Williams 124345 v. Winget

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 19, 2025
• Docket: 2:19-cv-05096
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 DaJuan Torrell Williams, No. CV-19-05096-PHX-MTL 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Unknown Winget, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Fact and Expert Discovery and for 16 Expert Fees Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1828 and 1920(6) and Civil Local Rule 54.1(e)(4) (Doc. 17 163). 18 This case was remanded from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on one narrow 19 factual issue: whether “inmates were restrained in a secure holding enclosure” after 20 Plaintiff’s violent confrontation with correctional officers. (Doc. 135-1 at 2.) Many months 21 later, after retaining pro bono counsel, Plaintiff filed the Motion currently before the Court. 22 (Doc. 163.) The Motion asks the Court to reopen discovery so pro bono counsel can: (1) 23 “designate experts and conduct expert disclosures and discovery”; (2) “potentially depose 24 Defendant’s trial witnesses”; and (3) “seek limited production of additional relevant 25 documents that have not yet been produced.” (Id. at 1.) The Motion argues reopening 26 discovery is appropriate because Plaintiff previously underwent discovery as a pro se 27 litigant. (Id. at 2.) Had Plaintiff been represented by counsel during the original discovery 28 phase, the Motion argues, the discovery now sought by pro bono counsel would have 1 occurred. (See id.) 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) states a scheduling order “may be modified 3 only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” The central inquiry under Rule 16(b)(4) 4 is “the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, 5 Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). If the party seeking the amendment “was not 6 diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. 7 Six factors must be considered when ruling on a motion to reopen discovery: 8 1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) whether the non-moving party would be prejudiced, 9 4) whether the moving party was diligent in obtaining discovery within the guidelines established by the court, 5) the 10 foreseeability of the need for additional discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and 6) the 11 likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence. 12 City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation 13 omitted). 14 Starting with diligence, the Court issued its scheduling order for this case on May 15 20, 2020. (Doc. 33.) The scheduling order established deadlines for Plaintiff to make initial 16 disclosures, to conduct depositions, and to complete written discovery. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff 17 demonstrated a lack of diligence by disregarding the scheduling order and not providing 18 Defendants with initial disclosures.* See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. A lack of diligence was 19 also shown by Plaintiff making no effort to pursue the discovery now being sought through 20 the Motion. Despite having nearly four months to take depositions, Plaintiff never 21 requested to depose Defendants or Defendants’ witnesses. The only discovery sought by 22 Plaintiff was interrogatories and “requests for discovery.” (See Docs. 54, 62.) Defendants 23 seemingly complied with all of Plaintiff’s requests. (See Docs. 57, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71.) 24 25

26 * Plaintiff instead filed a Notice of Inability to Timely Make Initial Disclosures in this Matter (Doc. 41). The notice states a recent transfer to the Maricopa County Jail resulted 27 in Plaintiff not possessing any documents related to this case. (Id. at 1.) While Plaintiff’s transfer may have affected the contents or timeliness of initial disclosure, it does not 28 explain why Plaintiff never provided an initial disclosure statement to Defendants. Failure to do so was a violation of the Court’s scheduling order. (Doc. 33 at 1.) 1 Plaintiff argues reopening discovery is appropriate because he previously 2 underwent discovery as a pro se litigant. (Doc. 163 at 2.) This alone, however, is not enough 3 to show diligence. Pro se litigants are expected to follow the rules of procedure and local 4 rules of practice. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). They also routinely 5 conduct discovery without the assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 6 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff’s lack of participation during the original 7 discovery phase, regardless of his pro se status, demonstrates a lack of diligence. The Court 8 finds the fourth City of Pomona factor weighs heavily against reopening discovery. See 9 866 F.3d at 1066. 10 Next, looking at the likelihood that discovery will lead to relevant evidence, the only 11 factual dispute for trial is whether “inmates were restrained in a secure holding enclosure.” 12 (Doc. 135-1 at 2.) The evidence is fully developed on this point. (Compare Doc. 75 13 ¶¶ 18-19 (stating inmates were not restrained and security cameras were blocked), with 14 Doc. 101 ¶¶ 17-18 (stating inmates were restrained in a fenced holding enclosure).) Jurors 15 simply need to weigh the competing evidence and then decide whether Defendant 16 Villanueva, based on the circumstances, acted “maliciously and sadistically for the purpose 17 of causing harm” or “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” Hudson v. 18 McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); (Doc. 17 at 6 (construing Plaintiff’s claim as alleging an 19 Eight Amendment excessive force violation).) This inquiry is non-technical and well 20 within the jury’s purview. See Salcido v. Zarek, 237 Fed. Appx. 151, 153 (9th Cir. 2007) 21 (finding Eighth Amendment claims are non-technical); Almy v. Davis, 22 2:12-cv-00129-JCM-VCF, 2013WL819875, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 5, 2013) (holding Eighth 23 Amendment use of force claims do not require expert testimony). Given the narrow issue 24 left for trial, any relevant evidence gained through reopened discovery is of minimal value. 25 The Court finds the sixth City of Pomona factor also weighs against reopening discovery. 26 See 866 F.3d at 1066. 27 Concluding with the four remaining City of Pomona factors, trial is imminent 28 because the final pretrial conference and jury trial are set and there are no pending || dispositive motions. Updike v. American Honda Motor Co., CV-24-01378-PHX-DJH, 2|| 2024WL4465684, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2024). The request to reopen discovery is || opposed by Defendant. (Doc. 167.) Defendant would be prejudiced by having to essentially 4|| redo discovery on the eve of trial—and over four years after discovery has closed. And, || finally, the original discovery phase gave Plaintiff adequate time to collect needed 6 || discovery. On balance, the six factors weigh heavily against reopening discovery. The || Court finds that Plaintiff lacks good cause to amend the Court’s scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4). 9 Because the Court declines to reopen discovery, Plaintiff's request for expert fees || is moot. (Doc. 163 at 7.) 11 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen Fact and 12 || Expert Discovery and for Expert Fees Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1828 and 1920(6) and Civil 13 || Local Rule 54.1(e)(4) (Doc. 163). 14 Dated this 19th day of March, 2025. WM cla T. Hburde Michael T. Liburdi 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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