BUTTLER, J.
Claimant in this workers’ compensation proceeding is the wife and beneficiary of a deceased worker. Although she was ultimately denied death benefits, the delay in the processing of her claim gave rise to an award of approximately one year’s worth of benefits denominated temporary total disability. She was also awarded a 5 percent penalty, assessed against the carrier. She was not, however, awarded burial costs. She appeals, contending that: (1) she should have been awarded interim spousal benefits rather than temporary total disability; (2) she should have been awarded burial and cemetery costs; (3) the 5 percent penalty assessed is inadequate in light of the length of the delay, and (4) denial of death benefits was error.
I
Vernon E. Williams (decedent) was employed by Bums International Security Services, Inc., as a security guard at a bank from May 24, 1974, until he died as a result of a heart attack on January 22, 1976. He was seen by his wife’s physician in July, 1973, for a physical examination, which revealed hypertension, but did not complain to his wife of any symptoms which may have been associated with his hypertension, and did not see any doctor after July of 1973.
Most of the evidence concerned the emotional condition of decedent. It indicates that he was a reliable, conscientious worker. He was concerned that he was not well-paid for what he considered to be substantial responsibility. A co-worker described him as "a worrywart-type who was very nervous and worried about every little thing.”
Physically, however, his job was not taxing, although the week of his death he had worked 41 hours in four days, and often worked overtime. His primary responsibility was guarding access to the money vault, which he did by controlling electronic gates from a central console.
[772]*772Decedent’s last day at work was unusual in only one respect: at lunch time an employee breached security by leaving a stack of cash ($12,000 — $20,000) outside the vault area. Decedent and the vault custodian, Mrs. Lachenmeier, placed the cash inside the vault. Mrs. Lachenmeier gave statements to each party and testified at the hearing. According to her, the incident was "highly unusual, and was worrisome for both of us until we had arranged for [the money’s] security.” One year prior to the hearing, in a written statement, she stated that the incident was "very upsetting to Vern given his nature and devotion to doing his job right.” Shortly after lunch, Mrs. Lachenmeier, who was required to fill in for an absent employee, sat and talked with decedent. She stated,
"As I sat there we talked some, but it was very obvious Vernon was not feeling well. His face was flushed and red which was not usual. He was unusually quiet that day. He sat rubbing his neck and complained of feeling choked up in his throat. He was never one to complain but revealed this to me when I asked him if he was alright. It was obvious to me he was not.
"As was the custom someone had provided a cake for vault employees. I had a piece and cut a piece for Vern who usually ate a piece. This time he said he could not eat it and put it in a drawer. He complained he was choked up and could not swallow.
"* * * He was quite nervous that day because he was trying to cut down on his smoking.”
In her later statement, she amplified that conversation with decedent:
"I asked him if he felt all right. He replied in general terms that he didn’t feel well; he said he was cutting down on smoking and because his wife had recently broken her foot, he was doing the housework and carrying her up and down stairs at their home. It was 'getting to him’ he said.”
He ate dinner that night, but related his illness of the afternoon to his wife, who testified,
"Well, he said that after lunch he had gotten back to work, and he felt real sick; and, then, I asked him, 'In [773]*773what way?’; and he said, well, his neck felt stiff, his jaws hurt, his teeth hurt, and that he had difficulty swallowing, but that then did pass over, and he felt that he should stay and finish his day’s work * * *.”
Decedent cleared the dinner dishes from the table, and he and his wife watched television for awhile. At about 9 p.m. he went upstairs (approximately 12 steps) to prepare his wife’s bed. He came back downstairs and spoke to her briefly, then returned upstairs to retire. When claimant retired that evening at 10 p.m., she discovered decedent was in bed, but did not respond when she called to him; he had no pulse that she could detect. An ambulance was called. The death certificate (without benefit of an autopsy) indicates decedent died at 11 p.m. that evening, the immediate cause being a myocardial infarction, due or as a consequence of coronary thrombosis, due or as a consequence of arteriosclerotic coronary artery disease.
