25CA1444 Williams v Blanca Forestry 08-27-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1444 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23CV30783 Honorable Michael J. Roche, Judge
Norman Williams, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Blanca Forestry Products, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division III
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Freyre and Berger*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 27, 2026
Wilhite, Rose, & Roberts, P.C., Sean T. Conrecode, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Johnson Bakken Greely Smith, P.C., Aaron R. Bakken, Joshua K. Smith, John R. Hardwick, Centennial, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Plaintiff, Norman Williams (Williams), appeals the district court’s dismissal of his case after defendant, Blanca Forestry Products, Inc. (Blanca), deposited $15,000 in the court registry. The deposited amount represented Williams’s statutory cap of damages under section 8-41-401(3), C.R.S. 2025, of the Colorado Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act). Williams contends that the district court erred because (1) Blanca waived any statutory cap by failing to plead that statute as an affirmative defense under C.R.C.P. 8(c); (2) it did not strike Blanca’s motion for determination of law; and (3) it capped his damages at $15,000. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Williams owns a welding and fabrication business as a sole proprietor. Blanca hired Williams as an independent contractor to build a new staircase outside of a sawmill or to repurpose a steel staircase located inside the sawmill and move it outside. While onsite at the sawmill, Williams fell from the staircase, suffering, among other issues, a severe traumatic brain injury. At the time of his injury, Williams did not maintain a personal workers’ compensation insurance policy, nor was he covered under Blanca’s policy.
2
¶3 Williams filed this lawsuit against Blanca asserting negligence, premises liability, and vicarious liability claims. In Blanca’s answer, it “invoked all statutory or other defenses applicable, related to or otherwise available under the [Act], C.R.S. 8-40-101, et. seq.”
¶4 Blanca filed a motion for determination of law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) (Rule 56(h) motion). It argued that, should a jury find in Williams’s favor, his damages should be capped at $15,000 under section 8-41-401(3). At the time Blanca filed its motion, Williams conceded he was an independent contractor hired to perform welding and fabrication work at Blanca’s sawmill, and that when he fell, he was within the scope of his duties. Blanca argued that the undisputed facts supported application of the statutory cap on damages.
¶5 In response, Williams sought to strike Blanca’s Rule 56(h) motion. Williams asserted that Blanca had not pled with specificity section 8-41-401(3) as an affirmative defense, and as a result, the defense was waived.
¶6 Before the district court ruled on its Rule 56(h) motion, Blanca sought summary judgment on Williams’s premises liability claim.
3
Blanca argued that Williams had an exclusive remedy under the Premises Liability Act (PLA). Under the PLA, Blanca argued that it had no knowledge of a dangerous condition nor did it have a duty to warn Williams. Williams responded, asserting in an affidavit that he was not at the sawmill on the day he was injured within the scope of his duties as an independent contractor, as Blanca changed the scope of his work from building the staircase to repurposing the existing one for outside. The court granted Blanca’s motion, in part, dismissing his negligence claim because Williams’s sole remedy fell under the PLA. But it denied Blanca’s request for summary judgment on that same claim, finding that a jury could find that Blanca had knowledge of a dangerous condition.
¶7 Subsequently, the court denied Williams’s motion to strike the Rule 56(h) motion, finding that Blanca had provided notice that it asserted defenses under the Act.
¶8 Thus, the court granted the Rule 56(h) motion, finding that the statutory cap under section 8-41-401(3) applied based on the undisputed fact that Williams was an independent contractor of Blanca who did not have personal workers’ compensation coverage.
4
¶9 Subsequently, Blanca filed a motion seeking dismissal, pending its deposit of $15,000 into the court registry, which represented the maximum amount of damages Williams could recover by a jury under section 8-41-401(3). In the meantime, Williams filed a motion to reconsider the court’s order granting Blanca’s Rule 56(h) motion. The court denied Williams’s request, finding that his arguments lacked merit and that his new affidavit did not create a genuine issue of fact. In the same order, the court dismissed Williams’s case, and the court later received Blanca’s $15,000 deposit.
