Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

D. Arizona

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

DecidedMay 8, 2025

Docket2:20-cv-00136

StatusUnknown

This text of Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Pincite

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Paula Jean Williams, No. CV-20-00136-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 14 Defendant. 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Paula Jean Williams’ Motion for Attorney Fees 16 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and Memorandum in support thereof. (Docs. 28, 29). The 17 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration responded. (Doc. 31). The Court now 18 rules. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) initially denied 21 Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review 22 of the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 1). The Court vacated the final decision of the 23 Commissioner and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. (Doc. 23; Doc. 24 24 (Clerk of the Court entered judgment)). On Plaintiff’s motion, the Court awarded Plaintiff 25 $8,622.87 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 26). 26 On remand, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff was entitled 27 to Social Security disability benefits beginning in March 2015. (Doc. 29-1 at 3). The 28 Commissioner issued a Notice of Award that stated that $61,505.25 had been withheld for 1 payment of attorney fees. (Doc. 29-1 at 5 (stating that the Commissioner “usually 2 withhold[s] 25 percent of past due benefits” and had withheld $61,505.25); see also Doc. 3 31 at 3 (the Commissioner stating that “the fees requested . . . do not exceed 25% of the 4 total of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits.”)). Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks this amount— 5 $61,505.25—as a total fee award. (Doc. 29). 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 A court entering judgment in favor of a Social Security claimant represented by 8 counsel “may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 9 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 10 claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Though “[t]he 11 statute does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is 12 reasonable,” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009), the Supreme Court 13 has made clear that the first step is to respect “the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 14 agreements,” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 793 (2002). A court may deviate 15 downward from a requested fee award “if the attorney provided substandard representation 16 or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Crawford, 586 F.3d 17 at 1151. A court may also “consider the lodestar calculation, but only as an aid in assessing 18 the reasonableness of the fee.” Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). “Because the SSA 19 has no direct interest” in how the award is apportioned between client and counsel, district 20 courts must independently “assure that the reasonableness of the fee is established.” Id. at 21 1149. 22 In determining whether fees sought under § 406(b) are reasonable, the Court 23 considers the contingent-fee agreement, the character of the attorney’s representation, and 24 the achieved result. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Although not controlling, courts may also 25 consider the number of hours spent representing the claimant and the attorney’s normal 26 hourly billing rate for non-contingent-fee cases in determining reasonableness. Id. at 808– 27 09. Finally, if a claimant’s attorney receives fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), the 28 attorney must “refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Id. at 796 (citation 1 omitted). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 Here, Plaintiff contractually agreed to pay counsel 25% of past-due benefits. (Doc. 4 29-2 at 2). Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks $61,505.25, or 25%, of the past-due amount 5 awarded to Plaintiff. (Doc. 29). Counsel’s itemization of services indicates 41.5 hours of 6 attorney services rendered. (Doc. 29-3 at 3). Based on the hours expended, Plaintiff’s 7 counsel’s effective hourly rate for this work is $1,482.05. (Doc. 31 at 2). There is no doubt 8 that this rate is on the high end of acceptable rates. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Comm’r of Soc. 9 Sec. Admin., No. CV-18-08129-PCT-DGC, 2024 WL 3010939, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 14, 10 2024) (effective hourly rate of $231.94); Mize v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21- 11 00330-TUC-JGZ, 2024 WL 3951986, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2024) (effective hourly rate 12 of $350.79); Reidhead v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21-1827-PHX-MTL, 2025 13 WL 238931, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2025) (effective hourly rate of $578.84); Terrazas v. 14 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-22-00468-PHX-DJH, 2024 WL 4534482, at *2 (D. 15 Ariz. Oct. 21, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $751.25). Nonetheless, the rate is still within 16 the range of reasonableness. See, e.g., Roegner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV- 17 20-01974-PHX-DLR, 2024 WL 5106647, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2024) (effective hourly 18 rate of $1,912.35); McCabe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-22-00192-PHX-DLR, 19 2025 WL 460744, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2025) (effective hourly rate of $1,513.51). 20 Furthermore, upon review of the record, the Court finds no indication that Plaintiff’s 21 counsel engaged in any substandard performance or undue delay in prosecuting Plaintiff’s 22 case. As such, upon consideration of the Gisbrecht reasonableness factors, in addition to 23 the risk involved in the contingency fee arrangement in this case, the Court concludes that 24 a fee award of $61,505.25 is reasonable and will approve an award in this amount. Because 25 “the claimant’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee,” 26 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796, the Court will order Plaintiff’s counsel to refund the $8,622.87 27 EAJA award to Plaintiff upon counsel’s receipt of the attorney fees awarded by this Order. 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees under 42 4|| U.S.C.§ 406(b), (Doc. 28), is GRANTED in the amount of $61,505.25. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel shall, after receipt of the 6|| above-awarded fee, refund to Plaintiff the fees previously awarded under the EAJA, in the amount of $8,622.87. 8 Dated this 8th day of May, 2025. 9 10 A 11 12 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-4-

