NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1143
WILLIAM SANTIAGO
vs.
KRYSTAL HEDGE & others. 1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, William Santiago, appeals from judgments
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted. At all relevant times Santiago has
been a prisoner in State custody. The gist of Santiago's
complaint is that in 2019, he voluntarily transferred to the
Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC) in Bridgewater so that he
could participate in the sex offender treatment program there,
but that the various defendants "illegally" prevented him from
progressing through the program and thereby deprived him of due
process of law. The sex offender treatment program at the MTC
1 Malee Prete, Jennifer McAllister, Jaleesa Freitas, Kathryn Degnan-LeDoux, Susan Lantagne, Chika Bosah, Chelsea Routhier- McNeil, and Victor J. Correia. was not run by State employees, but rather by a private
contractor, Wellpath, LLC; Santiago's complaint names as
defendants several Wellpath employees and affiliates, as well as
the superintendent of the MTC, Victor Correia. Because Santiago
has failed to plausibly assert any violation of the due process
clause, we affirm.
Background. 2 Santiago began the sex offender treatment
program at the MTC in September of 2019. He progressed to stage
three of the program in 2021. In December of 2021, his
therapist recommended that he be advanced to stage four, but
shortly thereafter, Santiago failed a psychoeducation class in
human sexuality. Santiago claims that defendant Bosah, a
Wellpath employee, failed him "maliciously" due to a
disagreement over class materials. Santiago filed grievances
with respect to the decision to fail him in the class, both
informally and then formally, but the grievances were denied.
Thereafter Santiago was notified to appear for an interview
with the "Senior Clinical Review Team" (SCRT) -- a panel
established by Wellpath Policy 85.00 "to provide clinical
oversight and consultation . . . for treatment decisions" in the
sex offender treatment program. The interview occurred on March
2 The facts cited are from the well-pleaded allegations in Santiago's complaint, and for present purposes are taken as true, in accordance with the standard of review of an allowance of a motion to dismiss. Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 253 (2021).
2 22, 2022, after which the SCRT "failed" Santiago, preventing him
from advancing from stage three to stage four.
Santiago's claim arises from the SCRT interview process.
He claims that the Wellpath defendants violated their own
policy, 85.00, in multiple ways. These include, for example,
his assertions that there was no proper basis for having an SCRT
interview of him, that the SCRT failed to document the reasons
for the interview, and that the SCRT failed to provide a timely
written report of its decision, all as required by policy 85.00.
Santiago alleges that the Wellpath defendants' failures to
follow Wellpath's policy amounted to a deprivation of due
process. As to whether he was deprived of a liberty interest,
Santiago posits that the interview prevented him from advancing
in the sex offender treatment program, and that if he had
completed the program, he would have better results applying for
parole, and better results with respect to his sex offender
level designation.
In his appellate brief, Santiago emphasizes an additional
argument, which is that his First Amendment rights were violated
by the Wellpath defendants' decision to subject him to an SCRT
interview, because that decision was made in retaliation for
Santiago's filing of the grievances against his Wellpath
teacher. Santiago made a similar argument in opposition to the
motion to dismiss in the trial court, but no First Amendment
3 retaliation claim is alleged in Santiago's complaint. The
Superior Court judge dismissed all claims against the Wellpath
defendants and Correia, reasoning that it was not improper to
refer Santiago for an SCRT interview, and that Santiago had no
due process claim because, among other things, he had no liberty
interest in being granted parole. See Greenman v. Massachusetts
Parole Bd., 405 Mass. 384, 388 n.3 (1989), citing Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9
(1979). The judge did not address any First Amendment
retaliation argument. This appeal followed.
Discussion. 1. Alleged deprivation of due process.
Santiago's claim is that the Wellpath defendants and Correia
violated his Federal constitutional rights. It is thus a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a claim for deprivations
of Federal constitutional rights effected under color of State
law. As noted, Santiago's complaint claimed only one
constitutional violation -- of the due process clause -- based
on the allegation that the Wellpath defendants required an
"illegal" SCRT interview, and failed to follow Wellpath's
procedures under policy 85.00.
To establish a claim for violation of the due process
clause, Santiago needed to allege (1) a deprivation of a
recognized liberty (or property) interest, (2) that occurred
without the provision of the required procedural safeguards.
