PD-1316-15 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Transmitted 10/21/2015 9:40:10 PM Accepted 10/22/2015 1:21:37 PM ABEL ACOSTA NO. PD-1316-15 CLERK
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
CRISTAN DRAYCE WILLIAMS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appeal from The Brazos County Court At Law No. 2 Trial Court Cause Number No: 12-02846-CRM-CCL2 And The Tenth Court of Appeals of Texas Cause Number 10-14-00307-CR
LAW OFFICE OF BENTON ROSS WATSON 120 E. 1st Street P.O. Box 1000 Cameron, Texas 76520 (254) 307-8181 (254) 231-0212—Facsimile ross@texastopdefense.com State Bar No. 24077591
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
October 22, 2015 NAMES OF THE PARTIES TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT
STATE OF TEXAS Ms. Rodney W. Anderson Brazos County Attorney Brazos County Attorney’s Office 300 East 26th Street Suite 1300 Bryan, Texas 77803
APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL John Paschall P.O. Box 681 Franklin, Texas 77856
APPELLANT’S COUNSEL ON APPEAL Benton Ross Watson 120 E. 1st Street P.O. Box 1000 Cameron, Texas 76520
TRIAL COURT JUDGE The Honorable Jim Lock County Court Judge 300 E. 26th, Ste. 214 Bryan, Texas 77803
Appellant Williams—PDR I TABLE OF CONTENTS
NAMES OF THE PARTIES TO THE FINAL JUDGMENT .................. I
TABLE OF CONTENTS .........................................................................II
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................. IV
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................ VI
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................. VI
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................... VII
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ................................................................ VIII 1. The Waco Court of Appeals disregarded established case law from this Court, the United States Supreme Court, and other Texas courts by finding the stop lawful. 2. The Waco Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard of review, and gave undue deference to the determinations of the trial court and officer. I. GROUNDS RESTATED:..................................................................... 1
The Waco Court failed to follow case law of this Court, the United States Supreme Court, and other Texas courts. .................................. 1
A. Reasons for Granting Review: ............................................................ 2
B. Factual Basis. ...................................................................................... 3
C. Argument. ........................................................................................... 5
1. The Waco Court ignored Fourth Amendment precedent requiring that behavior provide a sufficient link to criminal activity. ....................... 5 a. The Waco Court erred by finding Mr. Williams’s driving behavior unusual, and failing to discuss how it was unusual. ........................... 6 b. The Waco Court erred by finding, and failing to discuss how, Mr. Williams’s driving behavior was reasonably linked to DWI. ............. 8 2. The Waco Court erred by conducting an improper review of the objective facts, which did not support the officer’s conclusion that Mr. Williams’s driving behavior was linked to DWI. ...................... 11 a. The Waco Court could not uphold the stop because the objective facts failed to support Sergeant Summers’ conclusion that Mr. Williams’s behavior was linked to crime. ........................................ 11 b. Officer training and experience also could not supply a basis for upholding the stop. ............................................................................ 13
Appellant Williams—PDR II D. Conclusion. ....................................................................................... 14
PRAYER ................................................................................................ 15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................. 15
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................17
APPENDICES........................................................................................ 18
A-1: Memorandum Opinion
A-2: Order Denying Rehearing
Appellant Williams—PDR III INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
United States Supreme Court Cases
Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683 (1968) ................................................................................. 9 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ........................................................................................ 5 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) ............................................................................ 13, 14 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) ........................................................................................ 5
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Cases Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).................................................... 5 Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)................................................ 5, 9 Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)............................................ 12, 13 Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).............................................. 9, 10 State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).................................................... 5 Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).................................... 1, 2, 11, 12 White v. State, 574 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).............................................. 6, 14 Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)................................................ 5
Texas Appellate Court Cases Davy v. State, 67 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. App—Waco [10th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) ................... 9 Gamble v. State, 8 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. App.—Houston 1999, no pet.) ............................. 8, 14 State v. Jevari Edward Police, 377 S.W.3d 33 (Tex. App.—Waco [10th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ............ 8, 10 Thompson v. State,
Appellant Williams—PDR IV 408 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) .................................. 5 Williams v. State, No. 10-14-00307-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7928 (Tex. App.—Waco [10th Dist.] July 30, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication.)..1, 6
Other Authorities United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................... 13 United States v. Martin 679 F. Supp. 2d 723 (W.D. La. 2009)....................................................... 13
United States Constitution U.S. CONST. amend. IV & XIV. .................................................... II, VI, 5, 13
Texas Constitution TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9 .................................................................................. VI
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. ................................................................................. 2, 15 TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. ....................................................................................... 7 TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3 (a), (c), (f) ...................................................................... 2
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 ...................................................... VI
Appellant Williams—PDR V STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS:
Petitioner requests oral argument. Argument would benefit the
Court because the facts present a unique search and seizure question not
thoroughly discussed by Texas appellate courts, important constitutional
concepts are implicated, and the decision would affect daily actions of
ordinary citizens.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal challenges a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress
regarding an illegal traffic stop. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9, U.S. CONST.
