William Trengove, Jr. v. DOJ

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 17, 2024
• Docket: 24-1234
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 24-1234 __________

WILLIAM J. TRENGOVE, JR., Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-23-cv-00941) District Judge: Honorable Jamel Semper ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) September 3, 2024

Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed September 17, 2024) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se appellant William Trengove, Jr., appeals the District Court’s order granting

Appellee’s motion to dismiss his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. For the

following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I.

In February 2023, pro se appellant William Trengove, Jr. filed a complaint

alleging that the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) was negligent in failing to investigate

and charge the healthcare providers that he claims were responsible for the death of his

mother. Trengove contends that he presented evidence establishing that the providers

were guilty of murder, but that the DOJ took no action. He sought $1 billion in damages.

In response, the Government moved to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction. The

Government argued that Trengove’s claims could be brought only under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”), but that such claims were barred by the discretionary-function

exception and that Trengove had not exhausted his administrative remedies as required

by the FTCA. The District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint. This appeal

followed.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the

District Court’s order. See Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2018).

III.

“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its

agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Santos v. United States,

559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009). The FTCA, which is the exclusive avenue to relief in a

2 case like this, see Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2017), waives

the United States’ immunity for “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death

caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal employee “acting

within the scope of his office or employment,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

The FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, however, is limited by several

exceptions. Relevant here, the waiver does not apply to tort claims arising from a federal

employee’s acts or omissions involving the exercise of certain discretionary duties or

functions. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). This exception applies if the Government can show “(1)

its agent’s action involved an element of judgment or choice, and (2) its agent’s judgment

was of the kind that the exception was designed to shield, meaning that it was susceptible

to policy analysis.” Clark v. Sec’y of U.S. Navy, 102 F.4th 658, 661 (3d Cir. 2024)

(cleaned up).

We agree with the District Court that this exception applies here. As we have

previously recognized, “[t]he extent and scope of an investigation remains a matter of the

agency’s discretion.” Baer v. United States, 722 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting

Gen. Pub. Utils. Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also

Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948, 955 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Decision making as to

investigation and enforcement . . . are discretionary judgments.); Kelly v. United States,

924 F.2d 355, 362 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Since decisions to investigate, or not, are at the core

of law enforcement activity, the bureau chiefs’ challenged conduct involved precisely the

kind of policy-rooted decisionmaking that section 2680(a) was designed to safeguard.”).

Indeed, as the Supreme Court has stressed in a slightly different context, “an agency’s

3 decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a

decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney,

470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). And, while Trengove says that the DOJ acted wrongly here,

this exception applies “whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2680(a). Accordingly, the District Court correctly concluded that the Government’s

sovereign immunity barred Trengove’s claim.

Trengove also contends that the District Judge was biased against him because the

judge had previously been employed by the DOJ. However, because he made no

showing that the District Judge had any prior involvement in the incidents giving rise to

the claim, recusal was not necessary. See United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271, 279

(3d Cir. 1988).

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.