William (Willie) Venson, Bankrupt v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta

337 F.2d 616, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4141
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedOctober 16, 1964
Docket21487_1
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 337 F.2d 616 (William (Willie) Venson, Bankrupt v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William (Willie) Venson, Bankrupt v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, 337 F.2d 616, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4141 (5th Cir. 1964).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The District Court in this ease refused to restrain discovery proceedings by a *617 creditor, the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, against a bankrupt. The debt in question had been scheduled as follows:

“Judgment Superior Court of Fulton, County, Georgia Case No. A-8844, The Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta, dated February 18, 1963. 7,200”

The clerk of the bankruptcy court who is charged with the duty of notifying creditors of the bankruptcy proceedings sent a letter of notice to the Superior Court of Fulton County, rather than to the Housing Authority. This letter was never received by the Authority. However, it was admitted below that an employee of the Housing Authority had read of a William Venson bankruptcy in the Fulton County Daily Report.

The District Court rejected the defense of discharge in bankruptcy, holding first that the debt had not been “duly scheduled” within §§ 17, sub. a(3) and 7(8) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 35, sub. a(3) and 25(8), and second that the Housing Authority had no actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings within the meaning of § 7(8) of the Act. On this appeal, Venson contends that both of these holdings were erroneous.

The District Court gave thorough consideration to these questions, and we hold that it correctly concluded that the debt was not duly scheduled and that the Authority had no actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. In the Matter of Venson, Bankrupt, N.D.Ga., 1964, 234 F.Supp. 271, Venson not only failed to indicate the creditor’s address as required by the Act, but also listed the debt in a manner likely to confuse the bankruptcy clerk as to whether the creditor was the Housing Authority or the Superior Court. The debt being thus improperly scheduled, in order to secure a discharge Venson had the burden of proving that nevertheless the Authority had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. This he failed to carry.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)
337 F.2d 616, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 4141, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-willie-venson-bankrupt-v-housing-authority-of-the-city-of-ca5-1964.