amend IV and XIV, and TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23. (See trial
court’s denial of motion to suppress on the record at II R.R. 37:3.).
Appellant Williams—PDR VI STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Williams was arrested for DWI and possession of marijuana on
February 26, 2012. Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana
on July 31, 2014, after the trial court denied his motion to suppress.
Appeal was made to the Waco Court of Appeals shortly thereafter. On
July 30, 2015, the Waco Court issued a memorandum opinion affirming the
trial court’s decision. Cristan Drayce Williams v. State, No. 10-14-00307-
CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7928 (Tex. App.—Waco [10th Dist.] July 30,
2015, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication). (Appendix A-1)
Mr. Williams filed a Motion for Rehearing on August 13, 2015, which
the Waco Court denied on August 20, 2015. (Appendix A-2)
Appellant Williams—PDR VII GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
1. The Waco Court of Appeals disregarded established case law from this Court, the United States Supreme Court, and other Texas courts by finding the stop lawful.
2. The Waco Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard of review, and gave undue deference to the determinations of the trial court and officer.
Appellant Williams—PDR VIII I. GROUNDS RESTATED: The Waco Court failed to follow case law of this Court, the United States Supreme Court, and other Texas courts.
The only behavior offered to link Mr. Williams to crime was his
driving around a parking garage floor three times. There was nothing
else about his behavior. He did not drive unsafely or “irregularly”, or
exhibit “any bad driving.” (II R.R. 10:24; 12:1.). His presence in the
garage also was not unusual, and the officer “didn’t think too much of it.”
(Id. at 20:5-6.).
The Waco Court of Appeals simply rubber-stamped the state’s
position in, essentially, two sentences, stating:
[I]nnocent people would not be driving laps around one particular level in a nearly empty parking garage at 3 a.m. on a Sunday morning an hour after the bars had closed… Based on the testimony at the hearing, Williams exhibited unusual activity which was related to the crime of driving while intoxicated.
Williams v. State, No. 10-14-00307-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7928, at *4
(Tex. App.—Waco [10th Dist.] July 30, 2015) (mem. op.).
However, the state had the burden of proof, and the law makes clear, an officer and the Government must do more than simply label a behavior as "suspicious" to make it so. The Government must also be able to either articulate why a particular behavior is suspicious or logically demonstrate, given the surrounding circumstances, that the behavior is likely to be indicative of some more sinister activity than may appear at first glance. Appellant Williams—PDR 1 Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 672 & n.47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
As well, courts must independently determine if a “set of historical
facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion.” Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 669.
Thus, review should be granted because the Waco Court ignored
established case law requiring courts to look at the particular behavior for
linking suspects to crime, ignored objective facts underlying the officer’s
conclusion, and erroneously deferred to the trial court’s determination.
A. REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW: The Waco Court of Appeals failed to address “every issue raised
and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
The Waco Court of Appeals’ decision concerns and decides important
questions of both state and federal law in a way that conflicts with decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and other Texas appellate
courts. TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3 (a), (c).
The Waco Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Court of
Criminal Appeals' power of supervision. TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3 (f).
Appellant Williams—PDR 2 B. FACTUAL BASIS.
Mr. Williams was stopped by Sergeant Summers because he drove
around the second floor of the Northgate parking garage three times. (II R.R.
20:12-20; 23:3-15; 25:10-12.). Northgate is the central entertainment district
for College Station, Texas, and is responsible for the majority of DWI
business transacted by the College Station police. (Id. at 16:23-25; 17:1-3.).
Mr. Williams was not driving dangerously, erratically, frantically,
speedily or irregularly. (II R.R. 9:15-20; 10:7-10, 23-24; 11:1-4; 23:16-25.).
He did not display “any bad driving.” (Id. at 12:1.). He was not making
furtive movements or suspicious gestures, shouting obscenities, or creating a
threat or annoyance of any kind. (Id. at 10:11-13.). He was not standing
around, passed out behind the wheel, or asleep on top of, next to, or below a
vehicle. (Id. at 18:13-15.).
Mr. Williams was not in a place the law forbid him to be. (Id. at 10:1-
6.). The garage was open to paying patrons who needed a place to park
while visiting Northgate businesses on Saturday through Sunday morning.
(Id. at 19:2-4; 17:6-7.). Mr. Williams was inside his truck within the garage
near 3:00 a.m. on Sunday around an hour from when the bars officially
closed at 2:00 a.m. (Id. at 17:18-25.). Although the garage had mostly
Appellant Williams—PDR 3 cleared out, Mr. Williams was not the only one using the garage, and patrons
were still leaving past 2:00 a.m. (II R.R. 21:2-3; 18:3-12.).
In fact, Sergeant Summers checked the garage “later on, as people
were leaving.” (II R.R. 18:3-4, 11-12.).
Just before the stop, Sergeant Summers saw Mr. Williams parked in
the garage, and “didn’t think too much of it.” (II R.R. 20:5-6.). Sergeant
Summers only became suspicious moments later when he saw Mr. Williams
make three trips around the second floor of the parking garage. (Id. at 20:12-
17.). At that moment, Sergeant Summers concluded Mr. Williams was
driving while intoxicated, and stopped him based on that conclusion. (Id. at
11:18-24, 11:25-12:5.). Sergeant Summers admitted more than once that his
decision to stop was based on subjective conclusions. (Id. at 11:18-21,
11:25-12:1-2, 14:7-9, 10-11.).
Appellant Williams—PDR 4 C. ARGUMENT.
1. The Waco Court ignored Fourth Amendment precedent requiring that behavior provide a sufficient link to criminal activity.
Reasonable suspicion requires the presence of unusual activity, a
connection from the unusual activity to the individual detained, and an
indication that the unusual activity is reasonably linked to crime. State v.
Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
“The relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or
criminal, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular non-criminal
acts.” Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(quoting Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (quoting Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989)))).
“At a minimum, the suspicious conduct relied upon by law
enforcement officers must be sufficiently distinguishable from that of
innocent people under the same circumstance as to clearly, if not
conclusively, set the suspect apart from them.” Thompson v. State, 408
S.W.3d 614, 626 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (emphasis added).
Appellant Williams—PDR 5 a. The Waco Court erred by finding Mr. Williams’s driving behavior unusual, and failing to discuss how it was unusual.
The Waco Court basically disposed of this case with one sentence:
“[I]nnocent people would not be driving laps around one particular level in a
nearly empty parking garage at 3 a.m. on a Sunday morning an hour after the
bars had closed.” Williams, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 7928, at *4.
