is filed. 4 e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 5 No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 6 6. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 7 Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to 8 depose Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison. 9 7. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants or 10 || Defendants’ counsel, once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 11 them. 12 8. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 5 13 || informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 14 || Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11, a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 3 15 || while an action is pending must file a notice of change of address promptly, specifying the new 16 address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 3 17 directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 18 (2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 19 se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 20 9. Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be 21 granted provided they are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || Dated: April 28, 2020 Capen Mgt flees ‘ONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS United States District Judge 25 26 27 28