Williams 124345 v. Yuma, County of

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: February 24, 2025
• Docket: 2:22-cv-00154
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO JL 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 DaJuan Torrell Williams, CV-22-00154-PHX-MTL (CDB) CV-22-01118-PHX-MTL (CDB) 10 Plaintiff, CV-22-01120-PHX-MTL (CDB) CV-22-01163-PHX-MTL (CDB) 11 v. 12 Unknown Alvarez, et al., ORDER 13 Defendants.

14 15 Before the Court is Defendant Michael Cooper’s Motion for Summary Judgment on 16 qualified immunity grounds with respect to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding 17 outdoor recreation. (Doc. 182.) Plaintiff was informed of his rights and obligations to 18 respond pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) 19 (Doc. 184), and he did not file a response. The Court will grant in part and deny in part 20 Defendant Cooper’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 21 I. Procedural History 22 Plaintiff brought four civil rights actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On June 13, 23 2023, the Court consolidated the cases pertaining to Plaintiff’s incarceration at the Yuma 24 County Detention Center (“YCDC”).1 25 On October 10, 2023, the Yuma County Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 26 Judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement, 27

28 1 The Court refers to Plaintiff’s cases in the order they were filed as Williams #1, Williams #2, etc. 1 excessive force, and medical care claims; First Amendment mail claims; Sixth Amendment 2 access-to-counsel claim; and Fourth Amendment unreasonable search claim. (Doc. 127.) 3 Defendant Acosta separately moved for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s 4 Eighth Amendment medical care claim. (Doc. 120.) In a September 27, 2024 Order, the 5 Court granted Defendant Acosta’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 175.) The Court 6 also granted Defendants’ October 10, 2023 Motion for Summary Judgment in part and 7 denied it in part. (Id.) The Court denied the Motion as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 8 claim in Williams #1 regarding outdoor recreation against Defendant Cooper and his Eighth 9 Amendment excessive force claim in Williams #4 against Defendant Arriola. The Court 10 gave Defendants Cooper and Arriola 14 days to file a renewed Motion for Summary 11 Judgment limited to the issue of whether they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.) 12 Defendant Cooper filed his Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment on October 25, 2024. 13 (Doc. 182.) Defendant Arriola did not file a Renewed Motion. 14 Defendants then filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 162) 15 and a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration (Doc. 178). Defendant Acosta filed a 16 Motion for Entry of Judgment. (Doc. 187.) In a November 13, 2024 Order, the Court 17 granted the Supplemental Motion and the Motion for Clarification. (Doc. 191.) With 18 respect to Williams #3, the Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants and 19 directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close the case. (Id. at 13.) The Court 20 also directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close Williams #2 because there 21 were no remaining claims or Defendants and directed the Clerk to enter judgment as to 22 Defendant Acosta in CV-22-00154. (Id.) 23 II. Summary Judgment Standard 24 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 25 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The 27 movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying 28 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 1 the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 2 If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not 3 produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 4 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts 5 to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in 6 contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 7 governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable 8 jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 9 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th 10 Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its 11 favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, 12 it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 13 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal 14 citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 15 At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and 16 determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 17 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw 18 all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited 19 materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). 20 III. Defendant Cooper 21 In Williams #1, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cooper placed him on “zero item status” 22 for several months, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. 17 at 8-22.) On 23 screening, as relevant here, the Court determined that Plaintiff had stated an Eighth 24 Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim in Count Four against Defendant Cooper for 25 his alleged authorization of Plaintiff’s placement on “zero item status.” (Doc. 19 at 13.) 26 A. Facts2 27 Plainitiff has been in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections,