Claimant filed a claim on January 28, 1976. The claim lay unprocessed for approximately one year. When a hearing finally was held, claimant was denied all relief. On appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), the order was modified to allow Mrs. Williams to collect temporary total disability payments from January 26, 1976, through January 12, 1977, plus a 5 percent penalty thereon and reasonable attorney fees. In all other respects, the Board affirmed the hearings officer.
II
Claimant’s first assignment of error, that temporary total disability was an inappropriate award, has been conceded by respondent. Accordingly, the Board’s order is modified to reflect an award for interim spousal payments pursuant to ORS 656.204, from the date of death, January 22, 1976, to the date of the claim denial on January 14, 1977. Jones v. Emanuel Hospital, 280 Or 147, 570 P2d 70 (1977); Williams v. SAIF, 31 Or App 1301, 572 P2d 658 (1977).
[774]*774III
Claimant’s second assignment of error is the failure of the Board to award her burial and funeral costs incurred, prior to the time her claim was denied. In Jones v. Emanuel Hospital, supra, the Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme contemplates that "interim compensation” must be. paid by an employer who does not deny the claim within 14 days from the date of its notice or knowledge thereof until the claim is denied, even though the claim is determined ultimately to be noncompensable. In arriving at that result, the Court construed the word "compensation,” in the context of ORS 656.262,1 to mean "interim [775]*775compensation” rather than "all benefits * * * provided for a compensable injury,” which is the definition set forth in ORS 656.005(9).2 The Court pointed [776]*776out that the statutory definition was applicable, "except where the context otherwise requires.” ORS 656.003. This rationale was followed in Williams v. SAIF, supra.
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BUTTLER, J.
Claimant in this workers’ compensation proceeding is the wife and beneficiary of a deceased worker. Although she was ultimately denied death benefits, the delay in the processing of her claim gave rise to an award of approximately one year’s worth of benefits denominated temporary total disability. She was also awarded a 5 percent penalty, assessed against the carrier. She was not, however, awarded burial costs. She appeals, contending that: (1) she should have been awarded interim spousal benefits rather than temporary total disability; (2) she should have been awarded burial and cemetery costs; (3) the 5 percent penalty assessed is inadequate in light of the length of the delay, and (4) denial of death benefits was error.
I
Vernon E. Williams (decedent) was employed by Bums International Security Services, Inc., as a security guard at a bank from May 24, 1974, until he died as a result of a heart attack on January 22, 1976. He was seen by his wife’s physician in July, 1973, for a physical examination, which revealed hypertension, but did not complain to his wife of any symptoms which may have been associated with his hypertension, and did not see any doctor after July of 1973.
Most of the evidence concerned the emotional condition of decedent. It indicates that he was a reliable, conscientious worker. He was concerned that he was not well-paid for what he considered to be substantial responsibility. A co-worker described him as "a worrywart-type who was very nervous and worried about every little thing.”
Physically, however, his job was not taxing, although the week of his death he had worked 41 hours in four days, and often worked overtime. His primary responsibility was guarding access to the money vault, which he did by controlling electronic gates from a central console.
[772]*772Decedent’s last day at work was unusual in only one respect: at lunch time an employee breached security by leaving a stack of cash ($12,000 — $20,000) outside the vault area. Decedent and the vault custodian, Mrs. Lachenmeier, placed the cash inside the vault. Mrs. Lachenmeier gave statements to each party and testified at the hearing. According to her, the incident was "highly unusual, and was worrisome for both of us until we had arranged for [the money’s] security.” One year prior to the hearing, in a written statement, she stated that the incident was "very upsetting to Vern given his nature and devotion to doing his job right.” Shortly after lunch, Mrs. Lachenmeier, who was required to fill in for an absent employee, sat and talked with decedent. She stated,
"As I sat there we talked some, but it was very obvious Vernon was not feeling well. His face was flushed and red which was not usual. He was unusually quiet that day. He sat rubbing his neck and complained of feeling choked up in his throat. He was never one to complain but revealed this to me when I asked him if he was alright. It was obvious to me he was not.
