AFFIRIVIE1 Opinion Filed October 31, 2012.
In The Qnnrt of Apticat FiftI! 1itrirt of xu Lit tIa1tLu No. 05-1 1-00982-CR
CALViN DEWAYNE WILLIAMS, Appellant
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 439th Judicial I)istrict Court Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2-10-621
OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Richter, and Lang Opinion By Justice Lang
Calvin Dewayne Williams appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting him of possession
of marijuana in an amount of fifty pounds or less, but more than five pounds. Williams pleaded
guilty to the offense. The trial court accepted the plea and assessed his punishment at two years of
imprisonment and a $500 fine. In one issue, Williams argues the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress because the police did not have probable cause to search the trunk of his vehicle
without a warrant. We conclude the trial court did not err when it denied Williams’s motion to
suppress. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
The statuto spelling of the substance is “marihuana.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 481.002(26). .481 .120---.122 (West § 2010): Smith i. Stare. 176 S.W.3d 907.911 n.1 (Fex. App--Dallas 2005, no pet.). The common spelling of the word is “marijuana.” See Smith. 176 S.W,3d at 911 nI I. FACTUAL ANI) PROCEDURAL BACKGROIJNI)
Officer Barrett Morris observed a vehicle driving at a high rate of speed. Ftc “paced” the
vehicle and determined it was going sixty—seven miles—per—hour in a sixty mile—per—hour speed zone.
lie stopped the vehicle and approached it. Williams was driving the vehicle and admitted to Officer
Morris that the cruise control was set at sixty—five miles—per—hour. During this initial conversation,
Officer Morris detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle Also, he observed a
single key in the ignition, and multiple cellular telephones, energy drinks, trash, and random ball
caps in the rear seat of the vehicle. He asked both Williams and Price, a passenger in the vehicle,
about their driving plans and destination. Both Williams and Price stated they were going to a
funeral, but their answers were inconsistent regarding their destination and length of stay. Officer
Morris also observed that Williams and Price were nervous and took extra time to think about their
answers before responding to his questions. When he asked Williams and Price about the odor of
marijuana, they responded that they had been smoking wine-flavored cigars.
Officer Morris searched the vehicle, including its trunk. Inside the trunk, he found a spare
tire that was the wrong size for the vehicle, dirty. and not useable. lie lifted the tire from the trunk
and it was heavier than a standard air-filled tire. When he rolled the tire back-and-forth along the
pavement, he felt something moving inside the tire. He conducted an echo test and the results were
inconsistent with a standard air-filled tire. Then, he released some air from the tire and detected the
odor of marijuana, so he asked Williams about the contents of the spare tire. After receiving the
warnings pursuant to Miranda, Williams stated the spare tire contained approximately six pounds
of marijuana and that Price did not have any knowledge of the contraband. As a result, Officer
Morris used a blade to open the spare tire and found approximately eleven pounds of marijuana.
Williams was indicted for possession of marijuana in an amount of fifty pounds or less, but more than tive pounds. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, he pleaded
guilty to the offense. The trial court assessed his punishment at two years of imprisonment and a
$500 fine.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In ISSLIe one, Williams argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
because the police did not have probable cause to search the trunk ofhis vehicle without a warrant.
He contends that the officer’s observations of inconsistent statements, nervousness, and other “legal
items” in the passenger compartment of the vehicle did not establish probable cause for him to
search the trunk of the vehicle. The State responds that the detection of the odor of marijuana
emanating from Williams’s vehicle provided sufficient probable cause for the officer to conduct a
warrantless search of all areas of the vehicle that were capable of containing marijuana, including
the tnmk.
A. Standard ofReview
A bifurcated standard of review is applied to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence. This standard requires an appellate court to give almost total deference to a trial court’s
determination ofhistorical facts and applies a de novo review ofa trial court’s application ofthe law
to those facts. See Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554,559 (rex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court is
the sole trier of fact, and the judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given to their
testimony. See Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442,447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); St. George it. State,
237 S.W.3d 720,725 (rex. Crim. App. 2007).
When the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, an appellate court determines whether
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the rulin& supports those finding& State v. Kelly,
204 S.W.3d 808,818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Then, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s
-3- legal conclusions de novo and upholds the ruling so long as it is supported by the record and correct
under any legal theory applicable to the case. State i. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. Corn.