4 Parsons v. Mobile Home Park Rent Control Bd. of Chicopee, 423
Mass. 631, 634-635 (1996); Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. East
Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (1st Cir. 1992). 3 Here,
Santiago failed to plausibly allege either element. Santiago
does not have a protected liberty interest in taking a sex
offender treatment program. It is true that the Commonwealth
recommends that sex offenders engage in the program, and the
Commonwealth offers the program to some (but not all)
incarcerated individuals. The Commonwealth is not required by
the due process clause to provide sex offender treatment to
prisoners, however, nor is there a material infringement of
Santiago's liberty because he was denied (or delayed) in
advancement through the program. A liberty interest is
infringed when a punishment "imposes an 'atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1143
WILLIAM SANTIAGO
vs.
KRYSTAL HEDGE & others. 1
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiff, William Santiago, appeals from judgments
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted. At all relevant times Santiago has
been a prisoner in State custody. The gist of Santiago's
complaint is that in 2019, he voluntarily transferred to the
Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC) in Bridgewater so that he
could participate in the sex offender treatment program there,
but that the various defendants "illegally" prevented him from
progressing through the program and thereby deprived him of due
process of law. The sex offender treatment program at the MTC
1 Malee Prete, Jennifer McAllister, Jaleesa Freitas, Kathryn Degnan-LeDoux, Susan Lantagne, Chika Bosah, Chelsea Routhier- McNeil, and Victor J. Correia. was not run by State employees, but rather by a private
contractor, Wellpath, LLC; Santiago's complaint names as
defendants several Wellpath employees and affiliates, as well as
the superintendent of the MTC, Victor Correia. Because Santiago
has failed to plausibly assert any violation of the due process
clause, we affirm.
Background. 2 Santiago began the sex offender treatment
program at the MTC in September of 2019. He progressed to stage
three of the program in 2021. In December of 2021, his
therapist recommended that he be advanced to stage four, but
shortly thereafter, Santiago failed a psychoeducation class in
human sexuality. Santiago claims that defendant Bosah, a
Wellpath employee, failed him "maliciously" due to a
disagreement over class materials. Santiago filed grievances
with respect to the decision to fail him in the class, both
informally and then formally, but the grievances were denied.
Thereafter Santiago was notified to appear for an interview
with the "Senior Clinical Review Team" (SCRT) -- a panel
established by Wellpath Policy 85.00 "to provide clinical
oversight and consultation . . . for treatment decisions" in the
sex offender treatment program. The interview occurred on March
2 The facts cited are from the well-pleaded allegations in Santiago's complaint, and for present purposes are taken as true, in accordance with the standard of review of an allowance of a motion to dismiss. Osborne-Trussell v. Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 253 (2021).
2 22, 2022, after which the SCRT "failed" Santiago, preventing him
from advancing from stage three to stage four.
Santiago's claim arises from the SCRT interview process.
He claims that the Wellpath defendants violated their own
policy, 85.00, in multiple ways. These include, for example,
his assertions that there was no proper basis for having an SCRT
interview of him, that the SCRT failed to document the reasons
for the interview, and that the SCRT failed to provide a timely
written report of its decision, all as required by policy 85.00.
Santiago alleges that the Wellpath defendants' failures to
follow Wellpath's policy amounted to a deprivation of due
process. As to whether he was deprived of a liberty interest,
Santiago posits that the interview prevented him from advancing
in the sex offender treatment program, and that if he had
completed the program, he would have better results applying for
parole, and better results with respect to his sex offender
level designation.
In his appellate brief, Santiago emphasizes an additional
argument, which is that his First Amendment rights were violated
by the Wellpath defendants' decision to subject him to an SCRT
interview, because that decision was made in retaliation for
Santiago's filing of the grievances against his Wellpath
teacher. Santiago made a similar argument in opposition to the
motion to dismiss in the trial court, but no First Amendment
3 retaliation claim is alleged in Santiago's complaint. The
Superior Court judge dismissed all claims against the Wellpath
defendants and Correia, reasoning that it was not improper to
refer Santiago for an SCRT interview, and that Santiago had no
due process claim because, among other things, he had no liberty
interest in being granted parole. See Greenman v. Massachusetts
Parole Bd., 405 Mass. 384, 388 n.3 (1989), citing Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9
(1979). The judge did not address any First Amendment
retaliation argument. This appeal followed.
Discussion. 1. Alleged deprivation of due process.
Santiago's claim is that the Wellpath defendants and Correia
violated his Federal constitutional rights. It is thus a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a claim for deprivations
of Federal constitutional rights effected under color of State
law. As noted, Santiago's complaint claimed only one
constitutional violation -- of the due process clause -- based
on the allegation that the Wellpath defendants required an
"illegal" SCRT interview, and failed to follow Wellpath's
procedures under policy 85.00.
To establish a claim for violation of the due process
clause, Santiago needed to allege (1) a deprivation of a
recognized liberty (or property) interest, (2) that occurred
without the provision of the required procedural safeguards.
