UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mary Williams
v. Civil No. 15-cv-416-JD Opinion No. 2016 DNH 052 Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
O R D E R
Mary Williams, proceeding pro se, seeks judicial review,
pursuant to U.S.C. § 405(g), of the decision of the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying her
application for supplemental security income. The Acting
Commissioner moves to affirm.
Standard of Review
In reviewing the final decision of the Acting Commissioner
in a social security case, the court “is limited to determining
whether the ALJ deployed the proper legal standards and found
facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.” Nguyen v. Chater,
172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); accord Seavey v. Barnhart, 276
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). The court defers to the ALJ’s
factual findings as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Astralis
Condo. Ass’n v. Sec’y Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 620 F.3d
62, 66 (1st Cir. 2010).
Background
Williams applied for supplemental security income benefits
on October 30, 2012, alleging a disability beginning on March 1,
2012, caused by panic attacks, depression, and anxiety. After
her application was denied, she requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on May 22,
2014. Williams was forty-four at the time of the hearing, had
completed eighth grade, and previously had worked briefly as a
cashier.
Her medical background begins in October of 2012 when she
went to the emergency room at Lakes Region General Hospital
because of anxiety. She was prescribed Lorazepam. She began
treatment, as a new patient, with Laura Zakorchemny, APRN, on
November 15, 2012. Her record indicates she was then taking
Prozac and Buspirone for anxiety and would be referred for
counseling when it was available. Williams sought treatment at
the emergency room and with Nurse Zakorchemny over the next two
months for plugged ears, anxiety, and panic attacks. Williams
reported that she was not taking her prescribed medications
2 because she was worried about side effects and could not afford
the medications.
At appointments in February, April, and May of 2012 with
Nurse Zakorchemny, Williams reported that Prozac was working
well. Nurse Zakorchemny noted that Williams was not in acute
distress, had intact judgment, insight, and memory, was
oriented, and had no depression, anxiety, or agitation.
In April of 2013, Williams had a consultative psychological
examination with Robert Prescott, Ph.D. Williams reported her
history of panic attacks and her medication that she said was
helping. Based on his examination, Dr. Prescott found that
Williams had average intelligence, a marginally adequate ability
to abstract, the ability to interact and communicate
appropriately despite not being at ease with people she did not
know and in crowds, the ability to understand and remember basic
work procedures, and the ability to manage low levels of stress
and change.
In May of 2013, Craig Stenslie, Ph.D., a nonexamining
psychologist, reviewed Williams’s records and assessed her
mental function. Based on his review, Dr. Stenslie concluded
that Williams could deal with directions, maintain attention for
extended periods, sustain an ordinary routine without special
supervision, complete a normal work day and work week, could
3 work in coordination with others, and deal adequately with
change in a low-stress environment.
Williams appeared and testified at the hearing before the
ALJ without an attorney or other representation. When the ALJ
told Williams that she had the right to representation by an
attorney or someone else, she said that she wanted to proceed
without representation. Williams testified that she lived with
her husband and two sons, one of whom was disabled and needed
heart surgery. She described her anxiety and panic attacks and
the effects of medication and counseling in controlling both.
The ALJ issued a decision on July 24, 2014, finding that
Williams was not disabled. The ALJ found that Williams had a
severe impairment of anxiety but was nevertheless able to do
work at all exertional levels in a low-stress environment that
only required occasional interaction with the general public.
Relying on the Medical Vocational Guidelines, Rule 204, the ALJ
concluded that she could perform work that exists in the
national economy. Williams requested review by the Appeals
Council, and the Appeals Council denied her requiest on
September 10, 2015.
Discussion
Williams filed a one-page motion to reverse the Acting
Commissioner’s decision. She states that the Appeals Council
4 did not review her claim and that she submitted medical
documentation. The Acting Commissioner moves to affirm on the
grounds that the Appeals Council properly denied Williams’s
request for review and that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
A. Review by the Appeals Council
The Appeals Council’s denial of review is not reviewable on
appeal except in the exceptional situation when the denial
“rests on an explicit mistake of law or other egregious error.”
