Williams Bros. Aircraft Corp. v. Gould-Mersereau Co.

10 F.2d 44, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2212
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedDecember 7, 1925
DocketNo. 133
StatusPublished

This text of 10 F.2d 44 (Williams Bros. Aircraft Corp. v. Gould-Mersereau Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams Bros. Aircraft Corp. v. Gould-Mersereau Co., 10 F.2d 44, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2212 (2d Cir. 1925).

Opinion

MANTON, Circuit Judge.

The appellant sues for infringement of claims 2 and 3 of patent to Judd, No. 1,139,685, for a controlling mechanism for throttle valves, which _ was granted May 18, 1915, on an application filed September 8, 1914; also for infringement of claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of patent to Lloyd M. Williams, Percy J. Williams, and Chester L. Williams, No. 1,284,523, granted November 12, 1918, on application filed November 4, 1916, for an accelerator attachment. The defense of want of validity, principally because of the state of the prior art, is interposed. Infringement is denied.

The object of the invention is to provide a mechanism for controlling the throttle valves of motor-driven vehicles, which may be controlled either by hand or foot power. The advantages urged are cheapness, simplicity, and durability of construction, and it is clearly demonstrated that the contrivance made under the patent may be installed in a Ford ear merely by removing the standard connecting rod and substituting this one. All that is required is to find a suitable place for the pedal and make the necessary installation. It does not require a high degree of mechanical skill to do this. In addition, there is an advantage in the factor of safety which inexperienced drivers may have in time of trouble, due to the mutually independent operation of both the hand and foot mechanism. A considerable business has been built up by the appellant in manufacturing under the patent in suit. It is extensively used on Ford ears.

The invariable practice of the prior art was to transmit motion from the pedal connecting rod through an instrumentality which holds the throttle rigid and immovable so long as the pedal is depressed, as through the medium of an arm or a thrust rod extending rigidly from the foot lever, or a jointed connection involving a lever fulcrumed at a fixed point upon the engine, and to provide a lost motion connection in the connecting rod. This rendered the manual control inoperative whenever the pedal control is in use. The principle of the invention in suit was making the connecting rod out of the primary and secondary member slide upon one another. A transmitting connection from the pedal to the connecting rod is carried at one end. It is so yielding in the direction of the connecting rod movement that motion may be imparted to the connecting rod bodily or as a whole by the manual control, even while the pedal is depressed. The pedal power is not transmitted by rigid connecting parts, but by the pedal’s operation on the connecting rod or part of the connecting rod. The connecting rod is at all times operative and continuously a functioning element of control between the hand lever and the throttle. It is responsive to the pedal, because the pedal changes the length of the rod through which the hand lever is holding the throttle, while the hand lever is still dependent upon a holding means.

In claim 2 it is broadly stated: “A foot-[45]*45controlled device operative on said connection to contract the same, against the tension of said spring, and thereby actuate said throttle valve independently of said hand-controlled rod.” In claim 3, a “foot-controlled device, operative on the primary section of said rod.” In construction under this Judd patent in place of the rigid rod connection between the crank arms there is employed a longitudinally extensible and contract-able rod, comprising a primary section and a secondary section; the former being telescoped into the latter. The outer end of the rod section is pivotally secured to the free end of the crank arm by a hooklike extension screwed into the rod section. Rigidly secured to the rod section is a laterally projecting lug, which slidably works in a longitudinally extended slot formed in the rod section, and affords a stop to limit the longitudinal separation of the rod sections. A coiled spring is telescoped onto the rod section, compressed between a collar thereon and the inner end of the rod section, and yieldingly holds said sections in their extended positions. The rod sections complete the connection between the hand piece and throttle valve. While contracted by 'the foot mechanism, this extendable or eontraetable connecting rod exists as a continuing operative and effective connection between the two crank arms and the throttle, and is the crux of the whole situation in the Judd patent, because the necessary result thereof is to cause the foot control to operate upon a changed length of the rod without disturbing it as such operative connection between the two cranks, thereby bringing about the independence of the action between the hand and foot controls, which enables either to operate without impairing the control which the other has over the throttle. And this is the identifying novelty of the invention.

The Williams patent is the same operative principle as the Judd patent; that is, it has a similar organization of elements, but there is a different structural detail. The means through which the Williams structure embodied the Judd principle of rendering the pedal operative upon the two-part connecting rod enables it to perform an operation on the rod and change its length, while leaving the rod a continuing operative element of control between the hand-adjusted crank and the carbureter crank, which consists of a device known prior to the invention, although never before used in this manner, as the Bowden wire. In its operative principle, a tube is produced by coiling a wire after the manner of a tightly wound spring; such a tube is freely flexible and may be diverted into any path, but it will always remain noneompressible lengthwise, so that, if another wire is introduced into the flexible tube, it may be pulled in the tube, even though partaking of the path of the tube, without the wire straightening out or securing the shortest distance between the two points, and therefore be serviceable as a means for transmitting motion. Williams used the Bowden wire between the operative upper end of the pedal and the sliding primary member of the connecting rod, with its remote end in floating support upon the connecting rod in the same sense that it rides with the connecting rod on the flexible tube, and is anchored to the rod member, and the wire passes on to the sliding rod member, in order to move the latter relatively to the part performing upon the connecting rod the operation of shortening the connecting rod without disturbing the continuity of the hand lever control.

The appellant’s commercial structure uses this flexible wire tube. The coiled spring interposed between the two collars, as in the Judd patent, performs the function of holding the extendable and contracting connecting rod in its normally connecting position. When the throttle is depressed, the yielding of the spring permits the throttle to open independently of the rigid connecting rod, which latter is movable only as a hand mechanism. Thus the hand-actuated mechanism and the foot-actuated mechanism may open and close the throttle valve independent of each other.

Of the patents referred to as prior art, Hess, No. 1,174,981, granted August 26, 1923, Bowmann, No. 1,132,907, granted July 28, 1923, and Gibson & Staples, No. 1,131,-831, granted March 16,1915, were cop ending applications in the Patent Office with the Judd patent. They cannot aid in the defense of prior inventions as distinguished from anticipation. This court said in Davis, etc., v. Alexander Milburn Co., 1 F.(2d) 227:

“Priority of invention does not mean the same thing as anticipation in invention.

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Bluebook (online)
10 F.2d 44, 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-bros-aircraft-corp-v-gould-mersereau-co-ca2-1925.