Williams v. Baby Doll's Gentleman's Club

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

BRITTANY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 8:23-cv-2144-CEH-TGW

BABY DOLL’S GENTLEMAN’S CLUB,

Defendant. _________________________________/

ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion to Pay” (Doc. 11), which the Court construes as a motion to reconsider the order dismissing this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (see Doc. 3). Plaintiff argues she meets the “imminent-danger” exception to § 1915(g) because she suffers from depression, PTSD, and “schizobipolar.” But Plaintiff’s allegation that she suffers from mental illness, without more, is insufficient to meet the “imminent-danger” exception to § 1915(g). See, e.g., Clay v. Martin, 2023 WL 2733387, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2023) (“[E]motional or psychological injuries are not physical injuries and therefore cannot satisfy the requirements of § 1915(g).”) (citing Sanders v. Melvin, 873 F.3d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 2017) (prisoner’s allegations of “deteriorating mental state” insufficient to satisfy the § 1915(g) exception because “[m]ental deterioration. . .is a psychological rather than a physical problem”); Mathews

1 v. Streeit, 2024 WL 1589499, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1585932 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2024) (“The [imminent-danger] exception requires a showing of specific, credible allegations of imminent-danger of serious physical harm.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff provides no basis for the Court to reconsider the dismissal under § 1915(g). Plaintiffs “Motion to Pay” (Doc. 11) is therefore DENIED. DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on June 25, 2024.

Cchwanks- Monex pared Charlene Edwards Honeywell United States District Judge

Copies to: Plaintiff, pro se