Williams v. Armstrong Relocation Company, LLC

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: June 3, 2022
• Docket: N19C-01-107 FJJ
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SAMUEL G. WILLIAMS ) ) Plaintiff, ) C.A. No. N19C-01-107 FJJ ) v. ) ) ARMSTRONG RELOCATION ) COMPANY, LLC, and JOHN ) JOSEPH COX, ) ) Defendants. )

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL Decision: DENIED

Submitted: June 1, 2022 Decided: June 3, 2022

1. This case arises from an automobile accident that occurred on July 8, 2017.

Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when his vehicle was negligently struck by

another vehicle driven by Defendant John Joseph Cox (“Cox”) who was in the

course and scope of his employment with Armstrong Relocation Company LLC

at the time of the accident. Plaintiff alleges he suffered from injuries – mainly

to his neck – which ultimately led to two neck surgeries.

2. A two day jury trial began on April 4, 2022. The jury found that Defendants

were negligent but that their negligence was not the proximate cause of

Plaintiff’s injuries.

1 3. With respect to causation and damages, Plaintiff testified that the day after the

accident he started to experience neck and back pain – but mostly neck pain.

Plaintiff sought medical treatment from Dr. Atkins who, after eight (8) to nine

(9) months, recommended Plaintiff to an orthopedic specialist, Dr. James

Zaslavsky. Dr. Zaslavsky recommended that Plaintiff get neck surgery which

Plaintiff underwent in January 2019. However, the surgery was not successful

and Plaintiff underwent a second surgery in December 2020. Dr. Zaslavsky

testified that Plaintiff’s neck issues and subsequent surgeries were related to the

accident in question. The defense presented their own medical expert, Dr.

Stephen Fedder. Dr. Fedder disagreed with Dr. Zaslavsky and testified that the

Plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the accident in question.

4. Plaintiff moves for a new trial on three grounds:

a. The jury found that Defendant was negligent yet awarded no damages, and

thus, the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the evidence;

b. Juror No. 9 should have been dismissed by the Court after disclosing that

he had met Dr. Zaslavsky, Plaintiff’s medical expert; and

c. Plaintiff believes that difficulties with memory experienced by his wife

and witness, Barbara Williams, were the result of a COVID infection.

Plaintiff believes he should have the opportunity to have this issue

medically evaluated and for him to present relevant testimony, if

applicable.

2 5. “Under Superior Court Civil Rule 59(a), a new trial may be granted as to all or

part of the issues in an action.”1 “The Court has broad discretion in considering

a motion for new trial.”2 “However, such discretion ‘should be exercised

sparingly and cautiously,’ and … ‘should be invoked only in cases in which the

evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.’”3 “For this reason, the

Court will not upset a jury verdict unless it finds that: ‘a reasonable juror could

not have reached the result[;]’ ‘the jury disregarded applicable rules of law[;]’

or ‘the jury’s verdict is tainted by legal error committed by the Court during the

trial.’”4

6. The jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence. On the issue

of causation, the evidence was hotly contested. Each side presented an expert

in support of their respective positions. The Defendants called Dr. Fedder who

unequivocally testified that there was no causal relationship between the

injuries claimed by Plaintiff and the accident in question. Dr. Fedder’s

testimony was contested by Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Zaslavsky. It was Dr.

Zaslavsky’ s view that this motor vehicle accident was the proximate cause of

Plaintiff’s neck injury and resultant medical treatment. The jury was free to

decide between the experts’ testimony and the jury chose Dr. Fedder. This

1 Klosiewicz v. Stevenson, 2020 WL 707639, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct., Feb. 12, 2020). 2 Id. 3 Id. 4 Id.

3 finding was well supported by the evidence and this Court will not disturb that

finding.

7. As to Juror No. 9, this Court concludes that Plaintiff suffered no prejudice from

Juror No. 9 not being dismissed by the Court after disclosing that he had met

Dr. Zaslavsky, Plaintiff’s medical expert. Once the Court became aware of

Juror No. 9’s prior interaction(s) with Dr. Zaslavsky, the Court conducted voir

dire independently with the juror – asking him whether he had any prejudice

based on the fact that his father treated with Dr. Zaslavsky. Juror No. 9

responded, “No.” The Court then asked both Plaintiff’s and Defendants’

counsel whether they believed there was any reason that this juror should be

dismissed. Neither side opposed Juror No. 9 continuing his service on the jury,

and thus, the Court permitted him to do so. Plaintiff had the opportunity to

object to this juror’s continuation on the jury at the time the Court conducted

the voir dire. Plaintiff raised no such objection. As such, Plaintiff has waived

any objection on this issue.5 Even had Plaintiff’s counsel raised an objection,

this Court, based on the voir dire conducted, would not have dismissed juror

No. 9. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on this ground.

8. Lastly, Plaintiff raises an issue with alleged difficulties in memory experienced

by his wife and witness, Barbara Williams, during her testimony. Plaintiff

5 Powell v. AmGuard Insurance Company, 2020 WL 996734, at *7 ((Del. Super. Ct., Mar. 2, 2020) (noting that by failing to make an objection during trial that the party waived the ability to raise the argument post-trial).

4 believes that he should have the opportunity to have this issue medically

evaluated and for him to present relevant testimony. At the outset, Plaintiff

makes no reference to what these “difficulties” were, neither does he provide

any support for this assertion. Plaintiff could have brought this issue before the

Court at any time prior to or even during the trial. Instead, Plaintiff raises the

issue for the first time to this Court post-trial after the jury’s verdict was known

to Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff offers no explanation as to how these

“difficulties” with Ms. Williams’ memory prejudiced him during his trial. Mrs.

Williams’ testimony went primarily to liability, and did not address causation.

As plaintiff “won” on liability, any issue with her testimony cannot be said to

have an impact on the jury’s proximate cause conclusion.

From where this Court sits, the argument as to Ms. Williams appears to be

an attempt to manufacture a reason for a new trial because Plaintiff is not

satisfied with the jury’s decision. This Court will not go down the road

advocated by the Plaintiff. The jury has spoken and its clear voice is supported

by the evidence produced at trial. This Court will not interfere with the jury’s

verdict.

5 9. Based on the foregoing, none of the grounds asserted by Plaintiff warrant grant

of a new trial. Therefore, Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Francis J. Jones, Jr. Francis J. Jones, Jr., Judge

/jb cc File & ServeXpress Mr. Samuel G. Williams, Pro-Se Plaintiff (via U.S. Mail) Ms. Barbara J. Williams, Pro-Se Plaintiff (via U.S. Mail) Joshua D. Scheets, Esquire (via File & Serve Xpress)