William S. Kachele, Jr. v. Joe El-Maasri, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: January 28, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-03458
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 WILLIAM S. KACHELE, Jr., Case No.: 25-cv-3458-AGS-MMP

11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 12 v. PROTECTIVE ORDER

13 JOE EL-MAASRI, et al., [ECF No. 15] 14 Defendants. 15 16 17 18 19 20 On January 23, 2026, pro se Plaintiff William S. Kachele, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed an 21 ex parte motion seeking a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 26(c) to prohibit “Defendant” from contacting Plaintiff’s non-party employees regarding 23 the instant matter. ECF No. 15 at 1–2. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES 24 Plaintiff’s ex parte motion. 25 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 26 On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint. ECF No. 1. On December 19, 27 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 3. On January 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed 28 an ex parte motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and a Second Amended 1 Complaint (“SAC”). ECF Nos. 5, 6. The SAC names seven defendants: Joe El-Maasri, 2 751 Rancheros Holdings LLC, Chucri Nabih El-Maasri, Firestone Builders, Inc., Vanguard 3 Real Estate Services, City of San Marcos, and California Square Foot Studios. ECF No. 6. 4 On January 26, 2026, Defendant City of San Marcos filed a motion to strike the SAC. ECF 5 No. 16. No other defendant has appeared in the case. 6 On January 28, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Declaration of Service indicating the 7 “Amended Complaint and Summons” had been been served on Defendants Square Foot 8 Studios, 751 Rancheros Holdings LLC, Chucri Nabih El-Maasri, Firestone Builders, Inc., 9 Vanguard Real Estate Services, and City of San Marcos, California. ECF. No. 18. No proof 10 of service has been filed for Defendant Joe El-Maasi. Nor is it clear whether the SAC has 11 been served. 12 A. Plaintiff’s Motion for a TRO 13 Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO sought to enjoin Defendants from (a) “enforcing the 14 invalid 30-day notices to vacate” and “the December 30, 2025 rent return and proration 15 letter,” (b) “initiating or pursuing any unlawful detainer proceedings[,]” and (c) otherwise 16 interfering with Plaintiff’s occupancy . . . pending resolution of this action.” ECF No. 5 at 17 1. Plaintiff provided the following factual summary: “Plaintiff has occupied Suite 3 for 21 18 years under a month-to-month tenancy (Cal. Civ. Code § 1945). Defendants fraudulently 19 inflated square footage from 1,548 sq. ft. to 1,848 sq. ft. using BOMA standards, imposed 20 coercive deadlines, and issued retaliatory 30-day notices after Plaintiff’s objections, 21 violating due process without pre-deprivation hearing.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff sought 22 “immediate equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm from Defendants’ retaliatory and 23 fraudulent scheme to evict Plaintiff[.]” Id. at 2. 24 On January 7, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO. ECF No. 7. The 25 Court found Plaintiff “has not clearly shown that he is likely to prevail on the merits, nor 26

