Williams v. Brown

208 F. Supp. 3d 713, 2016 WL 5388945
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedSeptember 26, 2016
DocketCivil Action No. 3:09CV769, Civil Action No. 3:10CV505
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 208 F. Supp. 3d 713 (Williams v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Brown, 208 F. Supp. 3d 713, 2016 WL 5388945 (E.D. Va. 2016).

Opinion

OPINION

John A. Gibney, Jr. United States District Judge

This case involves the conviction of four innocent navy men—the “Norfolk Four”— charged with the rape and murder of Michelle Bosko. A fifth man named Omar Ballard actually committed the offense.

Two of the four men, Danial Williams and Joseph J. Dick, have filed the petitions for writs of habeas corpus under consideration here. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Both pled guilty—Williams to capital murder and rape, and Dick to first degree murder and rape. The trial court accepted their pleas, and they were convicted.

The respondent, on behalf of the Commonwealth of Virginia,1 has moved to dismiss on two grounds: (1) that the statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas petitions bars the § 2254 petitions and (2) that the petitioners’ claims are procedurally defaulted. Ordinarily, the Court would dismiss the petitions as untimely and defaulted. The actual innocence of Williams and Dick, however, allows the Court to [716]*716address the merits of their claims, notwithstanding the technical roadblocks raised by the Commonwealth. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013) (“[A]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar ... [or] expiration of the statute of limitations.”). The Court previously concluded that the petitioners had made a sufficient threshold showing of innocence to warrant an evidentiary hearing on their gateway claim of actual innocence. See Dick v. Muse, No. 3:10CV505, 2014 WL 4854689, at *7 (E.D.Va. Sept. 29, 2014); Williams v. Muse, No. 3:09CV769, 2014 WL 2921932, at *13-14 (E.D.Va. June 27, 2014).

The Court has conducted the evidentiary hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Williams and Dick are innocent and, therefore, have satisfied the standard for a gateway claim of actual innocence.2

I. How the Murder Really Happened

Before going through a detailed analysis of the evidence 'in this case, the Court will provide a brief outline of how the crime actually occurred, as conclusively demonstrated by the evidence presented to the Court. A more detailed analysis follows in Part VII of this Memorandum Opinion.

Omar Ballard alone killed Marie Bosko. For unknown reasons, Bosko allowed Ballard to enter her apartment late at night, while her husband was not at home. Ballard somehow got Bosko into the bedroom, where he raped her and stabbed her in the chest a number of times. Ballard admitted to both the rape and the murder. In his confessions, Ballard accurately described the apartment, the location of the corpse, and the knife used in the crime. Scientific evidence supported Ballard’s admission. The police found Ballard’s DNA on Bosko. The fatal stab wounds in her chest were of uniform depth and closely bunched together, indicating that a single individual inflicted them.3 The Norfolk Four, in contrast, left no DNA, fingerprints, or other evidence on the scene, could not accurately describe the location of the crime, and did not coherently explain what happened.

This evidence—clear and straightforward—makes it hard for the Commonwealth to tie the Norfolk Four to the crime. Undeterred, the Commonwealth offers a bizarre explanation for how Williams and Dick committed the alleged offenses. First, the Commonwealth notes, accurately, that Williams apparently had a crush on Bosko. (Resp’t’s Post-Hr’g Br. 16.) The State contends that Williams and Dick went to her apartment on the night in question. (Id. at 18.) Then, the Commonwealth says that Williams, Dick, and two other sailors joined Ballard in a united effort to rape and kill Bosko. (Id. at 12.) The Commonwealth says that the five men banded together to hold her down while she violently struggled. (Id. at 20-21.) Then they had sexual intercourse with her. The prosecution says that despite their combined efforts, none of the Norfolk Four ejaculated in Bosko’s vagina, and despite [717]*717their herculean labors to restrain her and her desperate struggles, they left not a trace of DNA. (Id.) According to the Commonwealth, after the sexual assault the four sailors and Ballard took turns stabbing her—passing the knife around so that each had a chance to stab her. (Id. at 21.) Yet the men (other than Ballard) did not leave any DNA on Bosko or anywhere else in the apartment. (Id. at 22.)

Recognizing the improbability of the scenario it proffers, the State argues that the confessions of Williams and Dick prove that they committed the crime. (Id. at 26.) This argument ignores three important things. First, it ignores the physical evidence that demonstrates the sailors’ innocence. Second, it ignores how the police secured confessions from the Norfolk Four. The police took multiple statements of the men to groom them to say what the police wanted.4 Third, this argument ignores dramatic research on how police tactics—such as those used here—lead to false confessions. E.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent, 14-44 (2011).

In contrast, Ballard described the scene accurately, deposited DNA at the scene, admitted to the offense, and said that the four sailors did not commit the crime. The evidence leads to one sensible conclusion: Ballard alone raped and killed Bosko.

The Commonwealth’s theory depends on assumptions that beggar belief: that four men' struggled with Bosko without leaving any DNA behind, that four men raped Bosko without leaving any DNA behind, that four men stabbed her without leaving any DNA behind, and that four men passed a knife around, taking turns stabbing her, and creating a neat pattern of fatal wounds, all of the same depth.5

Although the Norfolk Four have been released from prison, the wrongful convictions have continuing consequences. For instance, the men have to register as sex offenders. In the case of one of the four— Eric Wilson—the registration prevents Wilson from adopting his stepson, yet Wilson has no remedy in court to undo this injustice. Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir.2012). Williams and Dick must go through life with the burden of false felony convictions. Regardless of the eventual outcome of this case,6 it is time for the Commonwealth to free these men of the continuing shackles of their convictions.

II. Standard for Gateway Claim of Actual Innocence

By any measure, the evidence shows the defendants’ innocence—by a preponderance of the evidence, by clear and convincing evidence, by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by conclusive evidence.

The law actually requires only a substantial showing of evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), articulated the innocence standard for gateway procedural [718]*718relief. “[A] petition supported by a convincing Schlup

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
208 F. Supp. 3d 713, 2016 WL 5388945, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-brown-vaed-2016.