¶ 10 Williams now appeals.
II. Standard of Review
¶ 11 We review de novo a district court’s interpretation and application of a statute. Cavaleri v. Anderson, 2012 COA 122, ¶ 5. In construing a statute, it is our duty “to effectuate the intent and purpose of the General Assembly,” applying its plain and ordinary meaning. CLPF-Parkridge One, L.P. v. Harwell Invs., Inc., 105 P.3d 658, 660 (Colo. 2005). If the statute is unambiguous on its face, we need not resort to the other canons of statutory construction. Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18.
5
¶ 12 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Rabin, 2018 COA 183, ¶ 33, rev’d on other grounds and remanded, 2020 CO 77. A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. Ferraro v. Frias Drywall, LLC, 2019 COA 123, ¶ 10.
III. Affirmative Defense
¶ 13 Williams contends that the district court erred by granting Blanca’s Rule 56(h) motion because Blanca did not plead with particularity the statutory cap under section 8-41-401(3) as an affirmative defense in its answer. As part of this argument, Williams also contends that the court improperly denied his motion to strike the Rule 56(h) motion.
¶ 14 We disagree with Williams for three reasons.
¶ 15 First, the court’s interpretation of section 8-41-401(1) was correct. Subsection (1)(a)(I) states that “[a]ny . . . company, or corporation operating or engaged in or conducting any business by . . . contracting out any part or all of the work thereof to any . . . contractor, or subcontractor, . . . shall be construed to be an employer” under the Act, and “shall be liable as provided in said
6
articles to pay compensation for injury or death resulting therefrom to said . . . contractors, and subcontractors and their employees or employees’ dependents, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section.” § 18-41-401(1)(a)(I). Subsection (3) of 8-41-401 states
[A]ny individual who is excluded from the definition of employee pursuant to section 8-
40-202(2) . . . shall not have any cause of action of any kind under articles 40 to 47 of this title.
...
The total amount of damages recoverable pursuant to any cause of action resulting from a work-related injury brought by such individual that would otherwise have been compensable under articles 40 to 47 of this title shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars[.]
Section 8-40-202(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025, includes exceptions to the definition of an “employee” under the statute and outlines what is required to be deemed an independent contractor.
¶ 16 The court found — and we agree — that the legislative purpose of section 8-41-401(3) is to encourage independent contractors to participate in the workers’ compensation system by limiting the exposure of those contractors who obtain coverage from lawsuits or
7
claims brought by uncovered independent contractors who become injured on the job. Snook v. Joyce Homes, Inc., 215 P.3d 1210, 1215 (Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 17 In Pulsifer v. Pueblo Professional Contractors Inc., 161 P.3d 656, 663 (Colo. 2007), the supreme court interpreted section 8-41- 401(3), concluding that “[t]he General Assembly has shifted the risk of work-related injuries costing more than fifteen thousand dollars to individuals who have the choice to participate in the workers’ compensation system.” “The limitation [on damages] was premised on the belief that when an individual ‘chooses to opt out of Work[ers’] Comp. [he or she] can’t have the best of both worlds.’” Snook, 215 P.3d at 1215 (quoting House Hearing on H.B. 1215 (Mary Ann Tebedo, R., El Paso, Bill sponsor)).
¶ 18 And courts are obliged to follow the General Assembly’s express intent to establish a statutory limit on damages. Indeed, the supreme court has said, “harsh though it may seem to those subject to the statute’s limits, is that, if a sole proprietor wants to avoid such consequences, they are responsible for insuring against those consequences themselves.” Pulsifer, 161 P.3d at 663 (holding that it was “[c]onstrained by the language of [section 8-41-401(3)]”
8
and so it “cannot, absent constitutional infirmities, alter the General Assembly’s expressed intent to allow such outcomes to prevail”).
