William Sweet v. Chief Justice of Florida Supreme Court

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 26, 2025
• Docket: 23-13025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 1 of 11

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13025 ____________________

WILLIAM SWEET, KOSTANTINOS FOTOPOLOUS, GLEN ROGERS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus CHIEF JUSTICE OF FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, in his official capacity,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 2 of 11

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D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-00574-TJC-LLL ____________________

Before BRANCH, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Florida law allows “[t]he Justice Administrative Commis- sion, the Department of Legal Affairs, or any interested person” to “advise the court of any circumstance that could affect the quality of representation” of death-row inmates by their appointed capital collateral regional counsel. Fla. Stat. § 27.711(12). Treating this law as a state-created right to advise the Florida Supreme Court about the quality of their capital collateral regional counsel, three death- row inmates brought this 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action against the Chief Justice, in his official capacity, alleging that his court’s rules and policies prohibiting them from filing pro se pleadings violated the procedural component of the Due Process Clause. The district court granted the Chief Justice’s motion to dismiss the inmates’ procedural due process claim for lack of jurisdiction. After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Florida’s Capital Collateral Regional Counsel Statutes To understand the inmates’ procedural due process claim, it is helpful first to discuss the Florida statutes creating the capital col- lateral regional counsel position. The Florida legislature created the capital collateral regional counsel position “to provide for the collateral representation of any person convicted and sentenced to USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 3 of 11

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death in this state, so that collateral legal proceedings to challenge any Florida capital conviction and sentence may be commenced in a timely manner.” Fla. Stat. § 27.7001. But by providing collateral counsel to death-row inmates, the legislature explained that it was “not creat[ing] any right” for death-row inmates “to challenge in any form or manner the ade- quacy of the collateral representation provided.” Id. § 27.7002(1). Instead, “[w]ith respect to counsel appointed to represent defend- ants in collateral proceedings . . . , the sole method of assuring ad- equacy of representation provided” would be “in accordance with the provisions of [section] 27.711(12).” Id. § 27.7002(2). This is what the provisions of section 27.711(12) say: The court shall monitor the performance of assigned counsel to ensure that the capital defendant is receiv- ing quality representation. The court shall also re- ceive and evaluate allegations that are made regarding the performance of assigned counsel. The Justice Ad- ministrative Commission, the Department of Legal Affairs, or any interested person may advise the court of any circumstance that could affect the quality of representation, including, but not limited to, false or fraudulent billing, misconduct, failure to meet con- tinuing legal education requirements, solicitation to receive compensation from the capital defendant, or failure to file appropriate motions in a timely manner. Id. § 27.711(12). USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 4 of 11

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The Inmates’ Complaint William Sweet, Kostantinos Fotopolous, and Glen Rogers are death-row inmates in Florida. They each have exhausted their direct appeals in state court and are “presently being represented” by capital collateral regional counsel. Together, the inmates sued the Chief Justice in his official capacity and as the representative of his court. They alleged that they have “attempted to raise issues regarding the failure of [their appointed counsel] to timely file appropriate motions and provide quality representation” by filing pleadings with the Florida Su- preme Court. For example, the inmates attached pro se pleadings filed by Sweet, Fotopoulos, and two nonparty death-row inmates that were either denied or transferred by the Florida Supreme Court. The attached pro se pleadings advised the court that the inmates’ capital collateral regional counsel failed to research and investigate valid postconviction claims, failed to file timely and ap- propriate motions, and failed to follow up on newly discovered ev- idence. The inmates alleged that their advice about the quality of their representation has been systematically rejected because of the rules and policies of the Florida Supreme Court prohibiting death- row inmates from filing pro se pleadings. The Florida Supreme Court’s systematic rejection of their pleadings, the inmates alleged, violated their procedural due pro- cess rights to give advice as “interested person[s]” under section 27.711(12). As relief, the inmates sought nominal damages, a de- claratory judgment, an injunction, and a writ of mandamus. USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 5 of 11

