IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2023-CA-00160-COA
WILLIAM WORD APPELLANT
v.
U.S. BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR IN APPELLEE INTEREST TO WACHOVIA BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK, AS TRUSTEE, FOR MID-STATE TRUST VII
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/29/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MICHAEL CHADWICK SMITH COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PERRY COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHESTER BARRON McSWAIN ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: BETH USRY STEVEN PRICE NIXON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND RENDERED - 10/15/2024 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.
SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. U.S. Bank filed a complaint seeking an easement by necessity across William Word’s
property. The Perry County Chancery Court granted U.S. Bank’s request for the easement.
On appeal from the chancellor’s judgment, Word alleges multiple errors. Because U.S. Bank
lacks any right to an easement by necessity over Word’s property and provided no evidence
regarding the cost of using an available alternate route to access its own property, we find
the chancellor erred in awarding an easement by necessity. We therefore reverse the
chancellor’s final judgment and render judgment denying U.S. Bank’s request for an easement by necessity across Word’s property.
FACTS
¶2. Word and U.S. Bank own adjoining parcels of land that were once part of the same
larger tract of land owned by Zeno Griffin. The parties agree that the parcel Word now
owned was severed from the larger land tract by deed from Griffin in 1996 and that the parcel
U.S. Bank now owned was severed from the larger land tract by deed from Griffin in 1997.
Word purchased his parcel in 2016, and U.S. Bank acquired its parcel in 2019 through
foreclosure proceedings. The larger land tract from which Word’s and U.S. Bank’s parcels
were severed still surrounds the two smaller parcels. As the chancellor noted in his final
judgment, “[t]he larger land tract is heirship property in an [e]state that has not been
probated.” The estate was not made a party to the litigation between U.S. Bank and Word.
¶3. Relevant to the present appeal, Word’s parcel sits directly between a nearby highway
and U.S. Bank’s parcel. The evidence presented at trial showed that U.S. Bank’s parcel
became landlocked in 1997 when the parcel was severed from the larger land tract and left
without any direct access to the highway. Prior to both Word’s and U.S. Bank’s ownership
of their respective parcels, an unrecorded right-of-way existed across Word’s parcel that
provided highway access to U.S. Bank’s parcel. Based on the parties’ testimony and
evidence, the chancellor found “no dispute [existed] that the right-of-way has been used by
previous owners of [U.S.] Bank’s parcel since 1997.” The chancellor further found,
however, that Word was “not subject to a right-of-way.”
¶4. In his final judgment, the chancellor noted that in early 2019, before U.S. Bank
2 acquired its parcel, “Word barricaded the right-of-way because he suspected the previous
owners of [U.S.] Bank’s parcel” of illegal activity. The previous owners of U.S. Bank’s
parcel then “used another route over the surrounding heirship property to access their home.”
Having since acquired the parcel, though, U.S. Bank asked the chancellor “to establish the
blocked right-of-way through Word’s parcel as an easement by necessity.”
¶5. In response to U.S. Bank’s complaint, Word countered that U.S. Bank should finish
the nearby alternative right-of-way across the heirship property and extend that route about
twenty feet to provide access to its landlocked parcel. Word contended that the alternative
right-of-way would be less intrusive than granting the easement by necessity across his
parcel. Although the alternate route would traverse a corner of his property, Word stated that
he would be agreeable to such a solution. The chancellor noted, however, that U.S. Bank
objected to Word’s proposed solution “due to additional expense and because it deemed the
alternate route impassable in its current condition.” The chancellor personally inspected both
proposed routes and concluded that although “not completely impassable, [the alternate
route] could possibly render damage to any vehicle other than one for all-terrain purposes.”
¶6. Following his analysis of the parties’ evidence and relevant caselaw, the chancellor
found that U.S. Bank had sufficiently proved its entitlement to an easement by necessity
across Word’s property. As a result, the chancellor granted U.S. Bank’s requested relief.
Word unsuccessfully moved for the chancellor to reconsider his judgment or, alternatively,
to grant a new trial. Aggrieved, Word appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
3 ¶7. “Although we review questions of law de novo, we leave a chancellor’s factual
findings undisturbed when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused
his discretion, was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal
standard.” Hasley v. Hasley, 385 So. 3d 1258, 1262 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citation
and internal quotation mark omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. U.S. Bank lacks entitlement to an easement by necessity over Word’s parcel.