28 2 Because Plaintiff did not file a response or controverting statement of facts, the 1 Rehabilitation and Reentry (“ADCRR”) since 1999. On March 10, 2020, Plaintiff was 2 transferred from ADCRR to the YCDC to await trial on new charges. 3 Plaintiff alleges that between June 26 and September 15, 2020, he was placed “or 4 maintained on” “zero item status.” (Doc. 17 at 16-17.) Among other things, while Plaintiff 5 was on zero item status, he was not given any outdoor recreation or exercise for more than 6 120 days. (Id. at 18-19.) 7 YCDC does not have a “zero item status” policy. (County Defendants’ Statement 8 of Facts (“CDSOF”), Doc. 128 at ¶ 238.) Inmates housed in Special Management Unit F 9 Housing Unit are classified as high-risk inmates who have documented institutional 10 violence (either at YCDC or other facilities), inmates with behavioral problems who 11 demonstrate violent behavior, and inmates who have assaultive behaviors toward staff or 12 other inmates. (Id. at ¶ 214.) These inmates can be housed in either the F1 or F2 units. 13 (Id.) F1 is YCDC’s most restrictive unit and houses inmates who have a history of 14 disruptive and aggressive behavior towards staff. (Id.) 15 Plaintiff arrived at YCDC on April 17, 2020 and was classified and housed in F1. 16 (Id. at ¶ 233.) Based on Plaintiff’s ADCRR Maximum Security classification, previous 17 assaults on staff and other prisoners at ADCRR, and life sentence, Plaintiff did not qualify 18 to be housed in general population at YCDC. (Id.) Plaintiff was housed in F1 for most of 19 his time at YCDC. (Id. at ¶¶ 233-36.) 20 Upon request, and absent other circumstances like disciplinary, classification, or 21 individualized safety/security concerns, F1 inmates were afforded 30 minutes of recreation, 22 once a week. (Def.’s Statement of Facts (DSOF), Doc. 183 at ¶ 14.) F1 inmates were 23 required to ask one of the officers in the housing unit for recreation if they wanted to 24 participate. (Id.) The special recreation yard is the recreation yard utilized by F1 inmates. 25 (Id.) It is fully enclosed, with an open top, and a table inside. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Due to safety 26

Court will consider Defendants’ supported facts undisputed unless they are clearly 27 controverted by Plaintiff’s first-hand allegations in the verified Complaint or other evidence on the record. Where the nonmovant is a pro se litigant, the Court must consider 28 as evidence in opposition to summary judgment all the nonmovant’s contentions set forth in a verified complaint or motion. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). 1 and security concerns, including possible violence toward other inmates, only one inmate 2 is allowed on the special recreation yard at a time. (Id. at ¶ 16.) 3 On June 26, 2020, while he was being escorted to the law library, Plaintiff attempted 4 to stab an officer in the abdomen with a handmade weapon. (Doc. 121-1 at 5.) Plaintiff 5 was moved to “alternate SMU housing.” (Id. at 36.) On July 8, 2020, during a pat search, 6 Plaintiff headbutted an officer in the face. (CDSOF ¶ 11, 13.) On August 26, 2020, 7 Plaintiff was moved to segregation housing; no reason for the move is noted. (Doc. 121-1 8 at 36.) Due to Plaintiff’s behavior, including the two assaults on staff on June 26 and July 9 8, 2020, and the threat he posed to the safety and security of the facility, he was not 10 approved for recreation in F1 between June 26 and September 14, 2020. (DSOF ¶ 17.) 11 Between July 6 and September 14, 2020, Plaintiff had one disciplinary infraction, on 12 September 10, 2020, although the nature of the infraction is unclear. (Doc. 121-1 at 36.) 13 During his residence in F1, Plaintiff regularly declined recreation. (DSOF at ¶ 22.) 14 Plaintiff’s cell was large enough for him to exercise—e.g., perform push-ups, sit-ups, and 15 leg squats; run in place; stretch, etc. (Id. at ¶ 23.) During his residence in F1, Plaintiff 16 regularly exercised in his cell. (Id.) 17 B. Qualified Immunity 18 Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, state officials are not liable under § 1983 19 “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness 20 of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 21 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). Qualified 22 immunity “attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 23 or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Kisela v. 24 Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78-79 (2017)). A 25 clearly established right is one that is “sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official 26 would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 27 664 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). 