"As was the custom someone had provided a cake for vault employees. I had a piece and cut a piece for Vern who usually ate a piece. This time he said he could not eat it and put it in a drawer. He complained he was choked up and could not swallow.
"* * * He was quite nervous that day because he was trying to cut down on his smoking.”
In her later statement, she amplified that conversation with decedent:
"I asked him if he felt all right. He replied in general terms that he didn’t feel well; he said he was cutting down on smoking and because his wife had recently broken her foot, he was doing the housework and carrying her up and down stairs at their home. It was 'getting to him’ he said.”
He ate dinner that night, but related his illness of the afternoon to his wife, who testified,
"Well, he said that after lunch he had gotten back to work, and he felt real sick; and, then, I asked him, 'In [773]*773what way?’; and he said, well, his neck felt stiff, his jaws hurt, his teeth hurt, and that he had difficulty swallowing, but that then did pass over, and he felt that he should stay and finish his day’s work * * *.”
Decedent cleared the dinner dishes from the table, and he and his wife watched television for awhile. At about 9 p.m. he went upstairs (approximately 12 steps) to prepare his wife’s bed. He came back downstairs and spoke to her briefly, then returned upstairs to retire. When claimant retired that evening at 10 p.m., she discovered decedent was in bed, but did not respond when she called to him; he had no pulse that she could detect. An ambulance was called. The death certificate (without benefit of an autopsy) indicates decedent died at 11 p.m. that evening, the immediate cause being a myocardial infarction, due or as a consequence of coronary thrombosis, due or as a consequence of arteriosclerotic coronary artery disease.
Claimant filed a claim on January 28, 1976. The claim lay unprocessed for approximately one year. When a hearing finally was held, claimant was denied all relief. On appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), the order was modified to allow Mrs. Williams to collect temporary total disability payments from January 26, 1976, through January 12, 1977, plus a 5 percent penalty thereon and reasonable attorney fees. In all other respects, the Board affirmed the hearings officer.
II
Claimant’s first assignment of error, that temporary total disability was an inappropriate award, has been conceded by respondent. Accordingly, the Board’s order is modified to reflect an award for interim spousal payments pursuant to ORS 656.204, from the date of death, January 22, 1976, to the date of the claim denial on January 14, 1977. Jones v. Emanuel Hospital, 280 Or 147, 570 P2d 70 (1977); Williams v. SAIF, 31 Or App 1301, 572 P2d 658 (1977).
[774]*774III
Claimant’s second assignment of error is the failure of the Board to award her burial and funeral costs incurred, prior to the time her claim was denied. In Jones v. Emanuel Hospital, supra, the Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme contemplates that "interim compensation” must be. paid by an employer who does not deny the claim within 14 days from the date of its notice or knowledge thereof until the claim is denied, even though the claim is determined ultimately to be noncompensable. In arriving at that result, the Court construed the word "compensation,” in the context of ORS 656.262,1 to mean "interim [775]*775compensation” rather than "all benefits * * * provided for a compensable injury,” which is the definition set forth in ORS 656.005(9).2 The Court pointed [776]*776out that the statutory definition was applicable, "except where the context otherwise requires.” ORS 656.003. This rationale was followed in Williams v. SAIF, supra.
In order to sustain claimant’s contention here, we would be required to hold, contrary to Jone§ and Williams, that "compensation” as used in ORS 656.262 means "all benefits,” which would include burial expenses. ORS 656.204(1).3 We decline to do so. Not only would such a holding distort the rationale of Jones, but it would be unjustified under the statutory scheme. The cost of burial is a lump sum payment, not to exceed $1,000, is incurred very shortly after death, and its nonpayment during investigation of the claim does not create the same hardship as does nonpayment of time-loss benefits. Further, if claimant is correct, burial costs would be payable in all cases unless the death claim is denied immediately.