¶8. We recently explained the requirements for granting an easement by necessity as
follows:
An easement by necessity arises by implied grant when a part of a commonly owned tract of land is severed in such a way that either portion of the property has been rendered inaccessible except by passing over the other portion or by trespassing on the lands of another. The party seeking an easement by necessity has the burden of proof and must establish that he or she is entitled to a right of way across another’s land. An easement by necessity requires proof that (1) the easement is necessary; (2) the dominant and servient estates were once part of a commonly owned parcel; (3) the implicit right-of-way arose at the time of severance from the common owner. To satisfy this burden, the plaintiffs must show that they possess no other means of access to their property.
Hobby v. Ott, 382 So. 3d 1156, 1161 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶9. In addition, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held as follows:
[O]ne who sells a parcel of land to another which is wholly surrounded by the other lands of the seller, impliedly grants a right of way to the interior lot so sold over the exterior lands retained. . . . And when one sells interior lands surrounded in part by the other lands of the seller and in part by the lands of strangers, the implied grant of a way to the interior land exists over the
4 exterior lands of the seller. The reasons need not be sought afar, for they are obvious at a glance, and they are these - viz.: (1) The owner of the interior land could neither reach nor use his land unless a way to it existed or was capable of being brought into existence, the right to use, occupy[,] and enjoy being essential to impart value to the land; and (2) this essential right is to be sought in the grant of the seller of the interior lot, and the buyer is not to be driven to seek to acquire a way over the lands of other adjoining owners.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2023-CA-00160-COA
WILLIAM WORD APPELLANT
v.
U.S. BANK, N.A., AS TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR IN APPELLEE INTEREST TO WACHOVIA BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK, AS TRUSTEE, FOR MID-STATE TRUST VII
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/29/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MICHAEL CHADWICK SMITH COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PERRY COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: CHESTER BARRON McSWAIN ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: BETH USRY STEVEN PRICE NIXON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND RENDERED - 10/15/2024 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.
SMITH, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. U.S. Bank filed a complaint seeking an easement by necessity across William Word’s
property. The Perry County Chancery Court granted U.S. Bank’s request for the easement.
On appeal from the chancellor’s judgment, Word alleges multiple errors. Because U.S. Bank
lacks any right to an easement by necessity over Word’s property and provided no evidence
regarding the cost of using an available alternate route to access its own property, we find
the chancellor erred in awarding an easement by necessity. We therefore reverse the
chancellor’s final judgment and render judgment denying U.S. Bank’s request for an easement by necessity across Word’s property.
FACTS
¶2. Word and U.S. Bank own adjoining parcels of land that were once part of the same
larger tract of land owned by Zeno Griffin. The parties agree that the parcel Word now
owned was severed from the larger land tract by deed from Griffin in 1996 and that the parcel
U.S. Bank now owned was severed from the larger land tract by deed from Griffin in 1997.
Word purchased his parcel in 2016, and U.S. Bank acquired its parcel in 2019 through
foreclosure proceedings. The larger land tract from which Word’s and U.S. Bank’s parcels
were severed still surrounds the two smaller parcels. As the chancellor noted in his final
judgment, “[t]he larger land tract is heirship property in an [e]state that has not been
probated.” The estate was not made a party to the litigation between U.S. Bank and Word.
¶3. Relevant to the present appeal, Word’s parcel sits directly between a nearby highway
and U.S. Bank’s parcel. The evidence presented at trial showed that U.S. Bank’s parcel
became landlocked in 1997 when the parcel was severed from the larger land tract and left
without any direct access to the highway. Prior to both Word’s and U.S. Bank’s ownership
of their respective parcels, an unrecorded right-of-way existed across Word’s parcel that
provided highway access to U.S. Bank’s parcel. Based on the parties’ testimony and
evidence, the chancellor found “no dispute [existed] that the right-of-way has been used by
previous owners of [U.S.] Bank’s parcel since 1997.” The chancellor further found,
however, that Word was “not subject to a right-of-way.”
¶4. In his final judgment, the chancellor noted that in early 2019, before U.S. Bank
2 acquired its parcel, “Word barricaded the right-of-way because he suspected the previous
owners of [U.S.] Bank’s parcel” of illegal activity. The previous owners of U.S. Bank’s
parcel then “used another route over the surrounding heirship property to access their home.”
