Williams v. Brunot

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Williams v. Brunot

240 A.D.2d 564, 659 N.Y.S.2d 986, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6891

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 16, 1997

StatusPublished

This text of 240 A.D.2d 564 (Williams v. Brunot) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Williams v. Brunot, 240 A.D.2d 564, 659 N.Y.S.2d 986, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6891 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant second third-party plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated June 24, 1996, as denied its motion for summary judgment against the second third-party defendant.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the appellant’s motion as sought summary judgment on its third cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

It is undisputed that the second third-party defendant, Shan Nagendra, the lessee of the vehicle, did not name the defendant second third-party plaintiff General Motors Acceptance Corporation (hereinafter GMAC), the lessor of the vehicle, as an additional insured. Because the lease required Nagendra to name GMAC as an additional insured, GMAC is entitled to summary judgment on its third cause of action, alleging breach of that term of the lease (see, Kinney v Lisk Co., 76 NY2d 215; McGill v Polytechnic Univ., 235 AD2d 400; Mathew v Crow Constr. Co., 220 AD2d 490). GMAC, however, is not entitled to summary judgment on its contractual indemnification cause of action (see, Morris v Snappy Car Rental, 84 NY2d 21; Griffin v Fun Jung La, 229 AD2d 468). Bracken, J. P., Rosenblatt, Thompson and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant second third-party plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.), dated June 24, 1996, as denied its motion for summary judgment against the second third-party defendant.

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the appellant’s motion as sought summary judgment on its third cause of action, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

It is undisputed that the second third-party defendant, Shan Nagendra, the lessee of the vehicle, did not name the defendant second third-party plaintiff General Motors Acceptance Corporation (hereinafter GMAC), the lessor of the vehicle, as an additional insured. Because the lease required Nagendra to name GMAC as an additional insured, GMAC is entitled to summary judgment on its third cause of action, alleging breach of that term of the lease (see, Kinney v Lisk Co., 76 NY2d 215; McGill v Polytechnic Univ., 235 AD2d 400; Mathew v Crow Constr. Co., 220 AD2d 490). GMAC, however, is not entitled to summary judgment on its contractual indemnification cause of action (see, Morris v Snappy Car Rental, 84 NY2d 21; Griffin v Fun Jung La, 229 AD2d 468). Bracken, J. P., Rosenblatt, Thompson and Krausman, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

240 A.D.2d 564, 659 N.Y.S.2d 986, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6891, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-brunot-nyappdiv-1997.

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