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In response, the Chief Justice moved to dismiss the inmates’ complaint. The district court granted the dismissal motion because the inmates lacked jurisdiction to bring their procedural due pro- cess claim. This is the inmates’ appeal of the dismissal. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review jurisdictional issues de novo.” English v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). DISCUSSION The Chief Justice raises two jurisdictional issues on appeal that we must discuss before reaching the merits of the inmates’ procedural due process claim. See In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1108 n.30 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Normally, we must address the juris- dictional issues in an appeal first because we cannot reach the mer- its until we are satisfied that we have jurisdiction to consider them.”). We first address the inmates’ standing to bring their claim. Then, we consider whether their claim is barred by sover- eign immunity. Standing “Article III of the United States Constitution limits the ‘judi- cial Power’—and thus the jurisdiction of the federal courts—to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’” and standing is an “essential” compo- nent “of the case-or-controversy requirement.” Lewis v. Governor of Ala., 944 F.3d 1287, 1296 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (first quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, then quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). To establish standing, the plaintiff has the USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 6 of 11

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burden to show three elements: (1) injury in fact; (2) traceability; and (3) redressability. Id. At the pleading stage, the complaint “must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (cleaned up). When review- ing the allegations in the complaint for standing, “we must assume that on the merits the plaintiffs would be successful on their claims.” Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 100 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). We begin with the first element—injury in fact. “To estab- lish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and partic- ularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothet- ical.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). An injury is “particularized” if it affects the plaintiff personally. Id. (ci- tation omitted). And an injury is “concrete” if it “actually exist[s].” Id. at 340 (citation omitted). “[A]t the pleading stage, ‘general fac- tual allegations’ showing these elements will suffice.” MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Tenet Fla., Inc., 918 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). Here, the inmates alleged that their procedural due process rights to advise the court about the quality of their representation by capital collateral regional counsel were violated by the Florida Supreme Court’s rules and policies prohibiting their pro se plead- ings. But “standing is not dispensed in gross.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021). The inmates must demonstrate standing—including an injury in fact—“for each form of relief that USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 7 of 11

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they seek.” Id. In their complaint, the inmates sought nominal damages for past violations of their procedural rights, and injunc- tive, declaratory, and mandamus relief for future violations. So we must determine whether the inmates have alleged a past injury in fact, and then whether they’ve alleged that they are likely to suffer a future injury. Whether the Inmates Have Alleged a Past Injury In their complaint, the inmates alleged that they have been denied the procedural right to advise the court about the quality of their representation. But “a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” does not create an injury in fact. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341. To show an injury for a violation of a procedural right, the inmates must allege that the violation was connected to a concrete harm. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, 100 F.4th at 1356 (citing Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1170 (11th Cir. 2006)). For example, the plaintiffs in Center for a Sustainable Coast estab- lished an injury in fact when they challenged an agency’s failure to use a notice and comment process and “connect[ed] that proce- dural harm with the[] concrete injury” that their aesthetic interests were impacted by the deprivation of their procedural right. Id. Here, as in Center for a Sustainable Coast, the inmates have alleged that the Florida Supreme Court violated their procedural right—to advise the court about the quality of their collateral coun- sel—by systematically rejecting their pro se pleadings. And they connected that procedural violation to a concrete harm that was personal to them. The inmates alleged that they wished to advise USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 8 of 11