27 1 On January 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of errata for the SAC. ECF No. 14. It is not 28 1 even raised serious questions on that score.” ECF No. 7 at 2. Furthermore, the Court 2 determined there is a “low probability of success” on the § 1983 and Americans with 3 Disabilities Act claims, despite those being Plaintiff’s “most well-articulated causes of 4 action.” Id. at 2–3. The Court found Plaintiff’s remaining claims have serious deficiencies. 5 Id. at 3. The Court summarized “[t]here is little in the record to suggest that this Court will 6 even be able to hear these non-diverse claims, much less that [Plaintiff] is likely to win 7 them.” Id. The Court denied the TRO motion. Id. 8 On January 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s 9 denial. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff argued reconsideration was warranted to “correct clear errors 10 in the Court’s assessment of likelihood of success on the merits.” ECF No. 9 at 1. On 11 January 16, 2026, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of points and authorities in support of his 12 motion for reconsideration. ECF No. 12. The memorandum of points and authorities is 13 based on “newly obtained expert evidence” which “document extensive Americans with 14 Disabilities Act” and California Building Code violations. Id. at 1. Plaintiff argued the new 15 evidence strengthened his “showing of irreparable harm, likelihood of success on the 16 merits, and the balance of equities.” Id. at 2. 17 The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration on January 22, 2026. ECF 18 No. 13. 19 B. Plaintiff Attempts to File a Third Amended Complaint 20 On January 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint. ECF No. 10. The 21 Court struck the Third Amended Complaint as Plaintiff has already amended “as a matter 22 of course” under Rule 15 and “no further ‘leave’ has been requested or granted by the 23 [C]ourt. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). ” ECF No. 11. 24 C. The Instant Motion for Protective Order 25 Plaintiff filed the instant motion for protective order on January 23, 2026. ECF No. 26 15. Plaintiff alleges Defendant—though he does not identify which one—has conducted 27 “improper clandestine interviews” with Plaintiff’s current employees and seeks a 28 protective order to “prohibit such conduct.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff alleges the “unauthorized ex 1 parte contacts seek information related to the subject matter of the litigation without notice 2 to Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s counsel, potentially eliciting privileged or confidential 3 information, interfering with discovery processes, and risking witness intimidation or 4 undue influence.” Id. at 2. Therefore, Plaintiff requests the Court “order Defendant to 5 immediately cease all direct or indirect contacts with Plaintiff’s employees regarding this 6 matter, except through formal discovery channels . . . .” Id. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 “The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 9 annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 26(c)(1). “The burden is on the person seeking the protective order to demonstrate good 11 cause.” Grano v. Sodexo Mgmt., Inc., 335 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (citation 12 omitted). The moving party must show “specific prejudice or harm will result if no 13 protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 14 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 III. ANALYSIS 16 The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for protective order for four primary reasons. 17 First, Plaintiff names multiple defendants in the SAC, and it is unclear which “Defendant” 18 Plaintiff’s motion is aimed towards. Second, there is no evidence of proper service of the 19 SAC or service on all seven defendants; therefore it is unclear if the Court has jurisdiction 20 over the unspecified defendant. Third, only Defendant City of San Marcos has appeared in 21 the action. Fourth, Plaintiff have not established good cause to warrant a protective order. 22 A. Plaintiff’s Motion Does Not Specify Which Defendant 23 As a preliminary matter, nowhere in Plaintiff’s motion for protective order does he 24 identify the defendant by name. As Plaintiff has named seven defendants in the SAC, it is 25 unclear to the Court which Defendant’s conduct is allegedly at issue. As a result, the Court 26 finds Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for a protective order. 27 B. Plaintiff Does Not Provide Evidence of Proper Service of the SAC 28 Proper service is a requirement for a federal court to have jurisdiction over a 1 defendant. “A federal court does not have jurisdiction over defendant unless the defendant 2 has been properly served under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.” Direct Mail Specialists, 3 Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation 4 omitted). “Proper service of the summons is a prerequisite to a court’s exercise of personal 5 jurisdiction over a defendant.” In re. Pacific Land Sales, Inc., 187 B.R. 302, 309 (9th Cir. 6 1995) (citation omitted). “[N]either actual notice nor simply naming the defendant in the 7 complaint will provide personal jurisdiction without ‘substantial compliance with Rule 4.’” 8 Benny v. Pipes et al., 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 9 Here, there is no indication the Court has jurisdiction over all defendants because no 10 proof of service of the SAC has been filed. Although Plaintiff recently filed a Declaration 11 of Service indicating the “Amended Complaint and Summons” had been been served on 12 Defendants Square Foot Studios, 751 Rancheros Holdings LLC, Chucri Nabih El-Maasri, 13 Firestone Builders, Inc., Vanguard Real Estate Services, and City of San Marcos, 14 California, no proof of service has been filed for Defendant Joe El-Maasi. ECF No. 18. 15 Furthermore, with the exception of City of San Marcos, who has filed a responsive pleading 16 without disputing personal jursidiction, there is no indication “Defendant” has waived 17 service requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d). ECF No. 16. Plaintiff has 18 not included a proof of service of the SAC, nor motion for TRO or related filings. ECF 19 Nos. 5, 6, 9, 12. Therefore, it is unclear whether the Court has jurisdiction over the 20 unspecified “Defendant” due to lack of service evidence. Without jurisdiction, the Court 21 cannot compel a defendant (with the exception of City of San Marcos) to do anything. 22 C. Defendant Has Not Appeared in the Action 23 Plaintiff alleges Defendant is “proceeding pro se” and “has not retained counsel.” 24 ECF No. 15 at 2. Plaintiff names multiple defendants in the SAC and it is unclear which 25 Defendant Plaintiff’s allegations are aimed towards. Any entity defendants cannot proceed 26 pro se. See CivLR 83.3(j) (“Appearances by Corporations. Only natural persons 27 representing their individual interests in propria persona may appear in court without 28 representation by an attorney permitted to practice pursuant to Civil Local Rule 83.3. All 1 other parties, including corporations, partnerships and other legal entities, may appear in 2 court only through an attorney permitted to practice pursuant to Civil Local Rule 83.3.”). 3 D. Plaintiff Does Not Establish Good Cause for a Protective Order 4 Plaintiff’s substantive grounds for a protective order are unpersuasive. Plaintiff 5 alleges “Defendant’s actions circumvent formal discovery, risk breaching attorney-client 6 privilege, and prejudice Plaintiffs ability to prepare its case.” ECF No. 15 at 2–3. The Court 7 reviews each issue in turn. 8 1. Plaintiff has Not Established a Risk of Breach of Attorney-Client 9 Privilege 10 “The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between 11 attorneys and clients, which are made for the purpose of giving legal advice.” United States 12 v. Sanmina Corp., 968 F.3d 1107, 1116 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “The lawyer– 13 client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to 14 the client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried 15 out.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Trammel v. United 16 States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). The “party asserting the attorney-client privilege has the 17 burden of establishing the [existence of an attorney-client] relationship and the privileged 18 nature of the communication.” United States v. Graf, 610 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010) 19 (brackets and emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 20 Plaintiff has not shown a risk of attorney-client privilege breach to warrant a 21 protective order. First, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and there is no indication he is an 22 attorney or purports to bring claims on behalf of an entity or his employees. ECF No. 6 at 23 2. Rather, Plaintiff brought this case as an individual: “Plaintiff: William S. Kachele, Jr., 24 DMD, San Marcos resident operating a dental practice.” ECF No. 6 at 4. “This action 25 challenges Defendants’ scheme to deprive Plaintiff, a 40-year practicing dentist with a 21- 26 year established practice . . . of his protected property interest” in a tenancy. Id. at 2. 27 Therefore, Plaintiff has made no showing there is an “attorney-client relationship” or 28 privileged communication at stake. 1 Plaintiff argues the “Ninth Circuit has prohibited ex parte contacts with former 2 employees where privileged information is at risk, and this extends logically to current 3 employees.” ECF No. 15 at 4. However, as noted above, Plaintiff is not an attorney, 4 Plaintiff does not argue any of his employees are attorneys, and Plaintiff has not provided 5 evidence of any attorney-client relationship or privileged information at hand. Thus, this 6 argument is inapplicable. 7 Plaintiff also cites In re Coordinated Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust 8 Litigation, 658 F.2d 1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981), for the proposition “ex parte contacts 9 with former employees [are] barred if they possess privileged information” which extends 10 to current employees. ECF No. 15 at 4. However, Petroleum Products discusses current 11 and former employee communications with attorneys: 12 Although Upjohn was specifically limited to current employees, 101 S.Ct. at 685, n.3, the same rationale applies to the ex-employees (and current 13 employees) involved in this case. Former employees, as well as current 14 employees, may possess the relevant information needed by corporate counsel to advise the client with respect to actual or potential difficulties. 15 Again, the attorney-client privilege is served by the certainty that 16 conversations between the attorney and client will remain privileged after the employee leaves. Although no findings were made, it is clear that at least 17 some of the conversations referred to by the district court were made to 18 counsel for the companies in order to secure legal advice for the company.