4 Parsons v. Mobile Home Park Rent Control Bd. of Chicopee, 423
Mass. 631, 634-635 (1996); Rumford Pharmacy, Inc. v. East
Providence, 970 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (1st Cir. 1992). 3 Here,
Santiago failed to plausibly allege either element. Santiago
does not have a protected liberty interest in taking a sex
offender treatment program. It is true that the Commonwealth
recommends that sex offenders engage in the program, and the
Commonwealth offers the program to some (but not all)
incarcerated individuals. The Commonwealth is not required by
the due process clause to provide sex offender treatment to
prisoners, however, nor is there a material infringement of
Santiago's liberty because he was denied (or delayed) in
advancement through the program. A liberty interest is
infringed when a punishment "imposes an 'atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.'" Puleio v. Commissioner of
Correction, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 302, 306 (2001), quoting Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Unavailability of a program
of this type does not meet this definition.
3 Santiago would also have to show that the deprivation resulted from State action. Here, where Wellpath was a private contractor working for the Commonwealth arguably performing a state function, we will assume, without deciding, that the complaint plausibly alleges a deprivation arising from State action. See Baptiste v. Executive Office of Health & Human Servs., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 110, 115-116 (2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2626 (2021).
5 Santiago argues, however, that as a result of being denied
(or delayed) in completing the sex offender treatment program,
he was disadvantaged in his efforts to obtain parole, and
disadvantaged when litigating his sex offender classification
level. The disadvantages Santiago alleges, even if true, do not
rise to the level of a deprivation of a liberty interest. As
the motion judge pointed out, there is no cognizable liberty
interest in being granted parole -- that is, in the possible
early release from a lawfully imposed sentence. See Greenman,
405 Mass. at 388 n.3. Moreover, the deprivation of liberty that
Santiago claims (concerning his sex offender classification or
parole status) is too speculative and attenuated from the wrong
of which he complains. For example, completion of a sex
offender treatment program relates to only two of over thirty
factors that the Sex Offender Registry Board must consider in
establishing sex offender classification levels. It by no means
controls what level a particular sex offender is assigned, and
often has little influence on the result in a particular case.
See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender
Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 633 (2011), citing Smith v. Sex
Offender Registry Bd., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 812-813 (2006)
(hearing examiner has discretion to consider which factors are
applicable and how to weight each factor). Similarly,
completion of a sex offender treatment program is one of many
6 factors considered by the parole board. See Rodriguez v.
Massachusetts Parole Bd., 490 Mass. 596, 599-600 & n.4 (2022).
The delay in completing the sex offender treatment program at
issue does not qualify as an impairment of a protected liberty
interest.
Second, and in any event, Santiago received more than
adequate process here. Santiago received a hearing of which he
had notice, an opportunity to be heard before the panel, and a
written explanation of the reasons why he was not advanced. See
Thaddeus v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Health & Human
Servs., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 413, 424-425 (2022), quoting Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("[p]rocedural due process
requires at least the 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner'"). Santiago's complaint is
that in requiring the SCRT hearing and then (allegedly) failing
to document it properly, the Wellpath defendants did not follow
Wellpath's policy. However, a failure to follow an internal
policy (assuming such occurred) does not equate to a failure to
provide the process required by the due process clause. See,
e.g., Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017)
(prison's failure to follow inmate grievance procedure not
7 federal due process violation). Santiago received all necessary
process here. 4 See Thaddeus, supra. 5
4 We do not understand Santiago to be making a substantive due process argument and, in any event, such an argument could be successful only on a showing that the governmental conduct was "so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998). See Commonwealth v. G.F., 479 Mass. 180, 192 (2018). No such allegation is made here.
5 As noted, in his appellate brief Santiago advances a different constitutional argument, not in his complaint, which is that the Wellpath defendants also violated his First Amendment rights, because the decision to hold an SCRT review was in retaliation for the grievances Santiago filed. Santiago first raised this First Amendment claim in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. We do not address Santiago's purported First Amendment claim, as we do not have an operative complaint, and clear allegations, to consider. We note that to make out such a claim one element Santiago must meet is that the defendants took a qualifying "adverse action" against him. Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F. Supp. 2d 41, 51 (D. Mass. 2006), citing Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 2006). We also note that Wellpath Policy 85.00 establishes SCRT review as an integral component of the MTC's sex offender treatment program, in which Santiago was a voluntary participant.
8 The judgments of dismissal are affirmed.
So ordered.
By the Court (Ditkoff, Englander & Smyth, JJ. 6),
Clerk
Entered: August 14, 2024.
6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.