Having since acquired the parcel, though, U.S. Bank asked the chancellor “to establish the
blocked right-of-way through Word’s parcel as an easement by necessity.”
¶5. In response to U.S. Bank’s complaint, Word countered that U.S. Bank should finish
the nearby alternative right-of-way across the heirship property and extend that route about
twenty feet to provide access to its landlocked parcel. Word contended that the alternative
right-of-way would be less intrusive than granting the easement by necessity across his
parcel. Although the alternate route would traverse a corner of his property, Word stated that
he would be agreeable to such a solution. The chancellor noted, however, that U.S. Bank
objected to Word’s proposed solution “due to additional expense and because it deemed the
alternate route impassable in its current condition.” The chancellor personally inspected both
proposed routes and concluded that although “not completely impassable, [the alternate
route] could possibly render damage to any vehicle other than one for all-terrain purposes.”
¶6. Following his analysis of the parties’ evidence and relevant caselaw, the chancellor
found that U.S. Bank had sufficiently proved its entitlement to an easement by necessity
across Word’s property. As a result, the chancellor granted U.S. Bank’s requested relief.
Word unsuccessfully moved for the chancellor to reconsider his judgment or, alternatively,
to grant a new trial. Aggrieved, Word appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
3 ¶7. “Although we review questions of law de novo, we leave a chancellor’s factual
findings undisturbed when supported by substantial evidence unless the chancellor abused
his discretion, was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal
standard.” Hasley v. Hasley, 385 So. 3d 1258, 1262 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citation
and internal quotation mark omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. U.S. Bank lacks entitlement to an easement by necessity over Word’s parcel.
¶8. We recently explained the requirements for granting an easement by necessity as
follows:
An easement by necessity arises by implied grant when a part of a commonly owned tract of land is severed in such a way that either portion of the property has been rendered inaccessible except by passing over the other portion or by trespassing on the lands of another. The party seeking an easement by necessity has the burden of proof and must establish that he or she is entitled to a right of way across another’s land. An easement by necessity requires proof that (1) the easement is necessary; (2) the dominant and servient estates were once part of a commonly owned parcel; (3) the implicit right-of-way arose at the time of severance from the common owner. To satisfy this burden, the plaintiffs must show that they possess no other means of access to their property.
Hobby v. Ott, 382 So. 3d 1156, 1161 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
¶9. In addition, the Mississippi Supreme Court has held as follows:
[O]ne who sells a parcel of land to another which is wholly surrounded by the other lands of the seller, impliedly grants a right of way to the interior lot so sold over the exterior lands retained. . . . And when one sells interior lands surrounded in part by the other lands of the seller and in part by the lands of strangers, the implied grant of a way to the interior land exists over the
4 exterior lands of the seller. The reasons need not be sought afar, for they are obvious at a glance, and they are these - viz.: (1) The owner of the interior land could neither reach nor use his land unless a way to it existed or was capable of being brought into existence, the right to use, occupy[,] and enjoy being essential to impart value to the land; and (2) this essential right is to be sought in the grant of the seller of the interior lot, and the buyer is not to be driven to seek to acquire a way over the lands of other adjoining owners. Naturally he would have, under such circumstances, no right to make and use a way over the lands of third parties, and, by law, he could only hope to do so by costly and vexatious proceedings, whereas, by the conveyance of the interior lot, everything was granted which was absolutely prerequisite to reaching and occupying and using the interior lot.
Taylor v. Hays, 551 So. 2d 906, 908 (Miss. 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Pleas v.
Thomas, 75 Miss. 495, 500, 22 So. 820, 821 (1897)).
¶10. Here, it is undisputed that U.S. Bank’s parcel was severed from a larger parcel and
became landlocked in 1997. Under Mississippi caselaw, at the time of that conveyance, the
seller (i.e., Griffin) “implied[ly] grant[ed]” a right of way to the landlocked parcel “over the
exterior lands of the seller” (i.e., Griffin). Id. (emphasis added). It is undisputed that by
1997, Griffin did not own the parcel Word now owns. Rather, Griffin had previously
conveyed that parcel to Word’s predecessor-in-interest in 1996.1 Therefore, in 1997, Griffin
could not have impliedly granted U.S. Bank’s predecessor-in-interest a right-of-way over
Word’s parcel. By 1997, Word’s parcel was not part of “the exterior lands of the seller.” Id.