19 Petroleum Products, 658 F.2d at 1361 n.7 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 20 Plaintiff is a non-attorney representing himself pro se and has not represented his dental 21 practice has counsel. Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown the existence of attorney-client 22 privilege regarding employee communications. 23 2. Defendant is Entitled to Conduct a Factual Investigation 24 Finally, Plaintiff’s allegation of “prejudice” in his “ability to prepare [his] case” is 25 unsupported. Plaintiff has not shown the conduct of the unspecified “Defendant” was 26 improper or warrants a protective order. An individual party is generally entitled to conduct 27 a factual investigation into the case, including interview unrepresented persons. See 28 Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997) ([A] party’s right to interview 1 || witnesses is a valuable right.”’). See also In re Bofl Holding, Inc. Securities Litigation, 318 2 ||F.R.D. 129, 135 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (discussing the “legitimate needs of defendants to 3 || conduct investigations” to prepare their defense in context of witness interview). Plaintiff 4 || fails to establish good cause to warrant the Court barring an unspecified “Defendant” from 5 || conducting interviews with non-party employees. 6 CONCLUSION 7 Plaintiff has not shown good cause for a protective order. Accordingly, the Court 8 || DENIES Plaintiff's motion for protective order. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 ||Dated: January 28, 2026 Wyble th. ea HON. MICHELLE M. PETTIT D United States Magistrate Judge

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