28 “Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that [his] conduct was 1 unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the 2 conduct.” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)). 3 At summary judgment, an officer may be denied qualified immunity “only if (1) the facts 4 alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury, show that the 5 officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly 6 established at the time of the incident such that a reasonable officer would have understood 7 [his] conduct to be unlawful in that situation.” Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 8 1123 (9th Cir. 2011). 9 Although there does not need to be “a case directly on point for a right to be clearly 10 established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question 11 beyond debate.” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 104 (quoting White, 580 U.S. at 79). This standard 12 “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” al-Kidd, 13 563 U.S. at 743. 14 The Supreme Court has “not yet decided what precedents—other than [its] own— 15 qualify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 16 66 n.8. But the Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding, that controlling circuit 17 precedent can constitute clearly established law. See, e.g., City and Cnty. of S.F. v. 18 Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 614 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13 (2014); Reichle, 566 19 U.S. at 665-66 (concluding that even if controlling circuit authority could be a dispositive 20 source of clearly established law, the Tenth Circuit’s cases did not satisfy the “clearly 21 established” standard). 22 C. Discussion 23 1. Eighth Amendment Violation 24 Defendant Cooper argues at length that he did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional 25 rights. (Doc. 182 at 8-13.) In the September 27, 2024 Order, the Court determined there 26 are genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Defendant Cooper violated 27 Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights with respect to outdoor recreation or exercise. (Doc. 28 175 at 33-34.) The Court permitted Defendant Cooper to file a renewed Motion for 1 Summary Judgment “limited to the issue of whether [he is] entitled to qualified immunity.” 2 (Id. at 81.) The Court will not permit Defendant Cooper to reargue the Court’s finding 3 with respect to whether there was a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Court will 4 proceed directly to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. 5 2. Clearly Established Law 6 The Court begins its inquiry into whether the constitutional violation was clearly 7 established “by defining the law at issue in a concrete, particularized manner.” Shafer v. 8 County of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court has 9 repeatedly warned lower courts “not to define clearly established law at a high level of 10 generality,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743, but the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[t]o phrase 11 the ‘right allegedly violated’ in such detail and in terms so closely paralleling what 12 allegedly happened [] ‘would be to allow [the Officials], and future defendants, to define 13 away all potential claims.’” LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 14 Kelley v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995)). 15 “A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights 16 may overcome the defendant official’s qualified immunity only by showing that those 17 rights were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.” Davis v. Scherer, 468 18 U.S. 183, 197 (1984); see also Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 6 (2021) (per 19 curiam) (“To show a violation of clearly established law, Cortesluna must identify a case 20 that put Rivas-Villegas on notice that his specific conduct was unlawful”). In other words, 21 “‘[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly 22 established at the time of the alleged misconduct.’” Shooter v. Arizona, 4 F.4th 955, 961 23 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991)). 