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the court about the fact that their collateral counsel did not “file a newly discovered claim in a timely manner,” did not follow up on “newly discovered evidence,” failed to argue “that trial counsel conceded . . . guilt to the jury,” and did not “identify and file [a mo- tion] that insufficient evidence exist[ed] to maintain . . . convic- tions.” The inmates have also met the other two standing ele- ments—traceability and redressability. The alleged violation of the inmates’ procedural rights was traceable to the Florida Supreme Court’s rules and policies prohibiting their pro se pleadings. And the nominal damages they seek can redress the violation of the in- mates’ procedural due process rights, see Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 292 (2021) (holding that “a request for nominal dam- ages satisfies the redressability element of standing where a plain- tiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right”), alt- hough the inmates have another jurisdictional problem with their nominal damages claim that we’ll discuss below. Whether the Inmates Have Alleged a Future Injury For standing for future relief, the inmates “must show that [they are] under threat of suffering injury in fact that is concrete and particularized” and “the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (quotation omitted). In other words, a plaintiff seeking prospective relief “must show a sufficient likelihood that he will be affected by the allegedly unlawful conduct in the future.” Houston, 733 F.3d at 1328–29 (quoting Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 9 of 11

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Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1252, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)); see Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying the require- ment of future harm to multiple forms of prospective relief ). Past wrongs may be evidence of the threat of future injury, “but past exposure to illegal conduct . . . unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects” does not establish standing for future relief. JW v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1264 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “Where we have found a suf- ficient imminence of future harm based on a past injury, the plain- tiff has alleged with particularity that a future injury would likely occur in substantially the same manner as the previous injury.” Elend, 471 F.3d at 1208. The plaintiff must allege some “credible threat that the injury would be repeated imminently to justify de- claratory or injunctive relief.” Id. Take Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2001), for exam- ple. There, we held that plaintiffs alleging past disability discrimi- nation at a county courthouse did not have standing to seek future relief because they had not “alleged that they intend to [return to the courthouse] in the future.” Id. at 1082. “Absent such an allega- tion, the likelihood of future discrimination remain[ed] ‘conjec- tural, hypothetical, or contingent,’ and not ‘real and immediate.’” Id. (quoting Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1985)). Like in Shotz, the inmates have alleged a past violation—that they “attempted to raise issues” regarding the quality of their capi- tal collateral regional counsel but have been “unable to raise these issues” because of the Florida Supreme Court’s rules and policies. USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 10 of 11

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The inmates attached their rejected pleadings as proof. But missing from the complaint is any indication that the inmates will need to advise the court about the quality of their capital collateral regional counsel in the future or that they plan to advise the court about the quality of their appointed counsel in future pleadings. Without al- legations that the inmates are likely to face harm in the future, they have not alleged a credible threat of future injury, and, thus, do not have standing to seek future injunctive, declaratory, or mandamus relief. Sovereign Immunity Although the inmates have standing to seek nominal dam- ages for alleged past injuries, they face another jurisdictional bar- rier: sovereign immunity. Absent waiver by the state or Congress, “Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits brought by citizens against a state, including its agencies and departments.” Uberoi v. Sup. Ct. of Fla., 819 F.3d 1311, 1313 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations and footnote omit- ted). While sovereign immunity does not bar claims against state officials for injunctive or declaratory relief, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.18 (1985), “state officials sued for damages in their official capacity are immune from suit in federal court,” Jackson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Gra- ham, 473 U.S. at 169). Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is inherently jurisdictional. Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). USCA11 Case: 23-13025 Document: 44-1 Date Filed: 03/26/2025 Page: 11 of 11

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Here, the inmates sued the Chief Justice in his official capac- ity under section 1983. Because “the Florida Supreme Court is a department of the State of Florida,” Uberoi, 819 F.3d at 1313–14 (ci- tations omitted), the head of that department, the Chief Justice, is a state official entitled to sovereign immunity. Congress has not abrogated—and the state has not waived—sovereign immunity un- der section 1983. Cross v. State of Ala., State Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1502 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); Hill v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Fla., 513 So. 2d 129, 133 (Fla. 1987). So, absent state waiver or congressional abrogation, the in- mates are jurisdictionally barred from seeking nominal damages for past relief under section 1983 against the Chief Justice in his of- ficial capacity as the head of the Florida Supreme Court. CONCLUSION In the end, the federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider the inmates’ procedural due process claim. The inmates lack standing to seek future relief, and the Chief Justice has sovereign immunity for damages for past relief. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing the inmates’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. AFFIRMED.