However, this Court already said driving around for several minutes
in a parking lot known for crime without any apparent purpose was not
unusual, and provided “no reason for suspicion whatsoever.” White v. State,
574 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
Moreover, contrary to the appellate court’s representation, Mr.
Williams’s presence in the garage an hour after the bars closed at 2 a.m. was
not unusual.
When Sergeant Summers first saw Mr. Williams parked in the garage
just before the stop, he “didn’t think too much of it.” (II R.R. 20:5-6.). The
garage was not closed, and Mr. Williams was not the only one there. (II R.R.
10:1-6; 18:5-16; 21:2-3.). Thus, being in the garage was not suspicious.
Next, Sergeant Summers did not go check the garage until “people
were leaving.” (II R.R. at 18:3-4, 11-12.). Thus, driving in the garage at the
same time the officers were in the garage was not unusual because that was
around the time “people were leaving.” (Id.).
Appellant Williams—PDR 6 Further, once the bars closed, part of Sergeant Summers’ regular
duties was making sure people made their way to “their sober driver or
something like that safely…” (II R.R. 18:3-9.). Thus, the Waco Court
illogically assumed guilty, drunk people would be driving in the garage after
the bars closed because, actually, designated, “sober” drivers were regularly
present at that time. Indeed, Sergeant Summers admitted Mr. Williams could
have been looking for occupants, friends, or a lady friend. (II R.R. 20:12-20;
23:3- 15; 25:10-12.). Therefore, driving around the Northgate parking garage
at 3:00 a.m. was not unusual.
Although a memorandum opinion is intended to be brief,1 the Waco
Court’s decision “exceeds what is permissible by failing to give any reason
whatsoever for its conclusion…” 2 that innocent people would not be in Mr.
Williams’s situation—when it is clear any designated driver, person leaving
a concert, or Northgate business employee on the way home would, in fact,
be in the same situation.
1 TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. 2 Citizens Nat’l Bank in Waxahachie v. Scott, 195 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Tex. 2006).
Appellant Williams—PDR 7 b. The Waco Court erred by finding, and failing to discuss how, Mr. Williams’s driving behavior was reasonably linked to DWI.
The Waco Court’s statement (that innocent people would not be doing
that) could have been said in virtually any case cited throughout this appeal.
For instance, in Gamble v. State, 8 S.W.3d 452, 453 (Tex. App.—
Houston 1999, no pet.), it would have been real easy to say “innocent people
would not be out at 3:00 a.m.; be unknown to police; be in a high crime area
known for drugs and weapons, and responsible for roughly 70 police calls
per year; be in front of a house with its own history of incidents; be
repositioning themselves as officers drive by; and then walk away when
officers approach.” But, that’s obviously not what the Houston Court said
because it suppressed the stop.
In State v. Jevari Edward Police, 377 S.W.3d 33, 37, 39 (Tex. App.—
Waco [10th Dist.] 2012, no pet.), the Waco Court could have easily said
“innocent people would not be unknown to police, out at midnight, make an
immediate turn after being tailed by police, turn onto a horseshoe shaped
street with no exit that was located in an area known for its high crime rate,
exit the area in less than 90 seconds, and drive in the opposite direction of
police.” But, the Waco Court did not say that because it affirmed suppression.
The stop was suppressed because there were no “traffic violations,
irregularities, [or] dangerous, hazardous or reckless behavior…” Id. at 39.
Appellant Williams—PDR 8 The “behavior was not bizarre and nothing suggest[ed] a pattern or repetition
of unusual behavior as was found in Derichsweiler [v. State, 348 S.W.3d
906, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), which] … presented a ‘close call.’” Id. at
39-40. “The noncriminal, not terribly unusual, nonrepetitive behavior
observed in [Police] was insufficient to objectively support a belief that
criminal activity was or soon would be afoot.” Id. The defendant “simply
made a legal turn in front of an officer into a neighborhood where criminal
activity occurred previously.” Id. at 40.
