Williams v. Daub

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 25, 2024
• Docket: 3:22-cv-01667
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 3 John Wesley WILLIAMS, Case No.: 22-cv-1667-AGS-MMP 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SEVER (ECF 15), DISMISSING 5 v. COUNT 1 WITHOUT PREJUDICE, 6 B. BELTRAN, et al., AND TERMINATING DEFENDANTS BAILIS AND BOWEN 7 Defendants. 8 9 Defendant prison doctors claim that the inmate plaintiff here has inappropriately 10 joined two separate medical events into a single lawsuit. For his part, plaintiff argues that 11 both his claims arise from the same mental-illness problems and treatment. Because his 12 claims are insufficiently related to justify joining them into a single lawsuit, defendants’ 13 motion must be granted. 14 BACKGROUND 15 In his amended complaint, plaintiff John Williams claims a history of mental illness 16 and self-harm. He brings two counts against two separate sets of defendants.1 17 In Count 1, Williams alleges he was “admitted” to “a mental health crisis bed” in 18 February 2022 “due to danger to [him]self and plan to hang [himself] in suicide.” (ECF 9, 19 at 3.) A few days later, his “primary clinician” “Dr. Moreno” went on vacation. (Id. at 3.) 20 Meanwhile two other doctors—defendants Bailis and Bowen—were “bombard[ed] by 21 emails from non-mental[-]health prison officials” who apparently wanted to transfer 22 Williams to another facility “for a court hearing.” (Id. at 3–4.) After they spoke to Williams, 23 and after Williams informed them he was still harboring thoughts of self-harm, “Bailis and 24 Bowen then discharged plaintiff.” (Id. at 4.) Williams thereafter self-harmed with “hard 25 plastic from a CPAP machine.” (Id.) 26 27 1 The amended complaint lists three claims, but the third was dismissed at screening. 28 1 Count 2 begins eight months later in October 2022. Williams warned another 2 doctor—defendant Beltran—of “thoughts of suicide and self[-]harm.” (See id. at 6.) 3 Beltran “ignored” those warnings. (Id.) And over the next two days, Williams “engaged in 4 self[-]harm” and “mutilation.” (Id.) Williams was admitted to a “crisis bed” and again 5 assigned “Dr. Moreno” as his “primary clinician.” (Id. at 7.) This time, though, Moreno 6 did not go on vacation. Instead, Moreno allegedly told Williams that although unqualified 7 to make a formal diagnosis, he believed Williams might have a “personality disorder.” (Id.) 8 Williams contends Moreno shared this “unconfirmed theory” with Beltran and yet another 9 doctor, defendant Boyd. The three doctors—Beltran, Boyd, and Moreno—then 10 “coordinate[d]” to “structure a mental health treatment plan around the suspected 11 diagnosis,” and as a result Williams was discharged while “still suffering from thoughts of 12 suicide[] . . . and self[-]harm.” (Id.) After the discharge, Williams warned Beltran “of 13 continuing intense dreams and thoughts of suicide and self[-]harm,” but Beltran “ordered 14 subordinates to ignore” Williams. (Id. at 8.) 15 Three days after the discharge, Williams claims he cut his “left arm above the wrist 16 more severe[ly] than previously,” and “walk[ed] around the . . . facility actively bleeding 17 for over an hour” before other officers “observed [him] semi[-]conscious, fatigue[d] from 18 blood loss, and disoriented.” (Id.) Nevertheless, Williams alleges Beltran “yet again” 19 ordered his subordinates to “ignore Plaintiff’s report of ongoing intense dreams,” “thoughts 20 of suicide,” and “act of self[-]harm,” and cleared Williams to return to his cell. (Id. at 9.) 21 Both counts claim that defendants unconstitutionally subjected him to cruel and 22 unusual punishment by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. (See generally 23 id.) Defendants move to sever the counts, arguing that they were discrete events that 24 occurred months apart and involved different defendants. (See ECF 15.) 25 DISCUSSION 26 Generally, “[u]nrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.” 27 Jones v. Placer Cty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 219CV0342MCEEFBP, 2020 WL 1472426, at *2 28 1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2020). Williams argues that two federal rules of civil procedure 2 potentially permit joinder in this case: Rules 18 and 20. 3 Rule 18 allows a plaintiff to “join, as independent or alternative claims, as many 4 claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). So, “multiple claims 5 against a single party are fine.” See Jones, 2020 WL 1472426, at *2. But here, each count 6 has multiple defendants who do not overlap. The only defendant mentioned in both counts 7 is Dr. Moreno, but he had nothing to do with the alleged unconstitutional medical care in 8 Count 1. The amended complaint specifically alleges that Moreno was on “vacation[]” at 9 the time Drs. Bailis and Bowen ignored Williams’s threats of self-harm and discharged 10 him. (See ECF 9, at 3–4.) As Moreno was uninvolved in the deprivation of rights described 11 in Count 1, Rule 18 is inapplicable. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 12 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her 13 own misconduct.”). 14 That leaves Rule 20, which permits a plaintiff to join claims against different 15 defendants so long as they (1) “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 16 transactions and occurrences” and (2) have at least one “question of law or fact common 17 to all defendants.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)–(B). “The ‘same transaction’ requirement 18 refers to the similarity in the factual background of the claim.” Mills v. Clarke, 19 No. 120CV00498HBKPC, 2023 WL 3063287, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2023), report and 20 recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3466360 (E.D. Cal. May 15, 2023). Courts find that 21 claims arise from the same transaction when “they are based on the same precipitating 22 event, or a series of related events caused by the same precipitating event.” Id. 23 To make the “same transaction” showing, Williams relies on the fact that both counts 24 have to do with his “mental health,” his “self[-]injurious behavior,” and the “defendant[s’] 25 response or, lack thereof, thereto.” (ECF 16, at 3–4.) Some of those may qualify as 26 questions of “fact common to all defendants”—the second requirement under Rule 20— 27 but they don’t suggest that both counts were “based on the same precipitating event.” Mills, 28 2023 WL 3063287, at *3. Instead, the deprivations here are based on two “entirely different 1 || set[s] of defendants” making medical decisions eight months apart with no predicate event 2 || connecting them and no other “similarity of factual background that would warrant joining 3 them in a single action.” See id. at *6. 4 Thus, Counts 1 and 2 are misjoined. Defendants request that this Court dismiss 5 ||Count 1 without prejudice, while maintaining Count 2 in this action. (See ECF 18, at 1.) 6 || The Court agrees. Count 2 involves the more serious allegations and appears to be the crux 7 Williams’s claims, so he may continue to prosecute Count 2 in this suit. 8 CONCLUSION 9 Accordingly, defendants’ motion to sever is GRANTED. Count | is severed and 10 dismissed without prejudice, but Williams may refile it as a separate lawsuit. All claims 11 against defendants Bailis and Bowen are dismissed, and the Clerk will terminate them on 12 ||the docket. By February 16, 2024, the remaining defendants must file their responsive 13 || pleading to Count 1. 14 || Dated: January 25, 2024 15 a | / 16 Hon. rew G. Schopler United States District Judge 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28