William Welch v. Julie Jones
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Opinion
Rel: April 17, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________
SC-2025-0210 _________________________
William Welch
v.
Julie Jones
Appeal from Autauga Circuit Court (CV-23-900132)
PARKER, Justice.
William Welch appeals from an order denying his "motion to
reinstate" after the circuit court entered a default judgment against him SC-2025-0210
for failure to appear at trial. We affirm that order and dismiss the appeal
in part.
I.
Julie Jones hired Welch to construct a fence. After a dispute arose
over the project, Jones sued Welch, and a trial date was set. When that
day came, however, neither Welch nor his attorney appeared in court. So,
at Jones's request, the circuit court entered a default judgment in her
favor, ordering Welch to pay her a total amount of just over $64,000.
In response, Welch sought to "undo" the default judgment. He first
moved to "reinstate" the case, explaining generally (without attaching
evidence and without citing legal authorities) that his attorney had
incorrectly calendared the trial date. After briefing, however, the circuit
court denied that motion without explanation.
Welch then obtained new counsel and tried again. This time,
Welch's motion was verified personally under oath. And this time, his
motion expressly invoked Rule 60(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., which allows a
court to relieve a party from a final judgment in the event of "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."
2 SC-2025-0210
Before the circuit court ruled on Welch's second motion (his verified
Rule 60(b) motion), he noticed an appeal to this Court. Soon after, the
circuit court announced that, due to Welch's pending appeal, it would
hold the verified Rule 60(b) motion in abeyance until further order of this
Court.
II.
We affirm the denial of Welch's motion to "reinstate." In defense of
that motion on appeal, Welch invokes the so-called "Kirtland factors" for
determining whether to set aside a default judgment: (1) the strength of
the defendant's case on the merits; (2) the possibility of unfair prejudice
to the plaintiff; and (3) the culpability of the defendant in producing the
default. See Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So. 2d
600, 605 (Ala. 1988). It is clear from the record, however, that the circuit
court was well within its discretion to deny Welch's motion.
As the party seeking to set aside the default judgment, Welch bore
the burden of providing arguments and evidence regarding all three
Kirtland factors. Ex parte Ward, 264 So. 3d 52, 56 (Ala. 2018). But
Welch's motion to reinstate did not even address the first and second
Kirtland factors (that is, the strength of Welch's case and the possibility
3 SC-2025-0210
of unfair prejudice to Jones), let alone provide any supporting evidence.
And to the extent it addressed the third Kirtland factor (Welch's
culpability for the default), the motion arguably undermined Welch's
request by emphasizing that the missed trial date was "the fault of the
undersigned and no one else."
Welch's arguments under the Kirtland factors may be more
relevant to his second (and verified) Rule 60(b) motion. But that second
motion is still pending before the circuit court. Presumably, the circuit
court will rule on that motion after resolution of this appeal. But for now,
any appeal with respect to that motion is premature, and we must
dismiss this appeal to the extent that it relates to that second motion.
See, e.g., Womble v. Moore, 370 So. 3d 817, 820 (Ala. 2022) (dismissing
appeal for lack of jurisdiction when a Rule 60(b) motion remained
pending before the trial court).
III.
The circuit court's order dated March 26, 2025, denying Welch's
unsupported motion to "reinstate" is affirmed. To the extent that Welch's
appeal relates to the Rule 60(b) motion, it is dismissed.
4 SC-2025-0210
ORDER OF MARCH 26, 2025, AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED
Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.
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