Williams v. Cleaver

9 Del. 453

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: July 5, 1872
• Status: Published

Opinion

Harrington.

On the point of eviction the counsel on the other side had overlooked the further and very material fact proved, that after the parties had met on the day the defendant gave the plaintiff orders to leave the farm, to settle their mutual accounts, but without accomplishing that purpose, the plaintiff positively forewarned him and the men employed by him as they were entering on the premises to plant the corn, against entering on any land rented by him, and that the defendant then bade them go on, and to pay no attention to the plaintiff, or to any thing he had said, which they accordingly did, and planted the crop against his express objection, and, of course, without his consent; and that was the first unlawful entry which the defendant had made upon the plaintiff’s possession of the premises tip to that time. He had also overlooked the importance of the fact proved, that the defendant was to furnish all the horses, as well as all the other stock and implements for carrying on the farm by the terms of the agreement, and when he told him, as he did, on the occasion of their disagreement, that he could not have another horse to carry it on with, it was putting it out of his power to perform the agreement, and he accordingly had no alternative but to submit to his behest. In regard to the case of Currey v. Davis, 1 Houst. 598, he would remark that it did not appear from the report and the facts submitted in the case, that it was ever called or considered by the parties to the agreement, or either of them, a renting of the premises by the one to the other, or that the cropper resided on the land, or had the tenancy or possession of it, or ever entered upon it, except for the simple purpose of attending to the crops he had agreed to raise on it.

The Court,

Gilpin, C. J.,

charged the jury. Our statute provides that any contract, or consent pursuant to which a tenant shall enter into, or continue in possession of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, under an agreement to pay rent shall be a demise. Where no term is expressly limited, a demise shall be construed to be for a year, except of houses and lots usually let for a less time. And no demise, except it be by deed, shall be effectual for a longer term than one year. Rev. Code 421. There were other provisions, but which it was unnecessary to refer to on this occasion. If the plaintiff entered into possession of the farm, or such portion of it as was to be tilled and cropped that year for that purpose, under an agreement with the defendant to pay him rent for it, then it was a demise and the legal relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties from the time he so entered into the possession of it. But if there was no agreement between them than that he was to pay rent to the defendant for the use and occupation, and the right of tilling and cropping such portion of it as he was in possession of for their mutual benefit, then, although in possession for that purpose merely, it would not be a demise, or a renting of it by him within the meaning and definition of the statute. 'Either the former, or the latter relation, that is to say, of a cropper merely, must have existed according to the evidence in the case, between the parties from the time he entered into the possession of the premises under the agreement, but as that was entirely verbal, and not in writing, it would be for the jury, and not for the court, to determine from the evidence before them, which of the two relations in point of fact at the time existed between them. What the agreement between them in respect to that question was, therefore, a question of fact to be decided by the jury upon" all the proof before them in regard to the matter. Was the agreement between them that the plaintiff was to pay as rent for the premises to the defendant two-thirds of all the produce raised that season upon the premises in question ? Or was the agreement that the defendant was to hire the plaintiff upon the terms stipulated, to till and raise and harvest the crops that season upon them, and pay him one-third of the produce in- consideration of his work and labor and expenses in doing it ?

If the plaintiff" went into possession of the premises, or the portions of the farm he was to cultivate and crop that year,notwithstanding the defendant retained the possession of the mansion or any other part of the farm for his own use and occupation, under an agreement to pay to the defendant rent for the year to the amount of two-thirds of the produce, and to carry on the farm and hire, board and pay all the hands, in consideration that the defendant would furnish every thing else required for the purpose, then it was a demise and a renting of so much of the farm to the plaintiff by the defendant, and he had in contemplation of law under and by virtue of that agreement, such an exclusive possession of the locus in quo as would enable him to maintain the present action against the defendant, if he was wrongfully deprived of the possession of them, or prevented from performing the agreement on his part, by the defendant against his will and without his consent; and he would be entitled to recover damages to the full amount of the loss and injury which he had sustained by it. But if he was not in possession as before stated, under an agreement to pay rent to the defendant, but only as a cropper to be paid for his services as such, in one-third of the produce, he would not be entitled to maintain the action, and the verdict of the jury in that case should be in favor of the defendant. If, however, the jury should be of opinion upon the evidence, that the plaintiff was in possession as before mentioned, under an agreement to pay rent to the defendant, and so continued in possession from the last of March until about the fifth day of May 1870, and was then expelled or prohibited by the act of the defendant from proceeding any further to carry on the farm pursuant to the agreement against his will and without his consent, it would amount in law to an eviction of the plaintiff by the defendant from the premises in question, and in that case he would not only be entitled to recover compensation in damages to the full amount of the injury thereby done him, but the jury might go further and allow him exemplary damages, if in their judgment the circumstances which characterized the conduct of the defendant on the occasion were sufficiently aggravated to warrant and require it.

The plaintiff had a verdict for $275.