Williams v. Crestview Realty Company

Supreme Court of Florida

Williams v. Crestview Realty Company

29 So. 2d 250, 158 Fla. 484, 1947 Fla. LEXIS 546

DecidedFebruary 7, 1947

StatusPublished

This text of 29 So. 2d 250 (Williams v. Crestview Realty Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Williams v. Crestview Realty Company, 29 So. 2d 250, 158 Fla. 484, 1947 Fla. LEXIS 546 (Fla. 1947).

Pincite

Opinion

ON REHEARING GRANTED

ADAMS, J.:

On November 5, 1946, we reversed the decree appealed from and thereafter granted a rehearing. Upon further consideration of the case we are convinced that we were in error in the first instance. Stovall’s letter of conditional acceptance dated January 10, 1945, limited the one-third item to that “salvaged so far as the corporation is concerned.” Adm'ttedly the corporation, Stovall Properties, Inc., saved nothing out of the litigation. Williams then rests his claim for relief upon his statement that:

*485 “. . . ‘if I sign the praecipe for dismissal will you upon completion of the purchase by Crestyiew. issue to me as my contingent compensation one-third or 5 of the 15 shares coming to you or your nominees under the contract.’ ” Whereupon Stovall replied, “Yes.”

. , The proof of this assertion is affirmed by Williams and .denied by Stovall.' The chancellor weighed the evidence against Williams, who had the burden, and dismissed the bill. In this we see no reáson to put the chancellor in error.

The judgment heretofore entered is vacated and we recede from our former opinion and the decree appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., BARNS, J., and FABISINSKI, Associate Justice, concur. TERRELL, BUFORD and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissent.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

ON REHEARING GRANTED

ADAMS, J.:

On November 5, 1946, we reversed the decree appealed from and thereafter granted a rehearing. Upon further consideration of the case we are convinced that we were in error in the first instance. Stovall’s letter of conditional acceptance dated January 10, 1945, limited the one-third item to that “salvaged so far as the corporation is concerned.” Adm'ttedly the corporation, Stovall Properties, Inc., saved nothing out of the litigation. Williams then rests his claim for relief upon his statement that:

*485 “. . . ‘if I sign the praecipe for dismissal will you upon completion of the purchase by Crestyiew. issue to me as my contingent compensation one-third or 5 of the 15 shares coming to you or your nominees under the contract.’ ” Whereupon Stovall replied, “Yes.”

. , The proof of this assertion is affirmed by Williams and .denied by Stovall.' The chancellor weighed the evidence against Williams, who had the burden, and dismissed the bill. In this we see no reáson to put the chancellor in error.

The judgment heretofore entered is vacated and we recede from our former opinion and the decree appealed from is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, C. J., BARNS, J., and FABISINSKI, Associate Justice, concur. TERRELL, BUFORD and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissent.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

29 So. 2d 250, 158 Fla. 484, 1947 Fla. LEXIS 546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-crestview-realty-company-fla-1947.