App. 008): Banda r. Stare, 317 S.W.3d 903. 907—0$ (Tex. App.-— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010. no
pet.).
B. Applicable Lan’
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9, of the
Texas Constitution guarantee the right to be secure against unreasonable searches. U.S. C0NsT.
amend. IV; TEX, C0NsT. art. 1, § 9. Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the admission of evidence seized by any person or officer when that evidence has been obtained in
violation of the flderaI or state constitutions or in violation of federal and state laws. SeeTEx. Cont
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2005); Krause v. State, 243 S.W.3d 95. 103 (Tex.
App.----- Houston [1st Dist.j 2007, pet. refd).
There is a strong preference fir searches to be administered pursuant to a warrant. Guitierre.
v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under the Fourth Amendment, a search
conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause is per se unreasonable, unless it falls within
one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Guitierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 685; Reasor v.
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AFFIRIVIE1 Opinion Filed October 31, 2012.
In The Qnnrt of Apticat FiftI! 1itrirt of xu Lit tIa1tLu No. 05-1 1-00982-CR
CALViN DEWAYNE WILLIAMS, Appellant
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 439th Judicial I)istrict Court Rockwall County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2-10-621
OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Richter, and Lang Opinion By Justice Lang
Calvin Dewayne Williams appeals the trial court’s judgment convicting him of possession
of marijuana in an amount of fifty pounds or less, but more than five pounds. Williams pleaded
guilty to the offense. The trial court accepted the plea and assessed his punishment at two years of
imprisonment and a $500 fine. In one issue, Williams argues the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress because the police did not have probable cause to search the trunk of his vehicle
without a warrant. We conclude the trial court did not err when it denied Williams’s motion to
suppress. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
The statuto spelling of the substance is “marihuana.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. 481.002(26). .481 .120---.122 (West § 2010): Smith i. Stare. 176 S.W.3d 907.911 n.1 (Fex. App--Dallas 2005, no pet.). The common spelling of the word is “marijuana.” See Smith. 176 S.W,3d at 911 nI I. FACTUAL ANI) PROCEDURAL BACKGROIJNI)
Officer Barrett Morris observed a vehicle driving at a high rate of speed. Ftc “paced” the
vehicle and determined it was going sixty—seven miles—per—hour in a sixty mile—per—hour speed zone.
lie stopped the vehicle and approached it. Williams was driving the vehicle and admitted to Officer
Morris that the cruise control was set at sixty—five miles—per—hour. During this initial conversation,
Officer Morris detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle Also, he observed a
single key in the ignition, and multiple cellular telephones, energy drinks, trash, and random ball
caps in the rear seat of the vehicle. He asked both Williams and Price, a passenger in the vehicle,
about their driving plans and destination. Both Williams and Price stated they were going to a
funeral, but their answers were inconsistent regarding their destination and length of stay. Officer
Morris also observed that Williams and Price were nervous and took extra time to think about their
answers before responding to his questions. When he asked Williams and Price about the odor of
marijuana, they responded that they had been smoking wine-flavored cigars.
Officer Morris searched the vehicle, including its trunk. Inside the trunk, he found a spare
tire that was the wrong size for the vehicle, dirty. and not useable. lie lifted the tire from the trunk
and it was heavier than a standard air-filled tire. When he rolled the tire back-and-forth along the
pavement, he felt something moving inside the tire. He conducted an echo test and the results were
inconsistent with a standard air-filled tire. Then, he released some air from the tire and detected the
odor of marijuana, so he asked Williams about the contents of the spare tire. After receiving the
warnings pursuant to Miranda, Williams stated the spare tire contained approximately six pounds
of marijuana and that Price did not have any knowledge of the contraband. As a result, Officer
Morris used a blade to open the spare tire and found approximately eleven pounds of marijuana.
Williams was indicted for possession of marijuana in an amount of fifty pounds or less, but more than tive pounds. After the trial court denied his motion to suppress the evidence, he pleaded
guilty to the offense. The trial court assessed his punishment at two years of imprisonment and a
$500 fine.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In ISSLIe one, Williams argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress
because the police did not have probable cause to search the trunk ofhis vehicle without a warrant.
He contends that the officer’s observations of inconsistent statements, nervousness, and other “legal
items” in the passenger compartment of the vehicle did not establish probable cause for him to
search the trunk of the vehicle. The State responds that the detection of the odor of marijuana
emanating from Williams’s vehicle provided sufficient probable cause for the officer to conduct a
warrantless search of all areas of the vehicle that were capable of containing marijuana, including
the tnmk.