Even this Court, in Foster v. State, required more than awkward
driving behavior to justify a stop at 1:30 a.m. a few blocks from Austin’s
Sixth Street bar district—even when supported by the detective’s “prior
training and experience in traffic patrol…” 326 S.W.3d 609, 610-11 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010). Foster importantly demonstrated that the particular
behavior was indicative of crime—because it was “unsafe”, “erratic”, and
“aggressive” driving behavior commonly associated with DWI. Foster, 326
S.W.3d at 611 n.3, 614. See Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1691
(2014) (stating, “accumulated experience of thousands of officers suggests
these sorts of erratic behaviors are strongly correlated with drunk driving.”).
Similarly, in Davy v. State, the Waco Court upheld the stop because
the defendant entered a closed parking lot, performed five circles, exhibited
Appellant Williams—PDR 9 plausibly evasive behavior, weaved, drove slowly, and came dangerously
close to the curb. 67 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. App.—Waco [10th Dist.] 2001, no
pet.). As in Foster, the particular driving behavior directly and verifiably
evidenced an element of DWI that correlated to the attendant circumstances.
Thus, weaving, lurching, and similar behavior that occurs on a late
weekend night in a bar district will normally confirm reasonable suspicion of
DWI because the behavior evidences an element of crime commonly
associated with those attendant circumstances.
Yet, the same is not true with driving around a parking lot because
that behavior actually indicates one’s ability to control a vehicle by
navigating through narrow lanes, making turns, keeping a safe and
consistent speed, judging distances, and maintaining steady steering.
Thus, the court unreasonably assumed Mr. Williams’s behavior was
linked to crime just because he made legal, safe, and regular maneuvers in a
general area where crime occurred previously. Police, 377 S.W.3d at 40.
Appellant Williams—PDR 10 2. The Waco Court erred by conducting an improper review of the objective facts, which did not support the officer’s conclusion that Mr. Williams’s driving behavior was linked to DWI.
The court of appeals incorrectly deferred to the trial court’s decision,
which merely deferred to the officer’s legal conclusion, because courts must
independently determine if a “set of historical facts gives rise to reasonable
suspicion.” Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 669.
a. The Waco Court could not uphold the stop because the objective facts failed to support Sergeant Summers’ conclusion that Mr. Williams’s behavior was linked to crime.
Sergeant Summers admitted several times that his decision to stop was
based on subjective conclusions. (II R.R. 11:18-21, 11:25-12:1-2, 14:7-9,
10-11.). But, the trial court should not have accepted Sergeant Summers’
subjective opinions because, objectively, Mr. Williams did not drive
“irregularly” (id. at 10:24), or display “any bad driving.” (Id. at 12:1.).
Additionally, Mr. Williams exhibited no lurching, weaving,
inconsistent speed or acceleration, jerky maneuvers, or indication that he
could not maintain control of his truck while he operated it. The record
includes no evidence of Mr. Williams pausing and peering, making sudden
starts and stops, or varying his speed in such a way as to indicate that he was
confused about where he was or what he intended to do.
Appellant Williams—PDR 11 Therefore, driving safely, steadily, effectively, regularly, without
suspicious or furtive gestures, without violating any traffic laws, and
“without … any bad driving”, could not provide Sergeant Summers’ mere
opinion with “objective factual support.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 494
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). See Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 671 (stating, “What
matters are the objective facts that indicate criminal activity, not the officer's
characterization of them.”); Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 544-50 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (holding that “an officer’s mistake about the legal
significance of facts, even if made in good faith, cannot provide …
reasonable suspicion.” (citing Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 722 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012)); Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005) (finding that reasonable suspicion must be established by facts, not
conclusory statements); Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 531 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001) (refusing to defer to an officer's legal conclusion about
reasonable suspicion—“we will not use [the officer’s] ‘legal conclusion’ that
a seat belt violation may have occurred to imply more than what his
testimony reveals: that the child looked back several times.”); Viveros v.
