William Schwarzwaelder & Co. v. City of Detroit

77 F. 886, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 3025
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Michigan
DecidedSeptember 18, 1896
DocketNo. 3,386
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 77 F. 886 (William Schwarzwaelder & Co. v. City of Detroit) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
William Schwarzwaelder & Co. v. City of Detroit, 77 F. 886, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 3025 (circtedmi 1896).

Opinion

SWAN, District Judge.

The complainant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, and is the owner, by assignment, of letters patent No. 328,838, issued to L. A. Chichester October 20, 1883, for improvement in chairs. The defendants Mills, Lichtenberg, Dwyer, and Avery constitute the board of inspectors of the house of correction of the city of Detroit, and the defendant Joseph Nicholson is the superintendent of that institution. The hill charges the several defendants with infringement of the Chichester patent, and asks an injunction against further infringement and for an accounting.

It appeal's from the testimony that the Detroit House of Correction manufactured and sold, after the issue of the Chichester patent, and before the beginning of this suit, a chair designated in the record as “Complainant’s Exhibit, House of Correction Chair,” and that such chairs were made under the instructions of the superintendent, defendant Nicholson, at the house of correction, and that the money returned from these sales was turned over to the city of Detroit. The defendants admit that, about the month of July, 1893, they were notified by complainant’s representative that the chairs manufactured after the pattern of “Complainant’s Exhibit, House1 of Correction Chair” were infringements upon the rights conferred by said letters patent; that, prior to such time, neither of the defendants had knowledge of said patent or the complainant’s claims thereto; and “that, immediately upon receiving said notice, these defendants ceased wholly to manufacture such chairs,” and “have subsequently wholly refrained from manufacturing.” The pleadings put in issue the question of complainant’s right to relief because of its alleged failure to stamp or mark ás [888]*888patented, conformably to the requirements of law, the chairs by it manufactured. There is some conflict of testimony upon this point, which, by reason of the view taken of the main questions, it is unnecessary to decide.

A further preliminary question arises upon the fact that the only acts of infringement proved were the manufacture and sale of chairs complained of, under the direction of defendant Nicholson, as superintendent of the house of correction, without the knowledge of the board of inspectors. This penal institution is the creature of state legislation. Its status is defined by section 9845, How. Ann. St. Mich. It is claimed by defendants that, under this act, as construed by the supreme court of Michigan, in Detroit v. Laughna, 34 Mich. 402, the city of Detroit is '.not responsible for the acts of the superintendent, but the government of the prison is put wholly under the control of the board of inspectors, who, although appointed by the common council of the city on the nomination of the mayor, exercise rhe controlling power in the government of the affairs of the institution. The supreme court of Michigan in that case also held that, notwithstanding the mayor of the city and the chairman of the board of state prison inspectors were made ex officio members of the board of inspectors of the house of correction, nevertheless—

“Any interference whatever by the common council, either in the selection of inferior officers or in the internal management of the prison, would be unlawful and nugatory. * * * It is impossible, under such a law, to regard the city of Detroit either as custodian of the prison or as jailer and guardian of the prisoners. The officers are not city agents, and die city has nothing to do with their responsibility. It has no means of directing or of checking their action under the law, and the liability to respond for their misconduct cannot be laid upon the municipality, between whom and them there is no relation of agency or service.”

It would seem, from this statute and the construction given to it by tbe supreme court of Michigan, that the complainant, if entitled to redress, has no remedy against the city for the alleged infringement. ,

It is also contended that the board of inspectors are also exempt from liability because their office is entirely honorary, and that it would be inequitable to hold i;hem liable for tortious acts not directed or sanctioned by them, and committed, as it is claimed, without their knowledge, and wholly by the direction of the superintendent. Their immunity, however, for the acts of the superintendent, notwithstanding his powers and duties are governed by the general laws of the state of Michigan and the act establishing the Detroit House of Correction, is not so clear. It is unnecessary, however, to determine the question of their liability, or the validity of the defense urged in their behalf, nor yet that put forth for the protection of the superintendent.

The case turns upon the validity of complainant’s patent, which the defendants deny on two grounds: (1) That there is no novel invention in the structure claimed; (2) that the structure covered by the patent was the result of consultation between two parties, one of whom was not the applicant named in the patent nor a [889]*889grantee therein. The second defense may be dismissed with the remark that whatever of invention inheres in the structure must be regarded as originally and rightfully the property of Chichester, to whom the patent issued. Tlie letters patent themselves are prima facie evidence of the patentability of the article, and that tlie patentee is its inventor. This presumption must be overcome by clear proof and a preponderance of evidence^ in order to defeat his claim. The testimony of Chichester, the original patentee, denies in toto that of Williams, who claims to have been a joint inventor with Chichester of the most improved features of the chair in question. There is no other material evidence upon this point, and. the testimony being thus in equipoise between Chichester and Williams, it is insufficient to deprive the former of his monopoly, if any lie has.

Tlie single question remaining is as i.o the novelty of the invenfion. It is necessarily conceded that the Chichester chair is a combination of old elements. The merits claimed for it are that Li. can be folded more compactly, and thus occupy less space in shipment, than other chairs, and can be made at less expense, and is less likely to get out of order because of its simplicity of construction. It has no new feaiures. however, not: found in either the Bean & Fox patent. No. 168,324, issued October 19, 1875; the Hellig patent, No. 198,418, issued December 18, 1887; the English patent to Newton, No. 2,022, issued June 23, 1868; the Weller patent, No. 188,324, issued March 13, 1887; the Dleterich patent, No. 88,776, issued April 13, 1869; the Ware patent, No. 187,944, issued February 27, 1877; or the Stewart patent, No. 106,633, issued August 23, 1870. With reference to these patents, it is well said by ¡lie examiner, as appears in,the file wrapper of the Chichester patent, in his letter to Chichester of September 30, 1885:

“The case involves certain slight variations not found in the patents to Weller, Stewart, and tlie English jiatent, 2,022; but it is not apparent that such variations are more than mere immaterial changes of old contrivances, — that is, changos not effecting any new result.”

The examiner further said:

“If tlie speiiiieation should be amended to include a disclaimer setting forth a construction proved to be old, the differences therefrom involved in applicant's case, and the new result or advantage incidental to such differences, the case would be further considered.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
77 F. 886, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 3025, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-schwarzwaelder-co-v-city-of-detroit-circtedmi-1896.