A. Standard ofReview
A bifurcated standard of review is applied to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence. This standard requires an appellate court to give almost total deference to a trial court’s
determination ofhistorical facts and applies a de novo review ofa trial court’s application ofthe law
to those facts. See Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554,559 (rex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court is
the sole trier of fact, and the judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given to their
testimony. See Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442,447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); St. George it. State,
237 S.W.3d 720,725 (rex. Crim. App. 2007).
When the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, an appellate court determines whether
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the rulin& supports those finding& State v. Kelly,
204 S.W.3d 808,818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Then, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s
-3- legal conclusions de novo and upholds the ruling so long as it is supported by the record and correct
under any legal theory applicable to the case. State i. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 548 (Tex. Corn.
App. 008): Banda r. Stare, 317 S.W.3d 903. 907—0$ (Tex. App.-— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010. no
pet.).
B. Applicable Lan’
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9, of the
Texas Constitution guarantee the right to be secure against unreasonable searches. U.S. C0NsT.
amend. IV; TEX, C0NsT. art. 1, § 9. Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the admission of evidence seized by any person or officer when that evidence has been obtained in
violation of the flderaI or state constitutions or in violation of federal and state laws. SeeTEx. Cont
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2005); Krause v. State, 243 S.W.3d 95. 103 (Tex.
App.----- Houston [1st Dist.j 2007, pet. refd).
There is a strong preference fir searches to be administered pursuant to a warrant. Guitierre.
v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under the Fourth Amendment, a search
conducted without a warrant issued on probable cause is per se unreasonable, unless it falls within
one of the well-established exceptions to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Guitierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 685; Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000).
Under the automobile exception, a warrantless search of the vehicle is proper if the vehicle
is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. See
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938,940(1996); Keehu v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crirn.
App. 2009). The legal determination of probable cause is based on the totality of the circumstances
and practical common sense. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 23 1—39 (1983). There is no
-—4— all—encompassing definition of probable cause because it is a fluid concept “turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular flictual contexts.” alL’s, 462 (iS. at 232. Probable cause
amounts to reasonably trustworthy facts and circumstances within the officers knowledge that
would lead a person of reasonable prudence to believe that evidence of a crime will he found.
Guuierr’z. 221 S.W.3d at 685.
It is well-settled that the odor of marijuana is sufficient to constitute probable cause to search
an automobile. See e.g.. Marsh r. State, 64 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. (‘rim. App. 1984); Razo V.
Slate, 577 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Crim. App.[ Panel Op.) 1979); Isarn v. State, 582 S.W.2d 441,444
(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.) 1979). “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
C’. Apphcatwn oft/ic’ Law to the Facts
The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. Williams does not argue the
evidence fails to support the trial court’s findings of fact. He argues only that the facts were not
sufficient to give the officer probable cause to search the trunk of his vehicle. The trial court
specifically found that “Officer Morris immediately detected the odor of marijuana emanating from
the vehicle during his initial conversation with the occupants and immediately called for a back-up
officer.” Having found the officer’s testimony credible that he smelled marijuana emanating fi’om
the Williams’s vehicle, the trial court appropriately concluded that “The odor of marihuana gave
Officer Morris probable cause to search the vehicle including the trunk and anything that could store
marihuana.” See e.g., Ross, 456 U.S. at 825,’ /t’[arsh, 684 S.W.2d at 679; Razo, 577 S.W.2d at 711;
Isam, 582 S.W.2d at 444. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err when it denied
Williams’s motion to suppress. Issue one is decided against Williams.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err when it denied Wi1liamss motion to suppress.
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
/z 4 .-z_ DOUGLAS S. LANG J USTIC,1E
Do Not Publish Tix. R. Apr. P. 47 I 10982FJi05
—6— 1uitrt nf Apprals .!Fiftti Jitrict uf xai at t1at1a
JUDGMENT CALVIN DEWAYNE WILLIAMS. Appeal from the 439th Judicial District Appellant Court of Rockwall County, Texas. (TrCt.No. 2-10-621). No. 05-I 1-00082-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices Bridges and Richter participating. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this (late, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered October 3 1, 2012.
/ /•• Z I / DOUGLAS/S LANG JUST1CE