State, 828 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (refusing to defer to officers’
opinions and beliefs that activity was related to crime).
Appellant Williams—PDR 12 b. Officer training and experience also could not supply a basis for upholding the stop.
Courts must not defer to officer training and experience when they do
not help interpret the specific facts in question. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1968) (finding that due weight cannot be accorded to inferences drawn
by an officer unless he is “entitled to draw [them] from facts in light of his
experience.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (discussing
the Fourth Amendment’s “demand for specificity in the information upon
which police action is predicated.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, n.18));
Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492, 493-94 (finding that, when officers rely on
specialized training, they must specifically articulate objective facts
supporting why they are entitled to that reliance.). See also United States v.
Martin, 679 F. Supp. 2d 723, 734 (W.D. La. 2009) (stating courts may not
“rubberstamp an officer's proffered rationale simply because he invokes his
training and experience.” (discussing United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399,
404-05 (5th Cir. 2006)).
Despite abundant DWI training, Sergeant Summers never articulated
how any training aided the conclusion that driving around a parking lot
equated to drunk driving. (II R.R. 15:19-16:20.).
As well, of the hundreds of DWI arrests made by Sergeant Summers,
not one was for “just driving around a parking lot.” (II R.R. 22:2-3.). Appellant Williams—PDR 13 Because Sergeant Summers had no experience with this particular type of
behavior, he was not “entitled to draw [any inferences] from facts in light
of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. But, even if he was, Sergeant
Summers never even attempted to relate how Mr. Williams’s movement
was similar to those of intoxicated drivers he observed in prior cases.
In other words, Sergeant Summers’ conclusions were unacceptable
because he did not correlate driving around a parking lot three times with
any “modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers.” Cortez,
449 U.S. at 418; see also White, 574 S.W.2d at 547 (noting officer’s failure
to correlate behavior to any person fitting criminal description), and Gamble,
8 S.W.3d at 454 (discussing officer’s failure to specify that defendant’s
movement “fit a specific criminal profile.”).
Thus, Sergeant Summers’ claims of training and experience did not
support his opinion that driving around a parking lot three times was
somehow associated with DWI.
D. CONCLUSION. The Waco Court of Appeals failed to discuss Mr. Williams’s claims
that the behavior was not suspicious, or indicative of crime; that the officer
was not entitled to rely on experience or training; that the trial court
impermissibly deferred to the officer’s legal conclusions, opinions about
Appellant Williams—PDR 14 legal significance of facts, and interpretation of legal issues; and that the
officer’s opinion was not supported by objective factual support. Thus, the
appeals court also failed to address “every issue raised and necessary to final
disposition of the appeal.” TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
PRAYER
Mr. Williams prays this Honorable Court grant the petition, and order
briefing to further consider reversing the decision of the Waco Court of
Appeals, and either rendering a decision, or remanding for more thorough
consideration.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________ Benton Ross Watson 120 E. 1st Street / Box 1000 Cameron, Texas 76520 Tel: 1 (254) 307-8181 Fax: 1 (254) 231-0212 ross@texastopdefense.com State Bar No. 24077591 Attorney for Cristan Drayce Williams
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on October 21, 2015, a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document was served on the Brazos County
Appellant Williams—PDR 15 Attorney’s Office by electronic transmission to
rodanderson@brazoscounty and equisenberry@brazoscountytx.gov,
and by certified mail return receipt requested to 300 E. 26th Street,
Suite 1300, Bryan, Texas 77803.
_______________________ Benton Ross Watson
Appellant Williams—PDR 16 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4
Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitation, Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Requirements
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) because this brief contains 2,963 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements and the type style requirements of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(e) because this brief has been produced on a computer in conventional typeface using WordPerfect X6 in Times New Roman 14 point font in the body of the brief and Times New Roman 12 point font in the footnotes.