24 Plaintiff is not relieved of this burden because he represents himself. See, e.g., Padilla v. 25 Knickerbocker, No. 2:20-CV-00066, 2023 WL 6929297, at *4 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2023) 26 (granting qualified immunity because a pro se plaintiff failed to cite case law that showed 27 the right was clearly established); Parker v. Dequito, No. 20-CV-661, 2022 WL 2106154, 28 at *11 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2022) (same); Stacker v. Johnson, No. 2:16-CV-2913, 2019 WL 1 4991740, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019) (same); see also Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 2 1219 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A district court lacks the power to act as a party’s lawyer, even for 3 pro se litigants.”). “There is no analogous burden on § 1983 defendants to find factually 4 on-point cases clearly establishing the lawfulness of an officer’s actions. Nor must § 1983 5 defendants come forward with precedent showing that the unlawfulness of their conduct 6 was not clearly established.” Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 708 (9th Cir. 2023). By 7 failing to respond to Defendants’ Motion, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden. 8 Notwithstanding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent requiring plaintiffs to prove 9 the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the violation, the Ninth Circuit has 10 held that Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit this Court to 11 grant summary judgment by default. See, e.g., Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 12 917 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the Court must expend its limited public resources to 13 determine, on Plaintiff’s behalf, whether the right at issue was clearly established at the 14 relevant time. 15 “[T]he qualified immunity inquiry is highly context-sensitive, turning on whether it 16 would be clear to a reasonable officer that denying outdoor exercise was unlawful ‘in the 17 situation he confronted.’” Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010). 18 Defendant Cooper argues that at the relevant time, “it was clearly established that 19 restricting recreation where an inmate poses a serious threat to staff safety, does not violate 20 the Eighth Amendment.” (Doc. 182 at 14.) Defendant Cooper relies on LeMaire v. Maass, 21 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993), in support of his argument that Plaintiff’s history of assaultive 22 behavior justified the denial of recreation for two months. In LeMaire, a prisoner confined 23 in a disciplinary segregation unit was deprived of outside exercise for most of his five-year 24 period of incarceration due to the prisoner’s “relentless” assaults on officers and other 25 prisoners. Id. at 1149. Specifically, the prisoner had attacked a prison guard, “savagely 26 attacked” another prisoner, assaulted numerous prison officers with hot water, toilet water, 27 food, feces, and urine, had at least 25 major rule violations in a two-year period, and 28 attacked two prison officials as he exited an exercise cubicle (an act “he vowed to repeat” 1 if he were allowed to exercise again). Id. at 1448, 1458. The prisoner claimed the 2 disciplinary removal of his out-of-cell exercise privileges violated the Eighth Amendment. 3 Id. at 1457. The Ninth Circuit framed the issue as “whether curtailing [] outdoor exercise 4 privileges” as to a prisoner because he “both abused them and represent[ed] a grave security 5 risk when outside his cell” met the subjective requirements for an Eighth Amendment 6 violation. Id. at 1458. The Ninth Circuit held that “as long as [an inmate] engages in 7 violent and disruptive behavior, prison officials are authorized and indeed required to take 8 appropriate measures to maintain prison order and discipline[.]” Id. The Ninth Circuit 9 concluded that there was no Eighth Amendment violation because the plaintiff’s loss of 10 outside exercise privileges was “directly linked to his own misconduct, which raise[d] 11 serious and legitimate security concerns within the prison.” Id. 12 In Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit considered an 13 Eighth Amendment claim by a prisoner who alleged that for a six-week period, officials 14 provided him only 45 minutes per week of outdoor exercise. Id. at 1086. The prisoner had 15 been transferred to the prison’s special holding unit (SHU) “after multiple disciplinary 16 offenses ranging from counterfeiting documents to assault.” Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected 17 the defendants’ analogy to LeMaire, noting that unlike the plaintiff in LeMaire, the plaintiff 18 in Allen “did not lose his exercise privileges based on a determination by prison officials 19 that he presented a ‘grave security risk when outside his cell’ and that measures were 20 necessary to deter violent behavior separating [the plaintiff] from the rest of the population 21 in SHU.” Id. at 1088. 