The Board, therefore, properly denied these benefits to claimant.
IV
Claimant’s third assignment of error is that under the circumstances of this case a 5 percent penalty is inadequate. ORS 656.262(8) provides:
"If the fund or direct responsibility employer or its insurer unreasonably delays or unreasonably refuses to pay compensation, or unreasonably delays acceptance or denial of a claim, the fund or direct responsibility employer shall be liable for an additional amount up to 25 percent of the amounts then due plus any attorney fees which may be assessed under ORS 656.382.”
[777]*777No action was taken on claimant’s claim for almost a full year. The Board found, "The employer has the obligation to process the claim and it is obvious here it was negligent in carrying out this obligation.” Claimant relies heavily upon Williams v. SAIF, supra, where we said:
"* * * [Cllaimant had been disabled for 40 days but had been compensated for only one day of disability. SAIF did not fully update the payments even after being requested to do so, and at no time was the lag between entitlement and compensation less than two weeks. SAIF offers no substantial excuse for its tardiness. A 15 percent penalty, as imposed by the referee and the Board, is appropriately computed both as a sanction against SAIF and as payment to claimant for whatever difficulties may have been caused by the continuing delay. * * *” 31 Or App at 1305.
Claimant argues that if 15 percent penalty is appropriate where there is a general lag in excess of two weeks, complete neglect of a claim warrants the maximum of 25 percent penalty.
In Williams, we addressed the lack of "authority defining 'unreasonable delay’ or applying the term in the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act.” 31 Or App at 1305. Having no legislative guidelines, "case-by-case development of workable rules,” 31 Or App at 1305, is the only recourse. In this case, claimant retained counsel on the same day that she filed her claim, January 28, 1976. Although counsel proceeded to investigate the claim, taking statements from various witnesses over the course of the ensuing year, no communications were directed to the employer or carrier until January 3, 1977,4after which the claim was promptly processed.
While ORS 656.262(1) places the responsibility for processing claims upon the employer and its carrier, [778]*778the holdings in Williams and Jones impose an expensive financial burden on them if they do not deny a claim promptly. The obligation to pay compensation for a noncompensable claim is, in itself, in the nature of a penalty, which provides an incentive to process claims expeditiously. The express penalty is in addition to the requirement that compensation determined not to be payable be paid. In determining the amount of penalty to assess, different factors may be relevant, depending upon the basis for assessing it. For example, a greater penalty might be justified for an "unreasonable” refusal to pay compensation admittedly due as opposed to an "unreasonable” delay in properly denying a claim. There should not, however, be an incentive to file a highly tenuous claim and, realizing that it has been mislaid, make no further inquiry for a year or more in order to obtain benefits (plus penalty) ultimately determined not to be owing.
In Williams, claimant’s counsel objected to the delays and requested payments on three occasions subsequent to the filing of the claim. Here, while claimant retained counsel at the outset, there was no attempt to determine what had happened to the claim for almost one year. Considering that factor, plus the fact that the unreasonable delay here was in denying the claim rather than in refusing to pay the claim, we conclude the 5 percent penalty is reasonable.
V
Finally, claimant appeals from the Board’s determination that decedent’s fatal attack was not compensable. The referee and the Board both found that neither legal nor medical causation had been established. In order to prevail, a claimant must establish both. Foley v. SAIF, 29 Or App 151, 155, 562 P2d 593 (1977).
We recognize that there is, and has been, confusion in determining what is legal and medical causation in heart cases, but that confusion appears to be inherent in such cases, and will continue to be, to some extent at [779]*779least, until the state of medical knowledge improves. In this case, claimant’s contention is that decedent’s heart attack was "caused” by on-the-job stress. In analyzing this contention, we accept as a valid proposition that medically, from a statistical standpoint, stress may be "a causative factor in these cases” where, as here, there is an absence of evidence showing that the case in issue is distinguishable from cases in general. Clayton v. Compensation Department, 253 Or 397, 402, 454 P2d 628 (1969). Given that starting point, the question becomes whether there is sufficient evidence to persuade this court, as the trier of fact, that decedent was under stress in carrying out his job (legal cause) and if so, whether that stress was a material contributing factor in producing the fatal heart attack (medical cause).
