Williams v. Biden

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJuly 24, 2024
DocketCivil Action No. 2024-0879
StatusPublished

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Bluebook
Williams v. Biden, (D.D.C. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA _________________________________________ ) GRADY RENARD WILLIAMS, Jr., ) GDC 1130545, ) Petitioner,) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 24-0879 (UNA) ) JOSEPH BIDEN, Jr., ) ) Respondent. ) _________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s application to proceed in forma pauperis

(ECF No. 2) and his pro se petition for a writ of mandamus (ECF No. 1). The Court will grant

the application and deny the petition.

Petitioner “is domiciled in the Territory of Georgia,” Pet. at 2, and currently is

incarcerated at Dooly State Prison in Unadilla, Georgia. He identifies himself as “a Moorish

American National and Public Minister of the Moorish National Republic Federal Government,

born in the Continental United States of America, subject to the Emperor of Morocco[.]” Id.; see

Decl. of Status and Right of Avoidance (ECF No. 7) at 1. Petitioner fancies himself a “real party

in interest” who is “a ‘separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,’ (in the instant case,

otherwise[”]), Decl. of Status at 2, and therefore, is not “a citizen of a State of the United States,”

id. As such, petitioner allegedly “is not a juristic person which may be ‘affected’ by PUBLIC

STATUTES; but is invested with and bears the status, condition and character of a ‘sovereign

without subjects.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Given this supposed status, petitioner considers 1 himself beyond the reach of Georgia law. See, e.g., Decl. of Status at 3 (alleging “the court can

exercise no jurisdiction whatsoever over the ‘real party in interest’”). Allegedly petitioner is

“not to be held for detention under any colorable circumstances,” Decl. In Chief (ECF No. 4) at

2, and that “[t]he Police Power of the State of Georgia is abridging the rights, privileges, or

immunities of the Petitioner, and is denying the Petitioner of his liberty without due process of

law, or as denying to him the equal protection of the laws,” Pet. at 2; see Decl. of Status at 1.

According to petitioner, it is “the ministerial duty of the President of the United States to

forthwith demand the release of any Sovereign Moorish American Citizen,” such as himself,

who allegedly is “UN-justly deprived of his freedom by any Foreign jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 3; see

Pet. at 1. Alas, petitioner is mistaken.

A writ of mandamus “compel[s] an officer or employee of the United States or any

agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. “[M]andamus is

‘drastic’; it is available only in ‘extraordinary situations.’” In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Only if “(1) the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the

defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy available to the

plaintiff,” Thomas v. Holder, 750 F.3d 899, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2014), is mandamus relief granted.

Petitioner does not establish a clear right to relief or respondent’s clear duty to act. More

importantly, any legal theory based on petitioner’s supposed status as a Moorish American or

“sovereign citizen” is inherently frivolous, and petitioner well knows. See, e.g., Williams v.

Georgia, No. 5:21-cv-439, 2022 WL 568338, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 24, 2022) (noting that

“Plaintiff’s filings bear all the hallmarks of the sovereign citizen theory that has been

consistently rejected by the federal courts as an utterly frivolous attempt to avoid the statutes,

rules, and regulations that apply to all litigants, regardless of how they portray themselves”)

2 (cleaned up); Williams v. United States, No. 5:21-cv-061, 2021 WL 1239810, at *2 (M.D. Ga.

Apr. 2, 2021) (concluding that factual allegations based on “sovereign citizen” theory, “a

frivolous legal theory that is consistently rejected by federal courts,” were baseless and subject to

dismissal as frivolous) (citations and footnote omitted). In addition, petitioner fails to

demonstrate that there is no other remedy available to him. Petitioner could have, and actually

did, seek habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, see Williams v. Ward, No. 4:22-cv-201, 2022

WL 4473606, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2022) (adopting Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation to dismiss § 2254 petition as untimely, having been filed years after limitations

period expired).

The Court will grant petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis, deny the petition for a

writ of mandamus, and dismiss this civil action. An Order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

2024.07.24 12:20:12 -04'00' TREVOR N. McFADDEN United States District Judge DATE: July 24, 2024

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Related

In Re: Cheney
406 F.3d 723 (D.C. Circuit, 2005)
Keith Thomas v. Eric Holder, Jr.
750 F.3d 899 (D.C. Circuit, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
Williams v. Biden, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-biden-dcd-2024.