Mills v. Apfel, 244 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001). In that
exceptional circumstance, the reason for denying review must be
both articulated and “severely mistaken.” Id. Generally, an
issue about Appeals Council review will “arise[] in social
security cases where new evidence is tendered after the ALJ
decision.” Id.
In this case, Williams submitted new evidence to the
Appeals Council, a one-page letter from her case manager at
Genesis Behavioral Health that is also signed by her other
service providers. The letter states that Williams was
receiving weekly services at Genesis Behavioral Health and had
monthly case management services. The letter also stated that
Williams’s mental health issues made her unable to work. The
5 Appeals Council considered the letter but concluded that it did
not support a reasonable probability of changing the outcome.
The determination of whether a claimant is able or unable
to work is reserved for the Acting Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(d)(1). For that reason, a provider’s opinion that a
claimant is disabled or unable to work “does not mean that [the
Acting Commissioner] will determine that you are disabled.” Id.
Based on § 416.927(d)(1), the Appeals Council appropriately
considered but rejected the opinion that Williams provided.
No mistake or other error occurred in Williams’s case.
Therefore, the case cannot be reversed based on the Appeals
Council’s denial of review.
B. Disability Determination
In determining whether a claimant is disabled for purposes
of social security benefits, the ALJ follows a five-step
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mary Williams
v. Civil No. 15-cv-416-JD Opinion No. 2016 DNH 052 Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, Social Security Administration
O R D E R
Mary Williams, proceeding pro se, seeks judicial review,
pursuant to U.S.C. § 405(g), of the decision of the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, denying her
application for supplemental security income. The Acting
Commissioner moves to affirm.
Standard of Review
In reviewing the final decision of the Acting Commissioner
in a social security case, the court “is limited to determining
whether the ALJ deployed the proper legal standards and found
facts upon the proper quantum of evidence.” Nguyen v. Chater,
172 F.3d 31, 35 (1st Cir. 1999); accord Seavey v. Barnhart, 276
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). The court defers to the ALJ’s
factual findings as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Astralis
Condo. Ass’n v. Sec’y Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 620 F.3d
62, 66 (1st Cir. 2010).
Background
Williams applied for supplemental security income benefits
on October 30, 2012, alleging a disability beginning on March 1,
2012, caused by panic attacks, depression, and anxiety. After
her application was denied, she requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on May 22,
2014. Williams was forty-four at the time of the hearing, had
completed eighth grade, and previously had worked briefly as a
cashier.
Her medical background begins in October of 2012 when she
went to the emergency room at Lakes Region General Hospital
because of anxiety. She was prescribed Lorazepam. She began
treatment, as a new patient, with Laura Zakorchemny, APRN, on
November 15, 2012. Her record indicates she was then taking
Prozac and Buspirone for anxiety and would be referred for
counseling when it was available. Williams sought treatment at
the emergency room and with Nurse Zakorchemny over the next two
months for plugged ears, anxiety, and panic attacks. Williams
reported that she was not taking her prescribed medications
2 because she was worried about side effects and could not afford
the medications.
At appointments in February, April, and May of 2012 with
Nurse Zakorchemny, Williams reported that Prozac was working
well. Nurse Zakorchemny noted that Williams was not in acute
distress, had intact judgment, insight, and memory, was
oriented, and had no depression, anxiety, or agitation.
In April of 2013, Williams had a consultative psychological
examination with Robert Prescott, Ph.D. Williams reported her
history of panic attacks and her medication that she said was
helping. Based on his examination, Dr. Prescott found that
Williams had average intelligence, a marginally adequate ability
to abstract, the ability to interact and communicate
appropriately despite not being at ease with people she did not
know and in crowds, the ability to understand and remember basic
work procedures, and the ability to manage low levels of stress
and change.
In May of 2013, Craig Stenslie, Ph.D., a nonexamining
psychologist, reviewed Williams’s records and assessed her
mental function. Based on his review, Dr. Stenslie concluded
that Williams could deal with directions, maintain attention for
extended periods, sustain an ordinary routine without special
supervision, complete a normal work day and work week, could
3 work in coordination with others, and deal adequately with
change in a low-stress environment.