22 In Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit again 23 distinguished the facts in LeMaire with respect to the prisoner’s disciplinary history. In 24 Thomas, prison officials denied the plaintiff outdoor exercise for 13 months and 25 days 25 while he was in a maximum-security housing unit. Id. at 1146. The officials conditioned 26 the plaintiff’s access to outdoor exercise upon his signing a “pledge form” promising that 27 he would not engage in violence while participating in prison programs. Id. The plaintiff 28 signed contemporaneous interview forms promising to “program non-violently” but 1 refused to sign the pledge form itself. Id. The only disciplinary infraction during the 2 plaintiff’s 13–month–25–day confinement without out-of-cell exercise was a report filed 3 by a prison official charging him with “willfully obstructing a police officer” because he 4 had submitted a complaint to the prison Warden about the officials’ refusal to allow him to 5 exercise. Id. at 1153. 6 The district court concluded, in part, that the prison officials’ deprivation of the 7 plaintiff’s right to exercise was reasonable because of his disciplinary history, and because 8 he had the opportunity to sign the pledge form at any time, and upon signing would have 9 been permitted to exercise out-of-cell. Id. at 1146. The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding 10 that the plaintiff’s disciplinary history bore “very little resemblance” to that of the prisoner 11 in LeMaire, and LeMaire therefore had “little relevance to the present case.” Id. at 1153. 12 The Ninth Circuit observed that “deprivation of exercise may be reasonable’ in certain 13 situations, such as during a ‘state of emergency’ in a prison, or when a prisoner poses such 14 a threat to inmates or guards that his confinement without exercise is the only way to 15 maintain the security of the facility,” but where “the punishment of deprivation of exercise 16 appears clearly not to have been necessary to maintain order in the prison, it is difficult to 17 conceive of how a deprivation of a basic human necessity may be deemed reasonable.” Id. 18 at 1156. 19 Here, the seriousness of Plaintiff’s disciplinary history fell between that of the 20 plaintiffs in Allen and Thomas and that of the plaintiff in LeMaire but is closer to that of 21 the plaintiff in LeMaire. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Norwood, its precedent does 22 not hold that “a prisoner’s right to outdoor exercise is absolute and indefeasible, or that it 23 trumps all other considerations.” 591 F.3d at 1068. In the two weeks preceding the 24 decision to deny Plaintiff outdoor recreation, Plaintiff had assaulted two staff. Unlike 25 Allen, this is not a case where Defendant Cooper relied on “inconsequential logistical 26 concerns” to justify denying outdoor exercise. See Allen, 48 F.3d at 1088. Moreover, 27 “when balancing the obligation to provide for inmate and staff safety against the duty to 28 accord inmates the rights and privileges to which they are entitled, prison officials are 1 afforded ‘wide-ranging deference.’” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 2 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). “[A] reasonable officer could have believed that restricting 3 [Plaintiff’s] outdoor exercise was consistent with the Eighth Amendment,” and “no 4 authority clearly established the contrary.” Id. at 1070. Defendant Cooper is entitled to 5 qualified immunity with respect to the denial of outdoor recreation based on Plaintiff’s 6 history of assaulting prison staff. The Court will grant Defendant Cooper’s Motion for 7 Summary Judgment. 8 IV. Defendant Arriola 9 In the September 27, 2024 Order, the Court denied summary judgment as to the 10 excessive force claim against Defendant Arriola in Count Four in Williams #4. As noted, 11 Defendant Arriola did not file a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, the 12 excessive force claim against Defendant Arriola remains. 13 IT IS ORDERED: 14 (1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendant 15 Cooper’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 182). 16 (2) Defendant Cooper’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 182) is granted. 17 (3) Count Four in CV-22-00154 is dismissed with prejudice. There are no 18 remaining claims in CV-22-00154. 19 (4) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment in favor of Defendant Cooper as to 20 CV-22-00154. 21 (5) The sole remaining claim is the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim in 22 Count Four against Defendant Arriola in Count Four in Williams #4 (CV-22-01163). 23 . . . . 24 . . . . 25 . . . . 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28 . . . . 1] .... 2 (6) This matter is re-referred to United States Magistrate Judge Bruce G. Macdonald for a Settlement Conference. Defendants will be responsible for setting up a joint conference call with Judge Macdonald’s chambers no later than fourteen (14) days 5 | from the date of this order to schedule a Settlement Conference and for instructions 6| regarding preparation for the conference. 7 Dated this 24th day of February, 2025. 8 Wichal T. Hburde Michael T. Liburdi 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28