¶ 19 Second, a statutory cap on damages is not, as the district court correctly concluded, an affirmative defense. In Lee v. Colorado Department of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 225 (Colo. 1986), the supreme court addressed a similar situation as here in which an individual attempted to recover damages beyond the statutory limits of $150,000 in section 24-10-114, C.R.S. 2025, of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). By concluding that the plaintiff was subject to the CGIA’s limit, the court reaffirmed that statutory caps on damages are not waivable affirmative defenses; rather, they “serve as a limit on the jurisdiction of the court to enter judgment in an amount greater than the limits imposed by” such legislative acts. Lee, 718 P.2d at 225.
¶ 20 Lee’s reasoning is equally applicable to the conclusion that section 8-41-401(3) is not an affirmative defense. The supreme court’s unequivocal statement in Lee that such limitations on damages are “fixed by law and cannot be waived by the action or inaction of the parties” is just as apt under the CGIA as it is under
9
section 8-41-401(3). Id. Because the statutory cap is not an affirmative defense, the district court did not need to consider whether it would have allowed Blanca to amend its answer; as a result, Williams’s contention that he was prejudiced by the court’s action to allow Blanca to amend its answer is inconsequential.
¶ 21 Third and finally, we disagree with Williams’s contention that Blanca did not plead with particularity the statutory cap, as required under C.R.C.P. 8(c) because that civil rule deals with affirmative defenses.
¶ 22 Nevertheless, Williams relies on two cases in which he asserts that defenses under the Act are deemed to be affirmative defenses. Those cases are distinguishable, however, because the provisions at issue were deemed to be affirmative defenses. See Popovich v. Irlando, 811 P.2d 379, 385 (Colo. 1991) (“[C]o-employee immunity rule [under the Act] constitutes an affirmative defense to a tort claim against a co-employee[.]”); see also Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301, 327 (Colo. App. 2009) (holding that the statutory employer had “waived its exclusivity defense under WCA section 8-41-102,” as the employee exclusive remedy, when it did not raise it in its trial management order or during trial).
10
¶ 23 Williams’s attempt to use these cases to assert that section 8- 41-401(3) is also an affirmative defense fails because nothing in those cases hold that asserting a defense under one provision of the Act transforms another provision under the Act to an affirmative defense. Instead, case law supports that the courts look at individual provisions under the Act — as the district court did here — to determine whether the specific statutory section might qualify as an affirmative defense. See Indus. Comm’n v. Ewing, 418 P.2d 296, 298 (Colo. 1966) (holding that “the issue of ‘suitable employment’ [under the former version of section 8-51-107(2)] is deemed to be somewhat analogous to the various affirmative defenses provided for in civil actions” under Rule 8(c), “particularly the provision contained therein that ‘mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damages shall be affirmatively pleaded’”); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Taylor, 45 P.3d 759, 762 (Colo. App. 2001) (holding that policy limits for particular coverage and setoff amounts in the Act were affirmative defenses that had the ability to reduce an arbitration award); see also Valley Tree Serv. v. Jimenez, 787 P.2d 658, 660 (Colo. App. 1990) (holding that a reduction in benefits under a now repealed law in section 8-51-108(4) was “in
11
the nature of an affirmative defense which limits the employer’s liability”).
¶ 24 Because section 8-41-401(3) is not an affirmative defense, the district court correctly found that the statute applied to Williams’s case. Therefore, the court did not err when it denied Williams’s motion to strike Blanca’s Rule 56(h) motion and instead ruled in Blanca’s favor on the merits of its Rule 56(h) motion.
IV. Cap on Damages
¶ 25 Williams argues that the court erred by capping his damages at $15,000 under section 8-41-401(3) because (1) it is disputed whether he was working at the time of the incident; (2) it failed to consider whether Blanca’s policy covered him; and (3) Blanca did not inquire as to whether Williams carried a worker’s compensation policy as required by statute and, thus, should be equitably estopped from benefiting from the statute. We address and reject each contention.
A. Disputed Facts
¶ 26 In response to Blanca’s motion for summary judgment, Williams executed an affidavit asserting new facts that contradicted his deposition testimony.
