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William Roy Kimball v. State

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 1, 2004
Docket06-03-00236-CR
StatusPublished

This text of William Roy Kimball v. State (William Roy Kimball v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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William Roy Kimball v. State, (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion



In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana


______________________________


No. 06-03-00236-CR



WILLIAM ROY KIMBALL, Appellant

 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


                                              


On Appeal from the 410th Judicial District Court

Montgomery County, Texas

Trial Court No. 03-02-01485-CR


                                                 



Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter



MEMORANDUM OPINION


            William Roy Kimball appeals his conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI). A jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment at ten years' imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine, but placed him on community supervision for ten years. The trial court ordered that he serve 180 days in jail as a condition of community supervision.

            Kimball contends in his first point of error the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, alleging there was no reasonable suspicion for the police to have made the stop. Second, he contends the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support a conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

I.         Reasonable Suspicion for the Stop

            Kimball contends that the police did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress evidence. We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress by an abuse of discretion standard. Oles v. State, 993 S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When reviewing an appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, great deference is afforded to the trial court's decision on mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). For mixed questions of law and fact which do not fall within this category, an appellate court may conduct a de novo review of the trial court's ruling. Hernandez v. State, 957 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Hence, de novo review applies when the facts are undisputed. State v. Jennings, 958 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, no pet.). Additionally, questions involving reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 856; Singleton v. State, 91 S.W.3d 342, 345–46 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.). Finally, if the trial court's decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will uphold that decision. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56; Singleton, 91 S.W.3d at 346.

            Trooper Caryn McAnarney stopped Kimball without a warrant; therefore, the State bore the burden at the suppression hearing of demonstrating the stop was reasonable within the totality of the circumstances. See Hulit v. State, 982 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). To justify a traffic stop, the officer must have observed specific objective, articulable facts which, in light of the officer's experience and personal knowledge, together with inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonable person to believe a traffic violation had occurred. See Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 242–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Singleton, 91 S.W.3d at 346. This standard is an objective one: there need only be an objective basis for the stop; the subjective intent of the officer conducting the stop is irrelevant. Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Singleton, 91 S.W.3d at 346.

            The objective standard is based on the reasoning that a reasonable officer in the same situation would have reasonable suspicion to execute the stop and, therefore, nothing objectively unlawful would have been done. See Singleton, 91 S.W.3d at 347; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (the traffic violation itself constituted an objectively reasonable basis for the stop, so any ulterior motive on the part of the officers was irrelevant). In this case, Trooper McAnarney articulated that she observed Kimball's truck's rear license plate light was not working. Failure to have a light that illuminates the rear license plate is a traffic violation. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 547.322(f) (Vernon 1999).

            Trooper McAnarney testified that, as Kimball passed her, she looked at the side of his vehicle and noticed that his license plate light was not working. McAnarney turned off her headlights to confirm her observation. After confirming that the license plate light was not illuminated, she turned on her emergency light. When Kimball pulled over, McAnarney told him the reason for stopping him. Kimball looked at the rear license plate and responded that it was not his truck. Kimball did not claim the light was working.

            In contrast, Glenn Hoagland, the owner of the truck and Kimball's grade school friend, testified that the truck license plate light was working when he picked up the truck from the impound. Joshua Matthew Perez, a passenger with Kimball, also testified that the light illuminating the rear license plate was working. In a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Hoagland was impeached by the State when he testified that he had been with Kimball the entire night and had not seen him have a single drink. Kimball admitted to having a couple of drinks that night.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Whren v. United States
517 U.S. 806 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Garcia v. State
43 S.W.3d 527 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2001)
State v. Ballard
987 S.W.2d 889 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1999)
State v. Jennings
958 S.W.2d 930 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Singleton v. State
91 S.W.3d 342 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2002)
Oles v. State
993 S.W.2d 103 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Johnson v. State
23 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Zuniga v. State
144 S.W.3d 477 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2004)
State v. Ross
32 S.W.3d 853 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Dewberry v. State
4 S.W.3d 735 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Barnes v. State
832 S.W.2d 424 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1992)
Davis v. State
947 S.W.2d 240 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Walker v. Packer
827 S.W.2d 833 (Texas Supreme Court, 1992)
Guzman v. State
955 S.W.2d 85 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1997)
Hulit v. State
982 S.W.2d 431 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1998)
State v. Walker
679 S.W.2d 484 (Texas Supreme Court, 1984)
Hernandez v. State
957 S.W.2d 851 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1998)
Russell v. State
717 S.W.2d 7 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1986)
Clewis v. State
922 S.W.2d 126 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, 1996)

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William Roy Kimball v. State, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/william-roy-kimball-v-state-texapp-2004.