Williams v. Capital Asset Recovery, LLC (In Re McMullen)

441 B.R. 144, 2011 WL 65936
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Kansas
DecidedJanuary 6, 2011
Docket19-10292
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 441 B.R. 144 (Williams v. Capital Asset Recovery, LLC (In Re McMullen)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Capital Asset Recovery, LLC (In Re McMullen), 441 B.R. 144, 2011 WL 65936 (Kan. 2011).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT E. NUGENT, Chief Judge.

The parties submitted this adversary proceeding on stipulated facts and briefs. 1 The Trustee invokes her hypothetical lien creditor powers under § 544(a) to avoid defendant’s lien in a vehicle on the basis that defendant’s security interest became unperfected when the note and security agreement were assigned to it and it failed to cause its name to be shown on the title and in the Kansas Department of Revenue Motor Vehicle Division’s records. 2 The defendant asserts that nothing in the motor vehicle code requires it to amend its predecessor’s filing or notation on the title in order to retain a perfected lien in the vehicle.

Jurisdiction

The parties stipulated to the Court’s jurisdiction and entry of a final order in this matter. The Trustee’s claim for lien avoidance is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(K) over which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) and § 1334(b).

The case law and bankruptcy law treatises generally recognize a chapter 13 trustee’s standing to avoid liens and exercise strong-arm powers under § 544. 3 The defendant here does not contend otherwise.

Facts

The stipulations of fact and attached exhibits show that on June 23, 2007, Vince *146 McMullen purchased a used 2004 Chevrolet truck from a dealership in Cheney, Kansas. He signed a promissory note and security agreement granting the dealer a purchase money security interest in the vehicle. Thereafter, the dealer assigned the paper to Finance Company of Kansas (“Finance Company”) who caused its lien to be shown on the title records at the Motor Vehicle Division of the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR). Sometime in February 2008, Finance Company sold and assigned its interest to United Finance (“United”). Pursuant to an agreement entered into in October 2008, United sold and transferred its interest in the McMullen contract and vehicle to defendant Capital Asset Recovery LLC (“CAR”). Neither United nor CAR caused their names to be shown in the KDOR records or on the vehicle title. Finance Company’s name remains on the title as lienholder.

The McMullens filed this chapter 13 case on October 6, 2009. They claim the 2004 Chevy truck as exempt. The Trustee commenced this lien avoidance action on December 21, 2009. Debtors chapter 13 plan was confirmed April 6, 2010.

Issue

The Court views the issue before it as follows: Is an assignee of a properly perfected security interest in a vehicle required by law to “re-perfect” the security interest after assignment and transfer of the security interest or does the original perfection continue in the assignee?

Analysis

When a secured creditor takes a security interest in a motor vehicle after the original certificate of title to that vehi-ele has been issued (ie., a used vehicle), that creditor’s means of perfecting its security interest is defined by KaN. Stat. ANN. § 84-9-311 (2009 Supp.) and Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-135(c)(6) (2009 Supp.). Section 9-311(a) excuses a creditor from filing a financing statement when the collateral is covered by a state certificate-of-title statute. 4 That statute specifically references compliance with § 8-135 as it provides that a security interest in a vehicle is deemed perfected upon delivery of “documents appropriate under any such law ... as prescribed in subsection (c)(6) of K.S.A. 8-135....” 5 Section 9-311(b) states that compliance with the certificate of title statutes is the equivalent of filing a financing statement under Article 9. Therefore, we initially look to the motor vehicle code to determine whether the security interest currently owned by the defendant was properly perfected in the first instance.

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-135(c)(6) provides:

When a person acquires a security interest that such person seeks to perfect on a vehicle subsequent to the issuance of the original title on such vehicle, such person shall require the holder of the certificate of title to surrender the same and sign an application for a mortgage title in form prescribed by the division. Upon such surrender such person shall immediately deliver the certificate of title, application, and a fee of $10 to the division. Delivery of the surrendered title, application and tender of the required fee shall perfect a security interest in the vehicle as referenced in K.S.A. 84-9-311, and amendments thereto. 6

*147 As noted above, compliance with this process operates to perfect the initial lender’s security interest. There is no question here that Finance Company adequately complied with § 8 — 135(c)(6) and perfected its security interest in the Chevy. It was duly noted as the lienholder on the title and registration receipt.

The Trustee relies on the “when a person acquires a security interest” language in § 8 — 135(c)(6) to argue that each subsequent assignee of the lien had a duty to secure the surrender of the title from the debtor, surrender it to the Division, and re-perfect its interest in the truck. This reading of the title statute is incorrect in several ways. First, the words that anchor the Trustee’s theory are followed by the words “that such person [the lender] seeks to perfect.” A perfected security interest that is assigned is already perfected, suggesting that an assignee would not “seek to perfect” it again. Second, the Trustee’s argument ignores the presence and effect of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 84 — 9—310(c) (2009 Supp.). As CAR aptly points out, that provision says—

(c) Assignment of perfected security interest. If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest or agricultural hen, a filing under this article is not required to continue the perfected status of the security interest against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor. 7

As this statute plainly states, no one need file notice of an assignment of a financing statement in order for it to remain perfected as to the creditors and transferees of the debtor.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
441 B.R. 144, 2011 WL 65936, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-capital-asset-recovery-llc-in-re-mcmullen-ksb-2011.