12
¶ 27 In Williams’s amended complaint, he asserted the following facts:
On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff Norman Williams was working on a job site located at 29492 Country Road 12, Blanca, Colorado 81123 (“site”) that contained a sawmill.
Defendant Blanca owned the sawmill on the site.
Defendant Blanca hired Plaintiff as an independent contractor to work at the site, including in and around the sawmill at the site.
Plaintiff owned Norm’s Southwest Welding & Fabrication which had contracted with Defendant Blanca to perform work at the site and in and around the sawmill.
Plaintiff was working in the course and scope of his duties with his business he owned on March 25, 2022.
Likewise, in his deposition, he agreed with counsel’s questions that he was an independent contractor for Blanca and the day he was injured at the sawmill, he was conducting work pursuant to their agreement.
¶ 28 In his affidavit, however, he asserted that he did not have an agreement with Blanca to repurpose the staircase inside the sawmill, as the original agreement was for him to build a new
13
staircase and catwalk outside. Therefore, he contends that when he was at the sawmill that day, his injuries were not arising out of any agreement for contracted work with Blanca. He further asserted that the injury did not occur during the scope of his work because he went to the sawmill that day to simply observe the project.
¶ 29 He justified the additional facts in the affidavit due to his improved medical condition, allowing him to remember events that he previously could not recall at the time of his deposition. In its order on Williams’s motion to reconsider, the district court stated that Williams’s supplemental affidavit did not create a genuine issue of material fact, necessitating the court to vacate its judgment.
¶ 30 The district court determined that Williams had made judicial admissions that he was an independent contractor conducting work for Blanca, and so his later additional facts did not alter those admissions. It also relied on Cavaleri, ¶¶ 2-3, as an analogous case to determine section 8-41-401(3) applied to Williams’s circumstances. In that case, a sole proprietor independent contractor, who did not obtain personal workers’ compensation insurance, was injured on a job site conducting work for a
14
homeowner. Id. The contractor sued the homeowner, the homeowner tendered the statutory limit of $15,000 under the statute, and the district court dismissed the action with prejudice. Id.
¶ 31 Even assuming the court erred by treating Williams’s allegations in his complaint and deposition testimony as judicial admissions, any error was harmless.
¶ 32 A party’s judicial admissions are binding unless the party seeks relief from the court to amend them. See English v. Thorpe, 2026 COA 29M, ¶ 42. “A judicial admission is a formal, deliberate declaration which a party or his attorney makes in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of dispensing with proof of formal matters or of facts about which there is no real dispute.” Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Colo. 1986). Judicial admissions bind the party who makes them, can be used as evidence against such party, “and may constitute the basis of a verdict.” Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. State, 682 P.2d 486, 489 (Colo. App. 1983).
¶ 33 In the civil context, an error is harmless if it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. C.R.C.P. 61. “An error affects a substantial right only if ‘it can be said with fair assurance that the
15
error substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself.’” People in Interest of R.D., 2012 COA 35, ¶ 25 (quoting Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529, 535 (Colo. 2010)).
¶ 34 Williams’s argument that he asserted in his affidavit that he was not working at the time of the injury or did not have an agreement to repurpose the staircase does not change the fact that he was engaged to conduct work for Blanca. An independent contractor is an individual who performs services for another “according to his own methods and manner, free from any direction or control of their employer in all matters related to their work and is only accountable” for the result to be accomplished. Digit. Landscape Inc. v. Media Kings LLC, 2018 COA 142, ¶ 78 (quoting Cont’l Bus Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 267, 271 (10th Cir. 1963)). To the extent the nature of Williams’ work altered from building a new staircase to repurposing the current one, the result was the same: Williams was on the premises the day he was injured to conduct welding and fabrication work for Blanca. Indeed, Blanca’s argument that there was no other reason for Williams to be on Blanca’s premises but to work as contracted is compelling. And Williams’s affidavit contains nothing to suggest that Blanca had
16
entered into an agreement with Williams to treat him as an employee of the company, as opposed to an independent contractor.
