Williams v. Board of Parole

812 P.2d 443, 107 Or. App. 515, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 870
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJune 5, 1991
DocketCA A64077
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 812 P.2d 443 (Williams v. Board of Parole) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. Board of Parole, 812 P.2d 443, 107 Or. App. 515, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 870 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).

Opinion

*517 DE MUNIZ, J.

Petitioner seeks review of a final order of the Board of Parole resetting his parole release date. ORS 144.335. He contends that the Board applied rules that took effect after the commission of the crimes for which he was sentenced, contrary to the ex post facto provisions of the Oregon 1 and federal 2 constitutions.

In 1986, petitioner was convicted of rape and burglary and given an indeterminate sentence with a maximum of 20 years and a minimum of 10 years in prison for each offense. The sentences were to run consecutively. At his initial prison term hearing in 1987, the Board declined to override the minimum sentences and set petitioner’s prison term at 120 months.

In 1988, the Board reconsidered, because it had previously treated the sentences as concurrent, instead of consecutive. At that time, the Board overrode one minimum but did not disturb the other. The Board next held a personal review hearing in 1990. It overrode the remaining minimum sentence and granted a reduction in petitioner’s prison term of seven months, leaving him a total term of 113 months.

Petitioner now complains that the Board should have applied the “personal review” “prison term reduction” rules that were in effect when he committed his offenses in 1985 and 1986. 3 Under those rules, he was entitled to a *518 personal review by the Board after serving five years and every three years thereafter. At each personal review, his prison term could be reduced by the Board by as much as 20 percent of his established prison term. 4 In petitioner’s case, that means that, under former OAR 255-40-025, his remaining 10-year minimum prison term could be reduced by as much as 24 months, leaving him a total of 96 months to serve. Assuming a maximum reduction of 20 percent at the five-year review, petitioner would have only one personal review at five years under those rules, because his second would not be scheduled to occur until he had served 96 months, when he would be scheduled to be discharged.

Under the rules applied by the Board in the 1990 review, 5 petitioner may have a personal review every three *519 years but only if the Board first receives a recommendation for reduction from the institution. At the personal review, the Board is limited to reducing a prison term by a maximum of seven months. Assuming a review every three years, petitioner would be reviewed at 36 and 72 months. Assuming the maximum reduction of seven months at each review, the most that petitioner could receive is a reduction of 14 months. He would not receive a third review at 108 months, because he would be scheduled for discharge at 106 months.

*520 In Williams v. Board of Parole, 98 Or App 716, 780 P2d 793 (1989), rev den 309 Or 522 (1990), we held that an ex post facto analysis may apply to “Board rules that govern the setting of a parole release date, under both the Oregon and federal constitutions.” 98 Or App at 720. Both provisions prohibit legislation that imposes greater punishment than was in effect when an offense was committed. See Calder v. Bull, 3 US (3 Dall) 386, 390, 1 L Ed 648 (1798); Williams v. Board of Parole, supra.

This case is not controlled by our decision on the rules in Howard v. State Board of Parole, 105 Or App 288, 804 P2d 509 (1991). hxHoward, the petitioner challenged, among other things, the Board’s refusal to consider a reduction in his prison term at his review hearing, because it applied the version of OAR 255-40-005(1) that was in effect at the time of the hearing, rather than the version in effect when he was sentenced. Under the old version of the rule, an inmate was entitled to a hearing every three years. Under the new version, a three-year review hearing was conducted only when there was a recommendation by the parent institution for a reduction in the inmate’s prison term. 105 Or App at 291-92. We held that the application of the new rule did not violate the ex post facto provisions, “because it does not authorize greater punishment and because its abolition of mandatory hearings is merely a procedural change that does not substantially alter [the] petitioner’s rights.” 105 Or App at 293. However, the petitioner in Howard did not argue, as petitioner does here, that the new rules reduced the Board’s authority to shorten his prison term.

Application of OAR 255-40-025(2) to petitioner is contrary to the Ex Post Facto Clauses. Application of the rules in effect in 1990 eliminates petitioner’s opportunity to have his prison term reduced by an additional 10 months. Even though he may not achieve an “extended course of conduct indicating outstanding reformation,” reduction in his opportunity to have his sentence shortened makes the punishment under the new rules more onerous. See Weaver v. Graham, 450 US 24, 101 S Ct 960, 67 L Ed 2d 17 (1981); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 US 397, 401-02, 57 S Ct 797, 81 L Ed 1182 (1937); Raske v. Martinez, 876 F2d 1496, 1500 (11th Cir), cert *521 den 493 US 993, 110 S Ct 543 (1989). 6 Petitioner is entitled to be considered under the rules in effect when his offenses were committed. 7

Reversed and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1

Or Const, Art I, § 21, provides:

“No ex post facto law * * * shall ever he passed * *
2

US Const, Art I, § 10, provides:

“No State shall * * * pass any * * * ex post facto Law * *
3

When petitioner committed the crimes for which he was convicted, OAR 255-40-005(1) provided:

“Personal reviews shall be conducted after the prisoner has served five (5) years of his prison term and every three (3) years thereafter, starting with the date the prisoner’s sentence begins to run. Such review will be conducted to determine the progress of the prisoner and whether such progress is exceptional as to warrant a reduction in the prison term.”

Former OAR 255-40-025 provided, in pertinent part:

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Bluebook (online)
812 P.2d 443, 107 Or. App. 515, 1991 Ore. App. LEXIS 870, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-board-of-parole-orctapp-1991.