And U.S. Bank’s predecessor-in-interest would have had “no right to make and use a way
over the lands of third parties” such as Word’s parcel. Id.; accord Restatement (Third) of
Property, Servitudes, § 2.15 cmt. a (2000) (“Only if the cause of the landlocking can be
1 The 1996 conveyance from Griffin to Word’s predecessor-in-interest did not result in a landlocked parcel, as both Griffin’s remaining lands and Word’s parcel had access to the highway.
5 traced back to a particular conveyance does the common law provide a solution. The
common-law solution is limited to providing access over or through property held by the
grantor at the time of the conveyance.” (emphasis added)). Therefore, U.S. Bank has no
possible right to an easement by necessity over Word’s parcel, and U.S. Bank’s claim must
fail for that reason.2
II. U.S. Bank presented no evidence regarding the costs of using an available alternative route to access its property.
¶11. We also note that in a recent decision we unanimously reversed the grant of an
easement by necessity and rendered a judgment denying such requested relief where the
proponents of the easement failed to present “any supporting proof in the record regarding
the costs of alternative routes of access” to their property. Hobby, 382 So. 3d at 1157-58
(¶1). As we explained in Hobby,
our concern is only whether alternative routes exist. If none exist[,] then the easement will be considered necessary. But where other alternatives exist, we will grant an easement over the neighboring landowner’s property if it is the only reasonably necessary alternative available. The necessity should be judged by whether an alternative would involve disproportionate expense and inconvenience, or whether a substitute can be furnished by reasonable labor or expense. However, simply stating that it would appear to be very expensive to access property by some other means is not sufficient. An easement by necessity will not be awarded when the only evidence presented was that an alternative route would be longer and less convenient.
Id. at 1161 (¶14) (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
¶12. As in Hobby, the parties here agree that U.S. Bank “had a possible alternative route
2 U.S. Bank may have a claim to an easement by necessity over the exterior lands retained by Griffin at the time of the 1997 conveyance. As noted, however, the present-day owners of those lands were not made parties to this case.
6 to access [its parcel] that would not have required utilizing the route across [Word’s
property] that the chancellor ultimately chose.” Id. at 1162-63 (¶17). Because an alternative
route exists, our caselaw requires that U.S. Bank present “specific evidence of the expenses
involved in obtaining access [to its parcel] by alternative routes.” Id. at 1163 (¶18). “Simply
stating that it would appear to be ‘very expensive’ to access property by some other means
is not sufficient.” Swenson v. Brouillette, 163 So. 3d 957, 965 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting Harkness v. Butterworth Hunting Club Inc., 58 So. 3d 703, 708 (¶14) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2011)). Moreover, “[w]here one seeks to obtain a “way of access’ easement by
necessity but submits no evidence as to the allegedly higher costs of an alternative route, a
trial court will not err in declining to award an easement.” Id. (quoting Harkness, 58 So. 3d
at 708 (¶14)).
¶13. Here, the record reflects that U.S. Bank failed to provide any evidence at trial about
the specific costs associated with using the available alternative route to access its parcel of
land. The only finding on this issue in the final judgment was the chancellor’s recognition
that U.S. Bank objected to using an alternate right-of-way “due to additional expense.” We
therefore conclude that even if U.S. Bank possessed a possible right to an easement by
necessity over Word’s parcel, as in Hobby, it still would have constituted an abuse of
discretion to grant the easement “without evidence of the allegedly higher costs” associated
with utilizing the alternative route available. Hobby, 382 So. 3d at 1163 (¶18).
CONCLUSION
¶14. U.S. Bank has no legal right to an easement by necessity over Word’s property and
7 failed to present sufficient evidence regarding the expenses involved in using the available
alternate route to access its property. Therefore, U.S. Bank failed to prove its entitlement to
an easement by necessity over Word’s property, and the chancellor abused his discretion by
granting U.S. Bank’s requested relief. Accordingly, we reverse the chancellor’s judgment
and render judgment denying U.S. Bank’s request for an easement by necessity across
Word’s property.
¶15. REVERSED AND RENDERED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J, CONCURS IN PART I AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WEDDLE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.