¶ 35 In addition, although Williams’s affidavit suggests that he was not at the sawmill on the day he was injured to perform work, nothing refutes that he did not just “observe” the project that day. Instead, he assisted a Blanca employee to move the staircase outside. But even if he were just “observing,” his presence that day was within the scope of his duties by surveying the worksite for future work.1
¶ 36 Likewise, Williams’s counsel never sought to amend his complaint or deposition testimony in which he asserted and agreed he was hired as an independent contractor. To the extent Williams generally relies on medical improvements in his condition to justify remembering new facts — a position that we are not rejecting as a
1 To the extent Williams intended his vicarious liability claim to be
an independent cause of action, we conclude that when Blanca deposited the statutory cap of damages with the court, Williams was foreclosed from obtaining further relief on any claim. See § 8- 41-401(3), C.R.S. 2025 (If an independent contractor does not carry his own worker’s compensation policy, “[t]he total amount of damages recoverable pursuant to any cause of action resulting from a work-related injury brought by such individual . . . shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars”) (emphasis added).
17
genuine possibility — he had an obligation to amend his complaint or supplement his discovery responses to put the court and parties on notice that he no longer considered those statements to be accurate. See Thorpe, ¶ 42 (relying on out of state case law to note that a withdrawn or amended pleading, which contained a judicial admission, can be tendered as evidence and considered by the fact finder, although it no longer has the binding effect of a judicial admission). Therefore, we conclude that, because Williams’s affidavit, even if taken as true, did not create genuine issues of material fact, the court did not err by denying to vacate its judgment.
B. Coverage by Blanca’s Workers’ Compensation Policy
¶ 37 The district court found — and we agree — that Williams was not covered under Blanca’s workers’ compensation policy.
¶ 38 Williams argues that because Blanca’s workers’ compensation policy does not distinguish between employee and worker, and that because Williams was going to be a “worker,” Blanca’s policy could have applied to him. But as the district court held, Williams was not eligible under Blanca’s workers’ compensation policy because he was an independent contractor. Compare § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S.
18
2025 (stating that the Act is to assure “quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers”), with § 8-40- 202(2)(b)(II) (setting forth the test for determining whether an individual is an employee for the purposes of the Act). And Williams provided no evidence that Blanca had a contract with him to treat him as an employee.
C. Equitable Estoppel
¶ 39 Williams argues that Blanca should be equitably estopped from asserting section 8-41-401(3) due to its failure to inquire as to whether he had workers’ compensation coverage, as required by section 8-41-404(1), C.R.S. 2025. We disagree.
¶ 40 In the district court, Williams argued that, by Blanca not inquiring whether he carried workers’ compensation coverage as required by statute, it induced him to work for Blanca. The district court rejected this argument in denying Williams’s motion to reconsider, stating that “[t]he dispositive fact is that Williams had not obtained workers[’] compensation insurance for himself[,]” and that he was “not ignorant to the fact that he [Williams] had not obtained workers[’] compensation insurance.” The court concluded that Williams did not provide any proof that he had relied on
19
Blanca’s failure to inquire about his workers’ compensation status to his own detriment by not affirmatively obtaining coverage.
¶ 41 Even if the court erred in its analysis — in that Blanca had a statutory duty to inquire as to whether Williams carried coverage under section 8-41-404(1) — the error is harmless. C.R.C.P. 61; R.D., ¶ 25.
¶ 42 Any potential statutory violation committed by Blanca, however, does not negate the applicability of section 8-41-401(3). A company’s violation of section 8-41-404(1), at most, may result in the possible imposition of an administrative fine. See § 8-41-404(3). Williams has not pointed to any provision in the Act that prohibits an employer who has violated a provision of the Act from relying on section 8-41-401(3). Therefore, section 8-41-401(3) still applies to Williams even assuming Blanca violated section 8-41-404. Therefore, the court did not err by capping Williams’s damages at $15,000 under section 8-41-401(3).
V. Conclusion
¶ 43 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BERGER concur.