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Paula Jean Williams, No. CV-20-00136-PHX-JAT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 14 Defendant. 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Paula Jean Williams’ Motion for Attorney Fees 16 under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and Memorandum in support thereof. (Docs. 28, 29). The 17 Commissioner of the Social Security Administration responded. (Doc. 31). The Court now 18 rules. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) initially denied 21 Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review 22 of the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc. 1). The Court vacated the final decision of the 23 Commissioner and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. (Doc. 23; Doc. 24 24 (Clerk of the Court entered judgment)). On Plaintiff’s motion, the Court awarded Plaintiff 25 $8,622.87 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 26). 26 On remand, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff was entitled 27 to Social Security disability benefits beginning in March 2015. (Doc. 29-1 at 3). The 28 Commissioner issued a Notice of Award that stated that $61,505.25 had been withheld for 1 payment of attorney fees. (Doc. 29-1 at 5 (stating that the Commissioner “usually 2 withhold[s] 25 percent of past due benefits” and had withheld $61,505.25); see also Doc. 3 31 at 3 (the Commissioner stating that “the fees requested . . . do not exceed 25% of the 4 total of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits.”)). Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks this amount— 5 $61,505.25—as a total fee award. (Doc. 29). 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 A court entering judgment in favor of a Social Security claimant represented by 8 counsel “may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 9 representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the 10 claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Though “[t]he 11 statute does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is 12 reasonable,” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009), the Supreme Court 13 has made clear that the first step is to respect “the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee 14 agreements,” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 793 (2002). A court may deviate 15 downward from a requested fee award “if the attorney provided substandard representation 16 or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Crawford, 586 F.3d 17 at 1151. A court may also “consider the lodestar calculation, but only as an aid in assessing 18 the reasonableness of the fee.” Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). “Because the SSA 19 has no direct interest” in how the award is apportioned between client and counsel, district 20 courts must independently “assure that the reasonableness of the fee is established.” Id. at 21 1149. 22 In determining whether fees sought under § 406(b) are reasonable, the Court 23 considers the contingent-fee agreement, the character of the attorney’s representation, and 24 the achieved result. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Although not controlling, courts may also 25 consider the number of hours spent representing the claimant and the attorney’s normal 26 hourly billing rate for non-contingent-fee cases in determining reasonableness. Id. at 808– 27 09. Finally, if a claimant’s attorney receives fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), the 28 attorney must “refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Id. at 796 (citation 1 omitted). 2 III. DISCUSSION 3 Here, Plaintiff contractually agreed to pay counsel 25% of past-due benefits. (Doc. 4 29-2 at 2). Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks $61,505.25, or 25%, of the past-due amount 5 awarded to Plaintiff. (Doc. 29). Counsel’s itemization of services indicates 41.5 hours of 6 attorney services rendered. (Doc. 29-3 at 3). Based on the hours expended, Plaintiff’s 7 counsel’s effective hourly rate for this work is $1,482.05. (Doc. 31 at 2). There is no doubt 8 that this rate is on the high end of acceptable rates. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Comm’r of Soc. 9 Sec. Admin., No. CV-18-08129-PCT-DGC, 2024 WL 3010939, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 14, 10 2024) (effective hourly rate of $231.94); Mize v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21- 11 00330-TUC-JGZ, 2024 WL 3951986, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2024) (effective hourly rate 12 of $350.79); Reidhead v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21-1827-PHX-MTL, 2025 13 WL 238931, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2025) (effective hourly rate of $578.84); Terrazas v. 14 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-22-00468-PHX-DJH, 2024 WL 4534482, at *2 (D. 15 Ariz. Oct. 21, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $751.25). Nonetheless, the rate is still within 16 the range of reasonableness. See, e.g., Roegner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV- 17 20-01974-PHX-DLR, 2024 WL 5106647, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2024) (effective hourly 18 rate of $1,912.35); McCabe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-22-00192-PHX-DLR, 19 2025 WL 460744, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2025) (effective hourly rate of $1,513.51). 20 Furthermore, upon review of the record, the Court finds no indication that Plaintiff’s 21 counsel engaged in any substandard performance or undue delay in prosecuting Plaintiff’s 22 case. As such, upon consideration of the Gisbrecht reasonableness factors, in addition to 23 the risk involved in the contingency fee arrangement in this case, the Court concludes that 24 a fee award of $61,505.25 is reasonable and will approve an award in this amount. Because 25 “the claimant’s attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee,” 26 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796, the Court will order Plaintiff’s counsel to refund the $8,622.87 27 EAJA award to Plaintiff upon counsel’s receipt of the attorney fees awarded by this Order. 28 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 Accordingly, 3 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees under 42 4|| U.S.C.§ 406(b), (Doc. 28), is GRANTED in the amount of $61,505.25. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel shall, after receipt of the 6|| above-awarded fee, refund to Plaintiff the fees previously awarded under the EAJA, in the amount of $8,622.87. 8 Dated this 8th day of May, 2025. 9 10 A 11 12 _ James A. Teil Org Senior United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-4-

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-commissioner-of-social-security-administration-azd-2025.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack