AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed June 24, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00451-CR
WILLIAM THOMAS CRUZE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-00055-T
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Reichek Following a jury trial, appellant William Thomas Cruze appeals his conviction
for indecency with a child by sexual contact. He contends the evidence is legally
insufficient to prove he committed the offense. In a cross issue, the State asks us to
make two modifications to the judgment. As modified, we affirm.
Background
The complainant in this case is A.S. In 2009, when A.S. was 7 years’ old, her
mother Renee and youngest sister died in a car accident. The family struggled after
the accident, and from October 2011 to August 2015, A.S., her sister E.S., and her brother went to live with Robyn Cruze and appellant. Robyn is Renee’s adoptive
mother and A.S.’s biological great aunt. Robyn is married to appellant, and A.S.
called him “grandpa.” In 2017, when A.S. was back living with her father and his
new wife, the stepmother noticed E.S. watching a suggestive cartoon which led to
both girls’ making outcries about appellant’s behavior.
Appellant was charged with continuous sexual abuse of A.S. and E.S., and the
cases were tried jointly. The indictment charging appellant with continuous sexual
abuse of A.S. alleged that on or about May 1, 2015, he intentionally and knowingly,
during a period that was 30 or more days in duration, when he was 17 years of age
or older, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against A.S., a child younger
than 14 years of age. Four predicate acts of sexual abuse were alleged—penetration
of A.S.’s sexual organ by appellant’s finger, contact between appellant’s mouth and
A.S.’s sexual organ, contact between A.S.’s mouth and appellant’s sexual organ, and
contact between A.S.’s hand and appellant’s sexual organ.
A.S., who was twenty at the time of trial in 2022, testified things were normal
the first year she lived with Robyn and appellant. After that, appellant began asking
her to take nude pictures of herself on his phone and progressed to doing more
uncomfortable things. A.S. and E.S. shared a room at appellant and Robyn’s house.
They had bunk beds, and A.S. slept in the bottom bunk. Appellant started out by
lying in bed with her and rubbing her back, but as time went on he engaged in various
sexual acts. One of the things appellant made A.S. do was touch his penis. A.S.
–2– stated, “He grabbed my hand and put it on it and showed me how to move it up and
down.” Appellant’s hand was on top of her hand as it touched his penis. She could
not remember how many times appellant made her touch his genitals, but it happened
more than once. A.S. indicated that it happened “pretty regularly,” but not as
regularly as other sexual acts.
Appellant’s witnesses included his wife Robyn and his daughter Britanie.
Britanie lived in appellant’s house with A.S. and E.S. from 2011 to 2013. Britanie
had one child when she moved in and her second child was born in 2012. She
testified the house was “crazy and loud and there were kids everywhere.” She said
there was never quiet time or private time. On cross-examination, Britanie admitted
she was using methamphetamine while she lived in the house. Robyn testified that
their household had an open door policy for the children living there. Any time the
children were in their rooms, the door was to be left open unless they were changing
clothes. Appellant would sometimes rub the girls’ backs at bedtime to help them
fall asleep, but he was not in their room for long.
The jury charge gave the jury the option to find appellant guilty of continuous
sexual abuse of A.S. as charged in the indictment, guilty of the lesser included
offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child or indecency with a child, or not
guilty. The charge instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of indecency with a
child if it unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally or
knowingly engaged in sexual contact with A.S. by causing contact between her hand
–3– and his genitals with intent to gratify his sexual desire. The jury found appellant
guilty of indecency with a child, and the trial judge assessed his punishment at 17
years’ confinement. The jury found appellant not guilty of the charges involving
E.S.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts the evidence is legally insufficient
to support his conviction for several reasons. He suggests that because the jury
rejected the more serious charges against him and acquitted him in the case involving
E.S., it reached the verdict as a compromise. In addition, he contends A.S.’s
testimony was “bereft of details.” Because the State was focused on proving
continuous sexual abuse, he argues, it never focused on any specific acts constituting
indecency and did not prove the time or place of the indecency. He also points to
the lack of medical or scientific evidence and argues A.S.’s statements to the forensic
interviewer, who testified about the interview, were vague. Finally, he asserts there
was no evidence of his intent to gratify his sexual desire.
A person commits indecency with a child if he engages in sexual contact with
a child younger than 17 years of age or causes the child to engage in sexual contact.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a). “Sexual contact” includes any touching of any
part of the body of a child with the person’s genitals if committed with the intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 21.11(c)(2).
–4– In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction,
we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine
whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational
factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577
S.W.3d 240, 243, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The factfinder may choose to
believe all or any part of any witness’s testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d
611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The Jackson standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the factfinder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). An appellate court
cannot act as a thirteenth juror and make its own assessment of the evidence. Id. “A
court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when the
factfinder does not act rationally.” Id.
A child victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for
indecency with a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07; Keller v. State, 604
S.W.3d 214, 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d). In the context
of indecency with a child, the finder of fact can infer the requisite intent to arouse or
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AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed June 24, 2024
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-23-00451-CR
WILLIAM THOMAS CRUZE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-00055-T
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Reichek, Goldstein, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Reichek Following a jury trial, appellant William Thomas Cruze appeals his conviction
for indecency with a child by sexual contact. He contends the evidence is legally
insufficient to prove he committed the offense. In a cross issue, the State asks us to
make two modifications to the judgment. As modified, we affirm.
Background
The complainant in this case is A.S. In 2009, when A.S. was 7 years’ old, her
mother Renee and youngest sister died in a car accident. The family struggled after
the accident, and from October 2011 to August 2015, A.S., her sister E.S., and her brother went to live with Robyn Cruze and appellant. Robyn is Renee’s adoptive
mother and A.S.’s biological great aunt. Robyn is married to appellant, and A.S.
called him “grandpa.” In 2017, when A.S. was back living with her father and his
new wife, the stepmother noticed E.S. watching a suggestive cartoon which led to
both girls’ making outcries about appellant’s behavior.
Appellant was charged with continuous sexual abuse of A.S. and E.S., and the
cases were tried jointly. The indictment charging appellant with continuous sexual
abuse of A.S. alleged that on or about May 1, 2015, he intentionally and knowingly,
during a period that was 30 or more days in duration, when he was 17 years of age
or older, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against A.S., a child younger
than 14 years of age. Four predicate acts of sexual abuse were alleged—penetration
of A.S.’s sexual organ by appellant’s finger, contact between appellant’s mouth and
A.S.’s sexual organ, contact between A.S.’s mouth and appellant’s sexual organ, and
contact between A.S.’s hand and appellant’s sexual organ.
A.S., who was twenty at the time of trial in 2022, testified things were normal
the first year she lived with Robyn and appellant. After that, appellant began asking
her to take nude pictures of herself on his phone and progressed to doing more
uncomfortable things. A.S. and E.S. shared a room at appellant and Robyn’s house.
They had bunk beds, and A.S. slept in the bottom bunk. Appellant started out by
lying in bed with her and rubbing her back, but as time went on he engaged in various
sexual acts. One of the things appellant made A.S. do was touch his penis. A.S.
–2– stated, “He grabbed my hand and put it on it and showed me how to move it up and
down.” Appellant’s hand was on top of her hand as it touched his penis. She could
not remember how many times appellant made her touch his genitals, but it happened
more than once. A.S. indicated that it happened “pretty regularly,” but not as
regularly as other sexual acts.
Appellant’s witnesses included his wife Robyn and his daughter Britanie.
Britanie lived in appellant’s house with A.S. and E.S. from 2011 to 2013. Britanie
had one child when she moved in and her second child was born in 2012. She
testified the house was “crazy and loud and there were kids everywhere.” She said
there was never quiet time or private time. On cross-examination, Britanie admitted
she was using methamphetamine while she lived in the house. Robyn testified that
their household had an open door policy for the children living there. Any time the
children were in their rooms, the door was to be left open unless they were changing
clothes. Appellant would sometimes rub the girls’ backs at bedtime to help them
fall asleep, but he was not in their room for long.
The jury charge gave the jury the option to find appellant guilty of continuous
sexual abuse of A.S. as charged in the indictment, guilty of the lesser included
offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child or indecency with a child, or not
guilty. The charge instructed the jury to find appellant guilty of indecency with a
child if it unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally or
knowingly engaged in sexual contact with A.S. by causing contact between her hand
–3– and his genitals with intent to gratify his sexual desire. The jury found appellant
guilty of indecency with a child, and the trial judge assessed his punishment at 17
years’ confinement. The jury found appellant not guilty of the charges involving
E.S.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts the evidence is legally insufficient
to support his conviction for several reasons. He suggests that because the jury
rejected the more serious charges against him and acquitted him in the case involving
E.S., it reached the verdict as a compromise. In addition, he contends A.S.’s
testimony was “bereft of details.” Because the State was focused on proving
continuous sexual abuse, he argues, it never focused on any specific acts constituting
indecency and did not prove the time or place of the indecency. He also points to
the lack of medical or scientific evidence and argues A.S.’s statements to the forensic
interviewer, who testified about the interview, were vague. Finally, he asserts there
was no evidence of his intent to gratify his sexual desire.
A person commits indecency with a child if he engages in sexual contact with
a child younger than 17 years of age or causes the child to engage in sexual contact.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a). “Sexual contact” includes any touching of any
part of the body of a child with the person’s genitals if committed with the intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. Id. § 21.11(c)(2).
–4– In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction,
we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine
whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational
factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577
S.W.3d 240, 243, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The factfinder may choose to
believe all or any part of any witness’s testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d
611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The Jackson standard gives full play to the
responsibility of the factfinder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.
Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). An appellate court
cannot act as a thirteenth juror and make its own assessment of the evidence. Id. “A
court’s role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when the
factfinder does not act rationally.” Id.
A child victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for
indecency with a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07; Keller v. State, 604
S.W.3d 214, 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d). In the context
of indecency with a child, the finder of fact can infer the requisite intent to arouse or
gratify sexual desire from a defendant’s conduct, remarks, and all the surrounding
circumstances. Keller, 604 S.W.3d at 226. No oral expression of intent or visible
evidence of sexual arousal is necessary. Id.
–5– We disagree with appellant that A.S. did not provide sufficient details to
establish the elements of indecency. A.S. testified that on multiple occasions, in her
bed at his house, appellant forced her to touch his penis with her hand and move her
hand up and down. The jury was free to believe this testimony even though it did
not credit A.S.’s testimony about other acts of sexual abuse. Further, from A.S.’s
testimony, the jury could infer appellant’s intent to arouse or gratify his sexual
desire. No medical, scientific, or physical evidence was required to prove
appellant’s guilt.
Regarding appellant’s assertion that the State failed to prove when the offense
occurred, the State was not required to prove the exact date of the indecency. It was
required to prove the offense occurred prior to the presentment of the indictment and
within the limitations period. Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 255–56 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02(6). There is no limitations
period for indecency with a child, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.01(1)(E),
and the evidence showed the offense was committed during the time A.S. lived with
appellant from 2011 to 2015, prior to presentment of the indictment.
Finally, there is nothing in the record to support the idea that the jury reached
a “compromise verdict.” The jury was instructed that it was required to find
appellant not guilty unless it found from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that he was guilty of the charged offense or one of the lesser included offenses.
Absent evidence to the contrary, we must presume the jury followed the trial court’s
–6– instructions. See Costilla v. State, 650 S.W.3d 201, 213–14 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of indecency
with a child by contact beyond a reasonable doubt. We overrule appellant’s sole
issue.
Modification of the Judgment
In a cross issue, the State asks the Court to modify the judgment to comply
with article 42.01 of the code of criminal procedure. Article 42.01 provides that in
the event of a conviction of an offense for which registration as a sex offender is
required under Chapter 62, the judgment must include a statement that the
registration requirement of that chapter applies to the defendant and a statement of
the age of the victim of the offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01 § 1(27).
Indecency with a child by contact is subject to sex offender registration
requirements. See id. art. 62.001(5)(A). The judgment in this case, however, does
not state that appellant is required to register as a sex offender or indicate the age of
the victim.
The State requests that we modify the judgment to state that the victim’s age
was “less than 14 years old.” We agree that this appropriate. See Vasquez v. State,
No. 05-20-00116-CR, 2022 WL 2951667, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 26, 2022,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (statement that victim’s age at
time of offense was “less than 14 years” constitutes statement of age of victim as
–7– required by article 42.01). The record does not reflect A.S.’s exact age at the time
of the offense, but it occurred while she lived with appellant. She moved out in
August 2015 when she was 13 years’ old.
We also make one more modification on our own motion. Indecency with a
child by contact is a sexually violent offense when committed by a person 17 years
of age or older. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.001(6)(A). In the trial of a
sexually violent offense, the judge shall make an affirmative finding of fact and enter
the affirmative finding in the judgment if the judge determines that the victim or
intended victim was younger than 14 years of age at the time of the offense. Id. art.
42.015(b). The judgment for a sexually violent offense should reflect this finding in
addition to any required statement of the victim’s age for registrable offenses.
Decker v. State, No. 05-18-01259-CR, 2020 WL 614100, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Feb. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Lopez v. State,
No. 05-22-01222-CR, 2024 WL 1154143, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 18,
2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we have the
necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d
26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d) (en banc). We sustain the State’s cross issue and
modify the judgment in this case to show that the sex offender registration
requirements apply and that the age of the victim at the time of the offense was less
–8– than 14 years’ old. In addition, we modify the special findings portion of the
judgment to include an affirmative finding that the victim or intended victim was
younger than 14 years of age at the time of the offense.
As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Amanda L. Reichek/ AMANDA L. REICHEK JUSTICE
Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 230451F.U05
–9– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
WILLIAM THOMAS CRUZE, On Appeal from the 283rd Judicial Appellant District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-00055-T. No. 05-23-00451-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek. Justices Goldstein and THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Garcia participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
In the checkbox next to the phrase “Defendant is required to register as a sex offender in accordance with Chapter 62, CCP,” we INSERT an “X”;
Next to the phrase “The age of the victim at the time of the offense was,” we REMOVE “N/A” and INSERT “less than fourteen years of age” in its place; and
We INSERT the following “Special Finding”: “The Court affirmatively finds that the victim or intended victim was younger than fourteen years of age at the time of the offense.”
As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 24th day of June, 2024.
–10–