Williams appeared and testified at the hearing before the
ALJ without an attorney or other representation. When the ALJ
told Williams that she had the right to representation by an
attorney or someone else, she said that she wanted to proceed
without representation. Williams testified that she lived with
her husband and two sons, one of whom was disabled and needed
heart surgery. She described her anxiety and panic attacks and
the effects of medication and counseling in controlling both.
The ALJ issued a decision on July 24, 2014, finding that
Williams was not disabled. The ALJ found that Williams had a
severe impairment of anxiety but was nevertheless able to do
work at all exertional levels in a low-stress environment that
only required occasional interaction with the general public.
Relying on the Medical Vocational Guidelines, Rule 204, the ALJ
concluded that she could perform work that exists in the
national economy. Williams requested review by the Appeals
Council, and the Appeals Council denied her requiest on
September 10, 2015.
Discussion
Williams filed a one-page motion to reverse the Acting
Commissioner’s decision. She states that the Appeals Council
4 did not review her claim and that she submitted medical
documentation. The Acting Commissioner moves to affirm on the
grounds that the Appeals Council properly denied Williams’s
request for review and that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
A. Review by the Appeals Council
The Appeals Council’s denial of review is not reviewable on
appeal except in the exceptional situation when the denial
“rests on an explicit mistake of law or other egregious error.”
Mills v. Apfel, 244 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001). In that
exceptional circumstance, the reason for denying review must be
both articulated and “severely mistaken.” Id. Generally, an
issue about Appeals Council review will “arise[] in social
security cases where new evidence is tendered after the ALJ
decision.” Id.
In this case, Williams submitted new evidence to the
Appeals Council, a one-page letter from her case manager at
Genesis Behavioral Health that is also signed by her other
service providers. The letter states that Williams was
receiving weekly services at Genesis Behavioral Health and had
monthly case management services. The letter also stated that
Williams’s mental health issues made her unable to work. The
5 Appeals Council considered the letter but concluded that it did
not support a reasonable probability of changing the outcome.
The determination of whether a claimant is able or unable
to work is reserved for the Acting Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927(d)(1). For that reason, a provider’s opinion that a
claimant is disabled or unable to work “does not mean that [the
Acting Commissioner] will determine that you are disabled.” Id.
Based on § 416.927(d)(1), the Appeals Council appropriately
considered but rejected the opinion that Williams provided.
No mistake or other error occurred in Williams’s case.
Therefore, the case cannot be reversed based on the Appeals
Council’s denial of review.
B. Disability Determination
In determining whether a claimant is disabled for purposes
of social security benefits, the ALJ follows a five-step
sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. The
claimant bears the burden through the first four steps of
proving that his impairments preclude him from working. Freeman
v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 606, 608 (1st Cir. 2001). At the fifth
step, the Acting Commissioner has the burden of showing that
jobs exist which the claimant can do. Heggarty v. Sullivan, 947
F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1991). An ALJ may rely on the Medical-
Vocational Guidelines (“Grid”), 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,
6 Appendix 2, to find that a claimant is not disabled as long as
the claimant’s non-exertional impairments do not significantly
erode the occupational base at the identified exertional level.
Nguyen, 172 F.3d at 36; Ortiz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
890 F.2d 520, 524 (1st Cir. 1989).
To the extent Williams challenges the ALJ’s finding that
she is not disabled, she has not explained what error was made
that would require reversal. In response, the Acting
Commissioner addresses the ALJ’s decision to show that
substantial evidence supports the findings made and that
Williams is not disabled. Therefore, the findings must be
affirmed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the claimant’s motion to reverse
(document no. 10) is denied. The Acting Commissioner’s motion
to affirm (document no. 12) is granted.
The decision of the Acting Commissioner is affirmed. The
clerk of court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the
case.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Joseph DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge March 10, 2016
7 cc: Mary P. Williams pro se Michael T. McCormack, Esq.