3. The electronic file is virus and malware free.
____________________________________________ (Signature of filing party) Benton Ross Watson ____________________________________________ (Printed name)
Solo Practitioner ____________________________________________ (Firm)
October 21, 2015 ___________________________________________ (Date)
Appellant Williams—PDR 17 APPENDICES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Waco Court of Appeals
Memorandum Opinion App. A-1. Order Denying Rehearing App. A-2.
Appellant Williams—PDR 18 APPENDIX A-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14-00307-CR
CRISTAN DRAYCE WILLIAMS, Appellant v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 2 Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 12-02846-CRM-CCL2
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Cristan Drayce Williams pled guilty to the offense of possession of marijuana,
under two ounces. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.121(a), (b)(1) (West
2010). The trial court deferred a finding of guilt and placed Williams on community
supervision for 18 months. Because the trial court did not err in denying Williams’s
motion to suppress, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Williams was parked with his vehicle’s engine running on the second level in a
parking garage of a well-known entertainment and bar district at 3 a.m. on a Sunday morning. The bars had closed an hour before. The garage was nearly empty. Sgt. Jason
Summers of the College Station Police Department was on bicycle patrol of the garage
and noticed Williams’s parked vehicle. Summers then rode up to the fourth level to
check it to make sure it was clear and make sure there were no people passed out in
their cars or on the pavement. When he returned to the second level, Summers saw
Williams in his vehicle make at least three laps around the second level. Summers
suspected that Williams may be intoxicated and was having trouble either reading the
exit signs or finding the ramp to go down. Summers decided to detain Williams and
when he did, he arrested Williams for driving while intoxicated and possession of
marijuana.1
Prior to Williams’s plea, Williams complained in a motion to suppress that,
among other things, he was detained without reasonable suspicion. After a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion to suppress.
When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Robinson, 334
S.W.3d 776, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17,
24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial
1 At the time of the suppression hearing, Williams was still on bond for the DWI arrest.
Williams v. State Page 2 court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of
those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor; and (2)
application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and
demeanor. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). But when
application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the
witnesses, such as the determination of reasonable suspicion, we review the trial court's
ruling on those questions de novo. Hereford v. State, 339 S.W.3d 111, 118 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
In an investigatory stop, the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture —
must be taken into account. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A
detention based on reasonable suspicion must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.
Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific,
articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would
lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon
will be engaged in criminal activity. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007). Otherwise stated, those specific, articulable facts must show unusual
activity, some evidence that connects the detained individual to the unusual activity,
and some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime. Derichsweiler v. State,
348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Circumstances that an officer relies on
Williams v. State Page 3 "must be sufficiently distinguishable from that of innocent people under the same
circumstances as to clearly, if not conclusively, set the suspect apart from them." Wade
v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Crockett v. State, 803 S.W.2d
308, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
Williams contends that because he was not violating the law or driving
erratically, his actions were not “sufficiently distinguishable from that of innocent
people.” But innocent people would not be driving laps around one particular level in
a nearly empty parking garage at 3 a.m. on a Sunday morning an hour after the bars
had closed. Further, it is the totality of the circumstances that must be taken into
account.
Based on the testimony at the hearing, Williams exhibited unusual activity which
was related to the crime of driving while intoxicated. Accordingly, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and taking into account
the totality of the circumstances, we find Sgt. Summers had reasonable suspicion to
detain Williams. The trial court did not err in denying Williams’s motion to suppress,
and Williams’s sole issue is overruled.
Having overruled Williams’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
TOM GRAY Chief Justice
Williams v. State Page 4 Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Affirmed Opinion delivered and filed July 30, 2015 Do not publish [CR25]
Williams v. State Page 5 APPENDIX A-2 ORDER DENYING REHEARING IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
From the County Court at Law No. 2 Brazos County, Texas Trial Court No. 12-02846-CRM-CCL2
ORDER
Cristan Drayce Williams’s Motion for Rehearing is denied.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins Motion denied Order issued and filed August 20, 2015