William Welch v. Julie Jones

CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedApril 17, 2026
DocketSC-2025-0210
StatusPublished

This text of William Welch v. Julie Jones (William Welch v. Julie Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William Welch v. Julie Jones, (Ala. 2026).

Opinion

Rel: April 17, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

_________________________

SC-2025-0210 _________________________

William Welch

v.

Julie Jones

Appeal from Autauga Circuit Court (CV-23-900132)

PARKER, Justice.

William Welch appeals from an order denying his "motion to

reinstate" after the circuit court entered a default judgment against him SC-2025-0210

for failure to appear at trial. We affirm that order and dismiss the appeal

in part.

I.

Julie Jones hired Welch to construct a fence. After a dispute arose

over the project, Jones sued Welch, and a trial date was set. When that

day came, however, neither Welch nor his attorney appeared in court. So,

at Jones's request, the circuit court entered a default judgment in her

favor, ordering Welch to pay her a total amount of just over $64,000.

In response, Welch sought to "undo" the default judgment. He first

moved to "reinstate" the case, explaining generally (without attaching

evidence and without citing legal authorities) that his attorney had

incorrectly calendared the trial date. After briefing, however, the circuit

court denied that motion without explanation.

Welch then obtained new counsel and tried again. This time,

Welch's motion was verified personally under oath. And this time, his

motion expressly invoked Rule 60(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., which allows a

court to relieve a party from a final judgment in the event of "mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."

2 SC-2025-0210

Before the circuit court ruled on Welch's second motion (his verified

Rule 60(b) motion), he noticed an appeal to this Court. Soon after, the

circuit court announced that, due to Welch's pending appeal, it would

hold the verified Rule 60(b) motion in abeyance until further order of this

Court.

II.

We affirm the denial of Welch's motion to "reinstate." In defense of

that motion on appeal, Welch invokes the so-called "Kirtland factors" for

determining whether to set aside a default judgment: (1) the strength of

the defendant's case on the merits; (2) the possibility of unfair prejudice

to the plaintiff; and (3) the culpability of the defendant in producing the

default. See Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc., 524 So. 2d

600, 605 (Ala. 1988). It is clear from the record, however, that the circuit

court was well within its discretion to deny Welch's motion.

As the party seeking to set aside the default judgment, Welch bore

the burden of providing arguments and evidence regarding all three

Kirtland factors. Ex parte Ward, 264 So. 3d 52, 56 (Ala. 2018). But

Welch's motion to reinstate did not even address the first and second

Kirtland factors (that is, the strength of Welch's case and the possibility

3 SC-2025-0210

of unfair prejudice to Jones), let alone provide any supporting evidence.

And to the extent it addressed the third Kirtland factor (Welch's

culpability for the default), the motion arguably undermined Welch's

request by emphasizing that the missed trial date was "the fault of the

undersigned and no one else."

Welch's arguments under the Kirtland factors may be more

relevant to his second (and verified) Rule 60(b) motion. But that second

motion is still pending before the circuit court. Presumably, the circuit

court will rule on that motion after resolution of this appeal. But for now,

any appeal with respect to that motion is premature, and we must

dismiss this appeal to the extent that it relates to that second motion.

See, e.g., Womble v. Moore, 370 So. 3d 817, 820 (Ala. 2022) (dismissing

appeal for lack of jurisdiction when a Rule 60(b) motion remained

pending before the trial court).

III.

The circuit court's order dated March 26, 2025, denying Welch's

unsupported motion to "reinstate" is affirmed. To the extent that Welch's

appeal relates to the Rule 60(b) motion, it is dismissed.

4 SC-2025-0210

ORDER OF MARCH 26, 2025, AFFIRMED; APPEAL DISMISSED

Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.

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Related

Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Auth. Sewer Serv., Inc.
524 So. 2d 600 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1988)

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William Welch v. Julie Jones, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-welch-v-julie-jones-ala-2026.