While there have been attempts to formulate rules to simplify the resolution of heart cases arising under Workers’ Compensation acts, we are aware of none which achieve the desired simplification. Professor Larson proposes a "personal risk” evaluation rule. 1A Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 38.83 (1973), which he originally explained in The Heart Cases in Workmen’s Compensation: An Analysis and Suggested Solution, 65 Mich L Rev 441 (1967).5 We [780]*780adopted that analysis in Fagaly v. State Acc. Ins. Fund, 3 Or App 270, 471 P2d 441, rev den (1970), and quickly discarded it in Anderson v. S.A.I.F., 5 Or App 580, 587, 485 P2d 1236 (1971), because, we said, it was "at odds with the legal causation test set forth by the Oregon Supreme Court in Coday [v. Willamette Tug & Barge, 250 Or 39, 440 P2d 224 (1968).]”
In Coday, supra, the Supreme Court reiterated the standard for legal causation applicable in Oregon as recognizing that it is not necessary for a claimant to show that he exerted unusual strain in carrying out his job; his usual exertion in his employment is enough. There is, however, nothing in Coday, or any other Oregon cases we have found, which precludes us from considering evidence of nonemployment stress or exertion in weighing the evidence to determine whether the on-the-job stress was a material contributing cause. On the other hand, we read Coday to mean that it is not necessary for claimant to show that on-the-job stress or exertion was greater than that of nonemployment life in order to show legal causation, although such considerations are relevant to a determination of the ultimate question.6
Accordingly, we sit as a jury to review a cold record to determine, without the aid of any formula to ease the burden, whether the claimant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that on-the-job stress [781]*781was a material contributing cause in producing decedent’s heart attack. We hold in this case that she has not.
The evidence is that decedent’s job was a very sedentary one; there was only occasional modest physical exertion, and no stress other than decedent’s desire, as a conscientious employee, to do a good job. The only evidence of what might be characterized as identifiable stress on the day he died was the fact that another employee had left a money box containing a substantial amount of cash on the counter outside the vault where it should have been secured. There is evidence that he was upset over this incident, even though it was quickly resolved with the aid of another employee. This evidence does not persuade us that decedent was subjected to stress, either usual or unusual, on the job.
But even if we assume that claimant has established that decedent was subject to on-the-job stress, the evidence does not persuade us that such stress materially contributed to decedent’s death. To the contrary, the record shows that decedent was quite nervous the day of his death because he was cutting down on smoking and that his situation at home was "getting to him” because his wife had recently broken her foot, requiring him to do the housework and carry her up and down stairs.
The record contains medical reports from two doctors,7 one of whom stated that "there is not enough evidence to indicate that Mr. Williams’ work on January 22, 1976, was important in the pathophysiology of his final illness. * * * I do not believe that his work was a material contributing cause to his death.” The other report stated that it was not evident that decedent had undergone "any undue or unusual stress related to his work.” The report goes on to state that "a [782]*782sudden stress or work situation could, indeed, precipitate a myocardial infarction.” The report concludes:
"* * * As the symptoms that are compatible with but not diagnostic of an infarction began at work, I would certainly have to say it is likely that his final symptoms and possibly his death were work related. Again, there are too many variables to say that the job caused his death. The same course of events could have occurred had he not been working at all but there is no way that I can know.”
It is not clear that the two doctors disagreed, but even if they did, the more favorable opinion is highly equivocal. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate in claimant’s favor, and we agree with both the referee and the Board that claimant has not sustained her burden of proof.
Affirmed as modified.